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
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William C. Graene

HARVARD STUDIES  
IN  
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

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*To*  
*William Chase Greene*

ἄλσeos ἴδρις ἐκάστου ἐν οὔρεσιν ἡδὺ παρείχες  
πῶμα μεσημερίῳ καύματι τειρομένοις.  
νῦν καὶ τῆλ' ἄμα Πανὶ χορεύσας μνήσαι ἐταίρων,  
μὴ μάλα διψῶμεν σῆς ἀγανοφροσύνης.

## PREFATORY NOTE

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J. H. FINLEY, JR.

ZEPH STEWART

PHILIP LEVINE

*Editorial Committee*

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## PUBLICATIONS OF WILLIAM CHASE GREENE

1911-1954

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THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND THE PUBLICATION  
OF THE  
*DE NATURA DEORUM*

BY PHILIP LEVINE

SCHOLARLY acumen has been liberally expended on the intricate problem of identifying the Greek sources used in Cicero's philosophical works, and the *De natura deorum* has received more than its fair share of such close analytic study.<sup>1</sup> The results gained from this sort of examination are, to be sure, not without their importance; for, insofar as they are valid, they shed much necessary light upon the history of Greek philosophy during a critical period for which contemporary testimony is fragmentary and often wholly lacking. However, concentration on such dissection almost inevitably throws Cicero's achievement into the background, since this places more emphasis upon his debt to the Greeks than upon his own contribution to the development of a *genre* in Latin literature.<sup>2</sup> Obviously the sphere in which the author could give his originality and imagination freest play is not in the ideas which he took over from the Greeks but in the literary shape which he imposed upon the philosophic discussions in which he sets forth these ideas.

In this connection the dialogue afforded Cicero a convenient vehicle of transmission, a medium which he employed to naturalize alien material and to adapt it to suit Roman requirements of propriety. He was well aware that the Roman attitude toward philosophic speculation was not the same as the Greek, and this awareness, influencing his mode of exposition, visibly left its mark on several important aspects of his dialogue form. Moreover, in a work like the *De natura deorum* a special exercise of tact was required of the author. The subject under discussion, as he himself observed, vitally concerned a fundamental part of the Roman heritage,<sup>3</sup> and for this reason, in probing the foundations of belief in the gods, he had to take particular care not to exceed the limits of discretion; otherwise he ran the risk of exposing himself to captious criticism, which he always tried to avoid. The object of the present study is to demonstrate how far and in what ways the dramatic structure of the *De natura deorum* was affected by such external considerations.

The results of this examination, supported by evidence from his other works on philosophy, will then be directed to a clearer understanding of Cicero's technique in the dialogue form and to a plausible explanation of certain problems involved in the composition and publication of the *De natura deorum*.

Two features of this dialogue at once attract a reader's notice as especially designed to appeal to a Roman audience. One is the appropriateness of the occasion chosen for the philosophic inquiry. As in the the case of the *De republica*, the discussion is represented as taking place on the Latin Festival, a time when the disputants would enjoy the requisite leisure from their public obligations to devote themselves to a serious consideration of the subject.<sup>4</sup> The other feature is the personal prominence of the main interlocutors. No reader could help but be impressed by the *auctoritas* of the Roman spokesmen for the views of the three Greek philosophic systems represented in the *De natura deorum*.<sup>5</sup> Cotta, the Academic advocate, already belonged to the pontifical college at the dramatic date of the dialogue and was, in the course of an active political life, later to become consul.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, in regard to Q. Lucilius Balbus and C. Velleius, champions of the Stoic and Epicurean schools, respectively, the author leaves no doubt as to their distinction and excellence. Balbus is described as one who *tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis ut cum excellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur*. And the Epicurean side is maintained by no less a person than a Roman senator *ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deferebant*.<sup>7</sup> Concern for the proper occasion and the right people in a philosophic discussion reflects a distinctly Roman trait which stands in striking contrast to the Greek lack of discrimination which Cicero elsewhere criticizes.<sup>8</sup>

Now in these basic elements of the dialogue, that is, the occasion and *dramatis personae* of the conversation, the writer's aim and method of presenting Greek speculation according to a Roman sense of propriety are quite manifest and easily recognizable. However, the remarkable inconsistencies and curious departures from his usual manner that are contained in the extant form of the dialogue indicate that Cicero encountered some difficulty in the detailed execution of the work. In fact, the rough state of the *De natura deorum* prompted Mayor to propose the theory that the dialogue was still unpublished at the time of the author's death and had not received final revision at his hands.<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately, the English scholar offered no reasons to account for a delay in the publication of a work

which Cicero himself described as completed.<sup>10</sup> Hence other scholars, like Schwenke and Philippson, have dismissed Mayor's idea of a posthumous edition and ascribed to mere hasty composition the evidence for an uncompleted revision.<sup>11</sup> But, as will be shown below, their outright rejection of Mayor's theory is unsatisfactory, for a close examination of the various dramatic and structural peculiarities in the *De natura deorum* reveals that, far from being isolated phenomena, they form part of a pattern and can be derived from a common origin. Moreover, it will be seen that they probably result from an underlying motive which made Cicero hesitate to give the work his *imprimatur*.

As it now stands, the entire discussion in the *De natura deorum* is arranged to occur during the course of a single day and to take place at a spot from which the interlocutors do not once stir until the adjournment at the end of the third book. This design is plainly indicated by the general structure of the work, according to which the Academic critique of the Epicurean exposition in the first book is followed, after some brief verbal play, by the Stoic account in the second book, without any sort of real break, just as the third book is closely joined to the second without a change of scene or pause in time.<sup>12</sup> However, two or perhaps three vestiges of a different dramatic scheme may still be found in the work.

The first is where Balbus, the Stoic disputant, alludes to a remark made by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius and refers to it as being a statement of the previous day.<sup>13</sup> The second trace of another plan occurs where Cotta, in similar fashion, wishing to designate part of Balbus' discourse in the second book, calls attention to what was said two days previously.<sup>14</sup> And a third hint seems to be suggested by the words of Velleius to Cotta at the beginning of the third book where he says: *spero te, ut soles, bene paratum venire*.<sup>15</sup> This remark can be taken as implying an original break of some kind between the conclusion of the Stoic disquisition and the commencement of the Academic critique. More specifically, on the basis of the evidence, it would seem reasonable to infer that the dialogue was at first so arranged that the talks of the first and second days were included in what now constitute, respectively, the first and second books, and that then apparently a day was for some reason allowed to elapse before the Academic on the fourth day proceeded in what now makes up the third book to demolish the arguments of the Stoic.<sup>16</sup> The original duration of the dialogue, then, was considerably abridged, and the survival of a few scattered traces of the earlier



scheme in the later version reflects the haste with which the abridgment was executed.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, a consideration of the entire *mise en scène* reveals other significant signs of retrenchment in the economy of the *De natura deorum*. In general, the elaboration of the dramatic setting, which constitutes an essential part of the Ciceronian dialogue, is an esthetically attractive, though sometimes briefly developed feature of the author's artistic skill. Here he is independent of his sources and can give free expression to his own experience and imagination. But the present form of the *De natura deorum* is extremely disappointing in this respect. The scene opens as Cicero enters Cotta's house, where he finds the latter already engaged in a debate with Velleius, at which Balbus is also present. Except for bare mention of the fact that Cotta is sitting *in exedra*,<sup>18</sup> not a word is said either here or elsewhere in the whole dialogue about the actual surroundings amid which the discussion unfolds. In fact, the setting is left so vague and undefined that it cannot even be determined with certainty whether the meeting takes place in Cotta's city house or country villa.<sup>19</sup>

The cause of this meager sketch of the background can be attributed with apparent plausibility to the pressure of time upon the author or to his hasty workmanship. Yet a study of Cicero's literary activity and usual practice in the period during which the *De natura deorum* was composed does not quite support this explanation. He wrote the dialogue while he was living under the same circumstances of enforced retirement from public life as when he brought out the two editions of the *Academica*, the *De finibus*, and the *Tusculanae disputationes*, philosophical works which immediately preceded the *De natura deorum*.<sup>20</sup> Now all these other writings display, in greater or lesser degree, clearly defined backgrounds with some touches of local color. Thus the conversations of the *Academica priora* were artistically situated on Catulus' estate at Cumae and in Hortensius' villa at Bauli, while those of the *Academica posteriora* were represented as taking place in Varro's house at Cumae and perhaps, as Hirzel plausibly conjectured from a fragment,<sup>21</sup> also another spot near the Lucrine Lake. Further, Cicero's villa at Cumae furnished the setting for the first two books of the *De finibus*, Lucullus' house in Tusculum for the next two, and the Academy in Athens for the fifth book. Moreover, the scenic details of the *Academica* and the *De finibus* are skillfully integrated with topical allu-

sions in the actual discussions.<sup>22</sup> In the *Tusculanae disputationes*, to be sure, the dramatic background is less fully drawn, but nevertheless the reader learns that the talks occurred in Cicero's Academy at Tusculum on the afternoons of five successive days while the two participants either sat or walked.<sup>23</sup> Even the *De divinatione*, which was written as a supplement to the *De natura deorum*, is provided with the typical specific setting, laid in the author's Lyceum at his Tusculan estate, where the two interlocutors first strolled and later sat in the library.<sup>24</sup> Hence the extremely vague background against which the discussions of the *De natura deorum* take place proves, in effect, to be a rather unique departure from his regular manner of presenting precise topical details, as illustrated in the other dialogues written during the same period and forming part of the same philosophical encyclopedia.

The preliminary verbal interchange at the start of the *De natura deorum* is very limited in extent and has almost nothing of the familiar give-and-take of general, sometimes irrelevant conversation which considerably enhances the verisimilitude of any dialogue. Directly upon his arrival on the scene, Cicero is informed by Cotta that a discussion is already in progress. The latter next points out that the leading contemporary schools of philosophy are all represented in this gathering despite the absence of a Peripatetic, if, as Antiochus argues in his book, the differences between the Stoics and the Peripatetics are mainly verbal. Then, after Balbus, as a Stoic, makes appropriate objection to Antiochus' view and Cotta brings up again the specific subject on which they were engaged, Cicero affirms his Academic freedom of decision and the Epicurean at once enters upon his harangue.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, the opening remarks fairly plunge the reader *in medias res*, for they appear to serve more a definitely conceived practical or philosophic purpose than an artistic or dramatic function. This becomes clear from the tenor of the conversation. When Cicero has Cotta attempt to justify the absence of a Peripatetic advocate, he probably means to indicate that his work contains, in fact, a complete canvass of the views held on the subject under discussion by the principal philosophic systems of his time. And, further, Balbus' rejection of Antiochus' joining the Stoics with the Peripatetics reflects, like Cicero's assertion of his independence of judgment, a typical school trait rather than a personal characterization. Thus, contrary to Cicero's usual attempt to emulate Plato's crisp brilliance in the lively opening scenes of his

dialogues,<sup>26</sup> the *De natura deorum* in its present form retains the merest skeleton of a dramatic introduction, quite devoid of local color and spontaneous conversation.

Closely related to this unusually bare *mise en scène* is the lack of variation of setting that is customary in other dialogues as large as the *De natura deorum*. As noted above, the work is now arranged to contain in its three books an account of one day's conversations.<sup>27</sup> While it is true that Cicero has written other dialogues in which a single day's discussion occupies more than one book, yet the *De natura deorum* is his only extant work in which the participants conduct during the course of one day an uninterrupted series of philosophical disquisitions extending through three books without stirring from the spot at which they first gathered. Elsewhere, so far as it can be determined from existing evidence, a dramatic pause in time or change in scene regularly occurs after a maximum of two books and often after only one.<sup>28</sup> And, significantly enough, unlike the present version of the *De natura deorum*, the original design of this dialogue must also have been in accordance with the author's normal technique in this matter since the talks were obviously distributed over several days.<sup>29</sup>

At this point it seems appropriate to determine what can be deduced from the collective evidence of the various peculiarities in the dramatic structure of the dialogue. First, there can hardly be any reasonable doubt that the work had undergone some sort of revision. To this conclusion ample testimony is provided by the few traces of an earlier plan in which the conversations were spread over several days. Moreover, the compression of the time element to a single day furnishes a clue to the kind of modification that was made. It indicates that Cicero, for reasons still to be determined, wished to reduce his original conception of the dialogue to a less elaborate form. To effect this change he obviously had to remove the dramatic apparatus that accompanied the first design. However, in view of the present structure of the *De natura deorum*, it does not appear that the revision extended much further than this mechanical excision of the previous framework with the barest minimum of adjustments made to shorten the discussion. Hence it is that the setting was left largely undefined, and that the preliminary verbal play, which might have depended, in part at least, on the local background, was pretty much restricted to the requirements of the subject at hand. Hence, too, the customary dramatic pause or variation of scene is now lacking.<sup>30</sup> Even the dramatic date of this dialogue, which



is generally placed between 77 and 75 B. C., is fixed not by specific historical allusion but only by conjecture.<sup>31</sup> In brief, the combined evidence of the various structural inconsistencies and deficiencies in the *De natura deorum* suggests that the author had made a rough, fairly mechanical modification of an earlier plan and had left the present version in an undeveloped, if not unfinished, state.

The question now naturally arises as to the possible motive or motives which prompted Cicero to strip the *De natura deorum* of its original dramatic apparatus and to leave it reduced to the skeleton framework that has been described, which deviates in certain respects from his ordinary dialogue technique. Here conjecture must come into play since the author himself nowhere mentions explicitly any revision.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, a consideration of instances where he does reveal why he has reworked a dialogue and how he has gone about it secures a valuable insight into the character of his purposes or motives for adopting or altering a particular dramatic scheme. In this connection it is informative to observe what Cicero writes to his brother in explanation of his original choice of the Heraclidean type of dialogue for the *De republica*.<sup>33</sup> In his letter<sup>34</sup> he tells Quintus that he had deliberately set back by a few generations the dramatic date in order to avoid the risk of offending any contemporary by dealing directly with current political movements. However, as Cicero mentions in the same account, the enthusiastic reaction on the part of a certain Sallustius, after he had heard the author read a completed portion of the dialogue, caused him to change his mind about the earlier date. This eager friend urged him to treat the subject in his own person, arguing that he could do so with all the greater effectiveness because of his own wide practical experience in political affairs. This suggestion, doubtless inspired by truthful flattery, strongly appealed to Cicero's vanity and persuaded him to jettison, though with some reluctance, the work so far completed on the dialogue. Accordingly, he tells Quintus that he will revise his earlier plan and make both of them, that is, his brother and himself, the participants in a discussion with a new, more contemporary dramatic setting. Yet, significantly enough, Cicero did not carry out this idea despite its compelling personal attraction, but adopted instead a modified version of the Heraclidean type which he had first contemplated.<sup>35</sup> Although he nowhere states why he had a change of heart, it is reasonable to suppose that the motivation derived in great part from the same consideration as before, when he had decided to place the dialogue in an earlier period. In other

words, Cicero was probably induced to suppress his egotistical desire to introduce himself as main speaker in the *De republica* by a strong feeling of propriety which seems to have rendered him extremely sensitive to the danger of offending living contemporaries or of exposing himself to unfavorable reaction by conducting in his own person a critical examination of traditional institutions existing in the Roman State of his own times.

Like the *De republica*, Cicero's *Academica* was also revised more than once, but the reasons for altering the dramatic apparatus were of a different order. Whereas in the former work the author was in all probability motivated to revert to the Heraclidean type because of the inappropriateness of treating the subject in a contemporary environment, the important factor which governed the first revision of this latter dialogue was the historical incongruity of the roles assigned to three of the interlocutors. It was not long after the first edition of the *Academica* had been completed that Cicero realized that his choice of Q. Lutatius Catulus, L. Licinius Lucullus, and Q. Hortensius Hortalus as leading disputants was not especially felicitous.<sup>36</sup> To amend this biographical distortion he transferred their parts to Cato and Brutus. However, this new version was never published, for just about the time it was done he was reminded by his friend Atticus that Varro much desired to be included in a dialogue.<sup>37</sup> The polymath had long sought this favor from Cicero,<sup>38</sup> and the latter saw here a splendid occasion to grant it. Hence he thoroughly revised the structure of the *Academica*, enlarging the dialogue from two to four books and assigning to Varro a leading role in it. Although the latter was ideally suited for expounding the views of Antiochus through his personal philosophic preference for them and his breadth of general knowledge, nevertheless Cicero in his correspondence with Atticus reveals considerable uneasiness about the entire matter and repeatedly inquires of his friend whether he thinks that the proper thing is being done in honoring Varro with this work. The author intimates that he has cause for grave concern about Varro's reaction, but he states that he will disclose his reasons when he meets Atticus.<sup>39</sup> He probably feared, as Reid has suggested, Varro's temper and hypercritical fastidiousness; for, as Cicero writes in a letter to Atticus, the learned scholar was a hard man to satisfy and likely to find fault even with the choice role assigned to him on the ground that his part was less eloquently presented than Cicero's own.<sup>40</sup>

However, there seems to have been an additional and perhaps

more significant reason for the writer's qualms. He wanted to know from Atticus not only whether he was sure about Varro's desire for a dialogue but also whether he thought that the *Academica* was the appropriate work with which to honor him.<sup>41</sup> This latter point is important and requires a full explanation since it is not at once apparent why the author might deem as possibly unsuitable a dialogue of which he himself thought so highly<sup>42</sup> and in which the intended recipient was to express philosophical opinions which he personally favored. The sentiments attributed to Varro at the beginning of the *Academica* seem to provide a clue to the grounds for Cicero's anxiety. When in the course of conversation the former is asked why, in view of all his philosophical training, he had so far neglected to treat the subject of Greek philosophy in his writings,<sup>43</sup> he replies that in his opinion the presentation of Greek philosophy in Latin is of dubious worth, and he offers two reasons for his belief: first, students who are really interested in the teachings of the Greeks would prefer to study them in the original, and second, those who are indifferent to Greek learning would not care for philosophy since it cannot be understood without preparation in Greek; hence in both cases, he concludes, it would be a waste of time and effort to expound Greek philosophy in Latin literary dress.<sup>44</sup> Since Cicero put these words in the mouth of a living contemporary, it is reasonable to suppose that they were meant essentially to reflect Varro's own thoughts.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, if Varro did not hold such views, Cicero would have been guilty not only of extreme tactlessness but also of unnecessary misrepresentation inasmuch as the former's statement of his attitude occurs in the preliminary part of the dialogue and does not form an integral portion of the main argument. On the other hand, if, as seems most likely, Varro did attach slight importance to the Latinization of Greek philosophy, then Cicero had ample reason to have doubts about the propriety of making such a person the recipient of or participant in a Latin dialogue on Greek philosophy. On this hypothesis it also becomes clear why the author kept insisting that the presentation to Varro be made on Atticus' responsibility, since it was his suggestion, and why he was ready to change the dramatic framework even at the last moment if his friend had any misgivings about the whole affair.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, in the dialogue itself the author evidently hoped to forestall objections from Varro by adroitly allowing him to state *sua persona* his own position. Thus the recipient would know that Cicero understood and respected his personal attitude, though he did not agree with it, and that he had no malicious

intention in dedicating such a work to him or in introducing him in it as an interlocutor.<sup>47</sup>

From this study of the two revisions of the *Academica* it can be concluded that Cicero gave much thought to the propriety of his *dramatis personae* in relation not only to their personal eminence but also to the roles which they were to play. His first alteration of the dialogue, in which he substituted Brutus and Cato for Lucullus, Catulus and Hortensius, demonstrates how easily he could become dissatisfied with his original choice of characters even after the work had been completed and published;<sup>48</sup> his final version shows how scrupulous he was about introducing a living contemporary<sup>49</sup> and how, in order to avoid misunderstanding, he afforded him an opportunity within the dialogue itself to make his personal position clear.<sup>50</sup> In brief, despite the obvious fictional nature of the dialogue, Cicero made a considerable effort to preserve a certain historical verisimilitude in his characters and to portray the interlocutors in a proper light.<sup>51</sup>

Now, if the author exercised such care in regard to the representation of others, it is not surprising to find that he was no less concerned about the role that he himself was to play. Here too the composition of the *Academica* provides some insight into his method and technique. When Atticus proposed that Cotta be introduced in the discussion with Varro in the new edition of the *Academica*, Cicero in a somewhat elaborate response flatly rejected this suggestion on the ground that if he admitted the Academic pontiff into the *dramatis personae* he would himself be a *κωφὸν πρόσωπον*, and that although in his first two dialogues, the *De oratore* and the *De republica*, he had no role because of their early dramatic date this would be at variance with his current use of the Aristotelian manner.<sup>52</sup> The vexing question whether Aristotle himself did or did not appear in any or all of his own dialogues need not be considered here.<sup>53</sup> The important point is that in the last part of June, 45 B. C., when he wrote the letter, Cicero was employing in his dialogues a manner which he described as Aristotelian with the qualification that the leading role was retained by the author himself.<sup>54</sup> In the context of the letter the phrase *ut penes ipsum sit principatus*, regardless of how it is to be applied to Aristotle, is plainly intended to contrast, by implication, Cicero's own contemporary procedure with that which he had previously followed in the *De oratore* and the *De republica* and to explain thereby to Atticus why he would not assign to Cotta the championship of the Academic views, a part which he had re-



served for himself. Indeed, except for the *De senectute* and the *De amicitia*, which are really in a class by themselves and extraneous to the philosophical corpus upon which Cicero was engaged,<sup>55</sup> all his extant later dialogues are, in fact, dramatically placed at a time when he could appropriately include himself among the *dramatis personae*. Moreover, apart from the *De natura deorum*, which forms an integral part of the corpus, the author plays an active role in the conversations contained in these works.<sup>56</sup> Hence Cicero's actual practice is seen to confirm to a large extent, if not entirely, what he explained to Atticus was his general rule of procedure with respect to his own participation in his later philosophical writings.

This manifest preference of Cicero to have a prominent position in his own later dialogues should cause no wonderment, for it was hardly to be expected of a man of his temperament to be content with standing mutely by while another advocate of the same philosophical school took the lead which he himself could hold. What is remarkable is that he did depart from his customary manner in the *De natura deorum* and allow Cotta, the very same person whom he had excluded from the *Academica*, to usurp the *principatus* in it. Here indeed the crux of the problem lies, and Cicero's role in the *De natura deorum* must now be considered. In the present version of the dialogue his comment on the schools of philosophy represented by the company on hand and his assertion of his Academic independence of judgment mark his entire contribution as speaker in the whole work.<sup>57</sup> This self-relegation to a very minor role constitutes a curious departure from his general rule of keeping the leadership *penes ipsum* in a discussion dramatically set at a time when he himself was old enough to participate actively in it,<sup>58</sup> and doubtless this fact alone would justly require an explanation.

A study of the external evidence for the composition of the *De natura deorum*, however, shows that there is further cause to suspect that something unusual had occurred with respect to Cicero's role in the work. An early indication of his plan to write this dialogue can with reasonable probability be detected in a letter to Atticus, dated June 8, 45 B. C.<sup>59</sup> In this short note, without explicitly revealing a literary project, he asks his friend to procure for him Brutus' abridgment of the *Annales* of L. Coelius Antipater and Panaetius' *περὶ προνοίας*. The significance of this request lies in the fact that of these two works almost certainly one and quite possibly both were used as sources for the *De natura deorum*.<sup>60</sup> This means, of course, that Cicero must already have had the composition of the *De natura*

*deorum* in mind when later, at the end of June, he informs Atticus in another letter that the dialogues which he is then writing have the Ἀριστοτέλειον *morem in quo ita sermo inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus*.<sup>61</sup> In other words, it is altogether likely that the author's original intention was to play a leading role in this work just as he actually did in the *Academica*, the *De finibus*, the *Tusculanae disputationes* and the *De divinatione*, writings which were all composed during the same period of literary activity as the *De natura deorum*.<sup>62</sup>

Hence it is all the more astonishing to find that, far from having the *principatus* in the *De natura deorum*, Cicero is, in fact, almost the κωφὸν πρόσωπον that he refused to be in the *Academica*.<sup>63</sup> Once the subject under consideration is taken up by Velleius, he is completely ignored by the other interlocutors save when, in the second book, Balbus, glancing at the mute spectator, announces that he will quote from Cicero's Latin version of Aratus' astronomical poem.<sup>64</sup> Nor is the reader again reminded that he was present at the discussion until the end of the third book, after the conversation itself is terminated. Here the author, speaking in his own person, brings the work to a close with a statement to the effect that Velleius thought Cotta's discourse to be truer while he himself found greater probability in that of Balbus.<sup>65</sup> Thus from a dramatic point of view it would seem that the principal justification for Cicero's appearance in the dialogue is that it enabled him to report the occurrence of the discussion with a certain air of verisimilitude.

However, the final sentence, in which Cicero voices his own sentiments on the subject, requires further examination, for in one or two respects the informal poll of opinions which it contains is so curiously inconsistent with the rest of the dialogue that it appears to have been added as an afterthought to serve some immediate purpose rather than as an integral part of the original plan. First, it should be noted that dogmatists did not enjoy the same freedom as followers of the Academy; the former were expected to toe the "party line," while the latter could legitimately hold differing views on the same philosophic question.<sup>66</sup> Accordingly, when the Epicurean Velleius is described as thinking the arguments of Cotta truer than those of Balbus, it means that he is also, in a sense, slighting his own cause and thus belying the distinguished position which he is said to have held in his school.<sup>67</sup> For however much the Epicureans differed from the Stoics in their theology, they were nevertheless in agreement with them on the fact of some sort of divine existence as demon-

strated by universal *consensus*. Thus Velleius' stated preference for Cotta's negative criticism of the Stoic arguments implies a somewhat unorthodox acceptance of the Academic denial of the validity of *consensus gentium* as evidence for the existence of the gods.<sup>68</sup> Hence, so far as Velleius is concerned, the sentiment attributed to him in the concluding sentence is not wholly consistent with the philosophic attitude which he was meant to represent in the first book of the dialogue.<sup>69</sup>

Further, Cicero also involves himself in an incongruity through the position which he takes in the vote at the end. For when, exercising his prerogative as an Academic, he says that he himself saw greater probability in the Stoic argument, he is, in fact, revealing his private verdict on the philosophic question. As an Academic he was, to be sure, entitled to do so; but this disclosure of his personal view is quite contrary to what was at least his original intention as stated in the proem. There the author earnestly deprecates the inquisitiveness of those who are curious to discover his own belief on each point. He argues that the force of reason should weigh more with those who want to learn than the authority of the teacher, who, by expressing his opinion, would hinder them from using their own judgment.<sup>70</sup> This noncommittal attitude reflects Cicero's general policy of withholding his own opinion in speculative dialogues of this sort: it constitutes, in effect, an attempt to emphasize the descriptive character of such philosophical writing, and the objectivity gained thereby better serves his purpose of acquainting his fellow countrymen with the views of the different Greek schools of philosophy.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, the palpable contradiction between Cicero's inclination at the beginning of the *De natura deorum* to suppress his own opinion and the outright revelation of it at the conclusion provides, like the inconsistency of Velleius' position, additional evidence that he probably altered, in some fashion, his original plan of the dialogue after it had been committed to writing. Moreover, since these two notable deviations from the earlier part of the work are concentrated in an isolated passage at the end, and since, as shown previously,<sup>72</sup> conspicuous structural inconsistencies and deficiencies are present throughout, it seems reasonable to suppose that, after making a not very thorough revision of the main body of the text, Cicero used especial care in phrasing the last sentence so as to have it accord with his new intention. In other words, the concluding statement probably reflects the underlying reason or reasons which prompted the author to modify his initial design.

To arrive at an understanding of this motivation, it is necessary to consider how and to what extent the final sentence affects the significance of the entire dialogue. In this connection, the explanation proposed by Pease throws considerable light on the problem. He convincingly argues that the *De natura deorum* was not meant to be a polemic against traditional religious belief, but was designed to furnish a description of different philosophic views on the subject of the gods and to illustrate Academic procedure in examining both sides of each question without dogmatic requirements. Thus, when Cicero expresses his assent to the Stoic line of reasoning, he seeks to counterbalance the inevitably negative criticism of the other Academic and to demonstrate at once his school's method of inquiry and the freedom of decision that it allows to the individual.<sup>73</sup> Accordingly, if, as this theory plausibly suggests, the author found it necessary to neutralize the excessive skepticism of Cotta's philosophic position, he doubtless was concerned with the impact that the dialogue was likely to make upon the reader. And rightly so; for in writing the *De natura deorum* Cicero must have become aware that Academic skepticism would produce a far different effect upon the Roman mind when it dealt with a matter intimately connected with divine worship than when it speculated on other topics, like epistemology in the *Academica* or the theoretical basis of ethics in the *De finibus*. In contrast to these other subjects, which, to the Roman, were more remote from immediate or practical concern, religion, founded upon a belief in the gods, was considered as important a factor in the prosperous growth of the State as any of its venerable political institutions. This was a deeply rooted conviction to which frequent testimony is found in the Latin literature of all periods.<sup>74</sup> Hence, if the Academic critique of the Epicurean and Stoic dogmatic theologies went unmitigated, the school's position could, by virtue of its negative character, be wrongly interpreted as being essentially atheistic and hostile to the very basis of this outstanding feature of the Roman heritage. Therefore, since it was surely not the author's purpose to present in an unfavorable light the philosophic system of which he professed himself an adherent, it is not difficult to understand why the concluding sentence of the *De natura deorum* was added: it constitutes a concentrated, perhaps last minute attempt to put forward the other side of the Academic coin and to redeem the school from the invidious stigma of atheism. But this vindication of the Academy was at the same time accomplished at the expense of Epicureanism. For when Cicero has Velleius subscribe to the de-



structive arguments eloquently stated by Cotta against the dogmatic theology of the Stoics, he, in effect, causes the Epicurean not only unorthodoxy to renounce certain principles of his own sect's teaching but also to prove by his acceptance of Academic skepticism that Epicurus, as was contended all along by his adversaries, *re tollit, oratione relinquit deos*.<sup>75</sup> Thus, in a very subtle way, the writer tried to shift the burden of atheism upon the school with which he himself was least in sympathy.<sup>76</sup>

These same results could equally well have been obtained if, in more characteristic fashion, Cicero had retained the *principatus* for himself, as he seems originally to have intended,<sup>77</sup> and had allowed Cotta or another to play his own minor part. Thus it becomes apparent that the vindication of the Academic position was not his sole concern when he departed from his customary practice of withholding his judgment and that a further reason must be sought to explain his unusual role in the *De natura deorum*. But to this problem too the answer seems to be implicit in the final summary of opinions when it is realized that there the author means to speak not only as an Academic but also as an individual. Whether or not the statement reflects his own true sentiments on the subject is controversial, and the question need not be treated here. What is important is the fact that, from a Roman point of view, when he intimates that he personally regarded the Stoic arguments in support of the gods as more probable, he is actually setting himself, both as an Academic and as an individual, in the most favorable light possible under the circumstances. Accordingly, for Cicero to take the stand that he does can hardly be considered a mere whim or caprice; it is rather a calculated attempt to stay on the safe side of discretion in a delicate situation. In working on the dialogue he very likely came to the conclusion that, if he adhered to what was his regular technique at the time of composition and kept the main Academic part for himself, he would run the risk of being misunderstood by some of his readers. And, in all probability, it is for this reason that the writer decided to subordinate his dramatic function. He was taking no chances even though he could have allowed himself, as, indeed, he did Cotta, the opportunity of carefully drawing a distinction between philosophic skepticism about the nature of the gods and his own willingness, as a Roman, to accept on faith the established religion.<sup>78</sup> Hence, not only the addition of the significant last sentence in the *De natura deorum* but also Cicero's curious self-demotion to a minor role in the dialogue was evidently motivated by a deep concern re-

garding the reaction of his Roman audience to the devastating attack lodged by the Academic against the theology of the dogmatic schools.

On the basis of these considerations and with the help of the knowledge gained from the study of Cicero's procedure in the *De re publica* and the *Academica*, a plausible reconstruction can now be made of the different phases in the composition of the *De natura deorum*. Thus, when the author made his original draft of the work, it is altogether probable that he had given himself the principal, and perhaps only Academic role in it. As shown above, this would be wholly in keeping with his usual practice at the time when he had already conceived the idea of writing such a dialogue.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the few surviving traces of a more elaborate dramatic apparatus occupying several days most likely belong to this first stage.<sup>80</sup> But once the work, or a draft of it, was completed, it would seem that Cicero began to have qualms about his role because of its excessively skeptical position on a subject so fundamental to a justification of Roman *pietas*. For, regardless of what his personal conviction might be, he was well aware of the political importance of upholding the ancestral belief in the gods.<sup>81</sup> To be sure, it was never his purpose to subvert that belief, yet, as he shows in the *De re publica*, he was very cautious about contemporary reaction when it came to dealing critically in his own person with traditional institutions, even on a theoretical level.<sup>82</sup>

In such a situation, if the work already done was not to be entirely wasted, Cicero's obvious recourse was to revise and alter his role.<sup>83</sup> However, whereas in the case of the *De re publica* he had the original Heraclidean plan to fall back upon and ample time to revise in detail the dramatic framework of the dialogue, circumstances were different when he was writing his philosophical works in 45-44 B. C. For during the period in which the *De natura deorum* was composed the author was engaged in feverish literary activity and apparently producing dialogues in rapid succession.<sup>84</sup> Hence he could accomplish only a limited revision, and he appears to have done this by an excision of all topical and dramatic allusions which would tend to associate the main Academic role with Cicero.\*Such procedure as this would satisfactorily explain the meager and vaguely defined *mise en scène* and the absence of the customary change of setting in the present version.<sup>85</sup>

Cicero's next and most important step would be to introduce a suitable substitute to take the part which he himself held. For the

author's purposes Cotta, who like him was known to be an Academic and a distinguished orator, was an ideal choice since he could be fitted into the dialogue with a minimum of change.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, even now much of what Cotta says about himself in the *De natura deorum* could with equal propriety have come from the lips of Cicero, for behind the pontiff's casual allusions to contemporary acquaintances, his remarks about the philosophers under whom he has studied, and his account of experiences in Greece, there looms unmistakably the figure of the writer himself.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, the laudatory references by the Epicurean and Stoic interlocutors to the felicitous union of philosophy and eloquence in Cotta may perhaps be considered as praises which Cicero had originally had bestowed upon himself since it is known that he did not hesitate to have himself eulogized to his face by other speakers in a dialogue.<sup>88</sup> On the other hand, unless it is supposed that Cicero had substituted Cotta for himself in the revision with a minimum of change or addition, it seems remarkably strange that the pontiff omits to mention an autobiographical detail in a context where it would be most appropriate for him to do so. This occurs in a passage of the third book, where Cotta, enumerating evil deeds committed by the notorious Q. Varius, alludes to the murders of Drusus and Metellus, but, curiously enough, says not a word about his own banishment in 91 B. C. brought about by that same person.<sup>89</sup> Here, of course, would have been an historical incident applicable to the pontiff alone since Cicero's exile came later and under different circumstances.

There is one important respect, however, in which Cotta as characterized in the *De natura deorum* does differ from Cicero. On several occasions within the dialogue the reader is reminded that he was a member of the pontifical college.<sup>90</sup> From the manifest emphasis laid upon Cotta's high religious office in the course of the conversation Hirzel concludes that the author meant to suggest that a theologian could be expected to deal more freely with fundamental questions of divine belief.<sup>91</sup> But however true this may have been in the case of Q. Mucius Scaevola, the older priest who divided religion into three classes, *viz.*, mythical, natural and political,<sup>92</sup> the German scholar's reasoning loses its cogency here through the fact that Cotta makes a special effort to stress that he is not speaking as a pontiff but as a philosopher; he says that as a priest he is perfectly willing to accept on faith and without question the traditional State religion based upon a belief in the gods.<sup>93</sup> Rather it would seem that the purpose of Cicero's characterization of Cotta was to illustrate by extreme

contrast that contradictory views on the subject of the gods are not necessarily incompatible in the same person if as a Roman citizen he fulfills his public obligation toward them. Thus, far from seeking to justify the Academic's skeptical views on religion by virtue of his pontifical office, as Hirzel would have it, the writer did his utmost to distinguish Cotta's philosophical position from his official and avowed personal attitude.<sup>94</sup> Paradoxical as the resulting dichotomy may seem, the introduction of a pontiff to play the main Academic role in Cicero's stead represents a brilliant and bold attempt to obtain for the negative criticism of the dogmatic theologies the objectivity necessary to satisfy the Roman audience that their own traditional religion was not being undermined; for the figure of Cotta through his high priestly function was intended to give this assurance.<sup>95</sup>

Nevertheless, even after the dialogue had been revised along the lines indicated above, the writer evidently still had lingering doubts about the reception that it would receive. His uneasiness becomes apparent at the beginning of the *De divinatione*, where Cicero has his brother remark that, after reading carefully through the third book of the *De natura deorum*, he found that Cotta's arguments against the gods shook even his own views on religious belief. Moreover, although Marcus justly protests that the Academic aim was to refute the proofs of the Stoics rather than to subvert man's faith in the gods, Quintus persists in thinking that Cotta's overzealous confutation of the Stoic theology was tantamount to an annihilation of the gods.<sup>96</sup> In allowing such sentiments to be voiced the author reveals that he well realized how the negative Academic position, despite the precautions that he took, still could be misunderstood; and hence, in characteristic fashion, he tried to blunt the edge of criticism by anticipating it. In any case, to leave no doubts about his own orthodox stand in the matter, either as writer or as *dramatis persona*, Cicero, through his brother's words, affords himself an opportunity to inform the reader once again that he himself regarded Balbus' defense of religion as nearer to the truth.<sup>97</sup>

This deep and continued concern about the effect of the skepticism in the *De natura deorum* also provides a plausible reason why he might have hesitated to release the dialogue for publication after it had been revised and essentially completed. A good parallel to such hesitancy is furnished by the author's extreme reluctance to send, on his own initiative, a dedicatory copy of the second edition of the *Academica* to Varro. There too the question of propriety was in-



volved.<sup>98</sup> In the present instance Cicero appears to have been confronted with a graver cause for anxiety, for he was probably worried that the wholly negative position of the chief Academic spokesman might be wrongly interpreted not only as aiming to subvert the traditional Roman belief in the gods, but also, in view of the fact that he was author of the work, as reflecting his own unorthodox private opinion. Indeed, the extant testimony of early Christian writers would amply support his fears that such a construction could be put upon the dialogue. Early in the fourth century, Arnobius, with an unmistakable reference to Cicero's *De natura deorum*, reveals that there were many pagans who either refused to have anything to do with his books on theology or indignantly called for their destruction by order of the Senate on the ground that they supported Christianity at the expense of the authority of traditional belief.<sup>99</sup> Similarly, Lactantius, the pupil of Arnobius, in several places speaks of the third book of the *De natura deorum* as being wholly destructive of pagan religion.<sup>100</sup> And St. Augustine, in the first quarter of the fifth century, openly accuses Cicero of hiding behind the mask of Cotta to avoid the odium that would result from his denial of divine existence.<sup>101</sup> Hence it is seen that there were very good grounds why a cautious writer like Cicero might still hesitate to give this work, even in its new form, his *imprimatur*.

As Mayor points out, the author nowhere explicitly states that the *De natura deorum* was published; in fact, it is described merely as "completed" or "existing" in two instances where other writing is mentioned as already released to the public.<sup>102</sup> In view of this and the other considerations previously discussed, it is not altogether improbable that the dialogue was at least withheld for some time from general circulation, and perhaps, as Mayor suggests, not even published while Cicero was alive.<sup>103</sup> Although there is less certainty about a posthumous edition, the English scholar was in any case on the right track. To support any theory about the delayed publication of the work, however, it was obviously not enough simply to point to the roughnesses and inconsistencies in the dialogue; for these blemishes could be readily attributed by other scholars to hasty composition.<sup>104</sup> Rather there was required a coherent explanation of the various factors responsible for the present state of the *De natura deorum* in the light of the author's usual practice and technique in this literary genre. This study, it is hoped, has provided that explanation.

## NOTES

1. See the works listed in Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* fourth edition (Munich, 1927) I 510-511; cf. also A. Lörcher in *Bursian* 235 (1932) 39-71; R. Philippson, "Die Quelle der epicureischen Götterlehre in Ciceros ersten Buche de Natura Deorum," *SymbOslo* 19 (1939) 15-40; *id.*, "Cicero, De Natura Deorum Buch II und III. Eine Quellenuntersuchung," *SymbOslo* 21 (1941) 11-38; 22 (1942) 8-39; 23 (1944) 7-31; 24 (1945) 16-47; L. Krumme, "Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie in Ciceros Schrift de natura deorum" (Diss., Göttingen, 1941); C. Vicol, "Cicerone e l'Epicureismo," *Ephemeris Dacoromana* 10 (1945) 230-266; A. di Girolamo, "Carattere e valore della ricerca storica nel discorso di Velleio nel I libro De natura deorum di Cicerone," *Giornale Italiano di filologia* 4 (1951) 43-58.

2. A vigorous protest against the narrow aims of the *Quellenforscher*, who try, in effect, to eliminate Cicero himself from his philosophical writings, is raised by P. Boyancé, "Les méthodes de l'histoire littéraire. Cicéron et son oeuvre philosophique," *REL* 14 (1936) 288; cf. also M. van den Bruwaene, *La Théologie de Cicéron* (Louvain, 1937) vii-viii. W. Süss, "Die dramatische Kunst in den philosophischen Dialogen Ciceros," *Hermes* 80 (1952) 427-436, expresses the same sentiments as Boyancé and van den Bruwaene, but he adds little else in his general, somewhat cavalier treatment of certain crucial problems in the dramatic structure of the *De natura deorum*. His announced book, *Cicero als philosophischer Schriftsteller* (Heidelberg, ?) was not available at the time of writing.

3. Cf. *N.D.* 1.3; 14.

4. Cf. *Rep.* 1.14; *N.D.* 1.15; 2.3.

5. On the importance of the position of a person in relation to his role in a dialogue, cf. Cic. *Ad Q. Fr.* 3.5.1 (with reference to the *De republica*): *hominum . . . dignitas aliquantum orationi ponderis afferebat*; on Cicero's preference for distinguished *dramatis personae* see also *Ad Att.* 13.32.3; *Academica* 2.5-6. J. S. Reid, in the introduction to his edition of *Ac.* (London, 1885) 25, aptly observes: "in the eyes of the average Roman, philosophy in itself lacked dignity, and could only be attractive when set in a Roman frame."

6. Cf. J. B. Mayor in his edition of *N.D.* 1 (Cambridge, 1880) xl-xli; Klebs in *RE* s.v. *C. Aurelius Cotta* (96), 2482-2484; T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (New York, 1952) II 96.

7. *N.D.* 1.15; cf. also 1.58. Little is now known of either Balbus or Velleius; for the former see the references collected by Münzer in *RE* s.v. *Lucilius* (20), 1640. Velleius is described as a senator in this dialogue, which is generally supposed to take place sometime between 77 and 75 B.C., but because this title is not given him in the *De oratore* (3.78; dramatic date, 91 B.C.), the inference is usually drawn (and without sufficient warrant stated as fact in the editions) that he must have been a *tribunus plebis* around 90 B.C.; cf., e.g., Mayor, *N.D.* 1, xli; A. Goethe, in the introduction to his edition of *N.D.* (Leipzig, 1887) 12; A. S. Wilkins in his edition of *De or.* (3rd ed. Oxford, 1893), on 3.78; G. Niccolini, *I Fasti dei tribuni della plebe* (Milan, 1934) 427-428; but see also Broughton, *The Magistrates*, II 474, who points out that Velleius may have been enrolled in the Senate by Sulla.

8. Cf. the words that Cicero puts in the mouth of Crassus in *De or.* 2.18: *omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt innumerabiles, haud scio an nulla sit maior quam, ut illi (sc. Graeci) solent, quocumque in loco, quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissime disputare.* Cicero's regular practice of assigning important roles to outstanding men perhaps provides an adequate reason, if one be necessary, why he preferred for the Epicurean protagonist Velleius to Lucretius, who some scholars, such as Krische and Munro, have thought could have played the part more effectively; cf. A. B. Krische, *Die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker* (Göttingen, 1840) 21; H. A. J. Munro in his commentary on Lucretius' *De rerum natura* (London, 1900) 4-5. Unlike the poet, Velleius occupied a conspicuous position in Roman public life, and however anomalous this may have been for a leading Epicurean, it nevertheless imparts a genuine Roman coloring to the proponent of a school of philosophy which Cicero himself least esteemed. On the fallacy of Munro's assumption that, if Lucretius had been alive when the dialogue was written, he might have taken the place of Velleius, cf. R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* (Leipzig, 1895) I 530, n. 1.

9. Cf. the introduction to his edition of *N.D.* 3 (1885) xxv-xxvi.

10. Cf. *Div.* 2.3; *Fat.* 1.

11. See the references cited in n. 103 *infra*.

12. *N.D.* 2.1: *Quae cum Cotta dixisset, tum Velleius, "Ne ego," inquit, "incautus, qui cum Academico et eodem rhetore congredi conatus sim . . . .";* 3.1: *Quae cum Balbus dixisset, tum adridens Cotta, "Sero," inquit, "mihi, Balbe, praecipis quid defendam . . . ."* Cf. V. Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum apparatu capita tria," *Dissertationes Philologicae Halenses* 23, 2 (1914) 180-181.

13. *N.D.* 2.73; *velut a te ipso hesterno die dictum est.*

14. *N.D.* 3.18: *quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt.*

15. *N.D.* 3.2.

16. This arrangement is essentially the one proposed by Mayor in his note on *nudius tertius* in 3.18 and by Philippson in *RE* s.v. *M. Tullius Cicero*, 1152; the latter suggests, *SymbOslo* 21 (1941) 14, that the Academic needed the extra day to prepare adequately for his criticism of the Stoic arguments. The chronological organization as outlined above especially commends itself because of its reasonableness and simplicity, although Philippson's explanation of the intervening day is mere speculation. However, scholars are not agreed on this matter, and Mayor even altered his view in the course of his commentary. In his introduction to the third book, p. xxv, he stated that the whole discussion must have occupied four days, one day for each speech, and earlier, in his note on *hesterno die* in 2.73, he surmised that the original treatise was broken up into three distinct conversations held on three successive days. This latter view is also expressed in greater detail by Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 529 and n. 3, who regards the first part of Balbus' exposition, to which Cotta refers by *nudius tertius* in 3.18, as originally intended to belong to the first day's conversation and the rest of it as occupying the entire second day. This theory squares well, to be sure, with the chronological references in the traces of the earlier design, but it requires Balbus' discourse to be broken up rather awkwardly and overcrowds the conversation of the first day, which already includes the Epicurean presentation and the Academic criticism of it. For support of his view Hirzel alludes to Balbus' wish to postpone the second half of his discourse to another time; cf. *N.D.* 2.3: *omnino dividunt nostri*

*totam istam de dis immortalibus quaestionem in partis quattuor . . . nos autem hoc sermone quae priora duo sunt sumamus; tertium et quartum, quia maiora sunt, puto esse in aliud tempus differenda.* However, since this proposal is immediately rejected by Cotta, Balbus' words may simply have been intended by the author to inform the reader that the Stoic argument is lengthy and will require more space than was allotted to the Epicurean in the first book. Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 181, also favors the supposition that the three books of the dialogue were originally designed to contain the conversations of three successive days, but he arrives at this conclusion by the arbitrary assumption that Cotta's *nudius tertius* is an error for *hesterno die*. Even more unlikely is the reconstruction proposed by I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften* (Breslau, 1928) II 146-147. He argues that Cicero originally planned for the first day to include Velleius' entire discourse and the beginning of Balbus' presentation while on the second day the latter would finish his arguments and Cotta would commence with his refutation of the Epicurean doctrine. As Heinemann himself is forced to admit, this scheme separates the Academic critique too far from its object of attack and is rightly rejected as improbable by Krumme, "Die kritik der stoischen Theologie," 26, n. 49.

17. A similar curtailment of the dramatic duration was effected in the *De republica*. Cicero planned originally to arrange the discussion so as to have it extend over a period of nine days in as many books; cf. *Ad Q. Fr.* 3.5.1. However, when the work was finally published, the conversations were reduced to only three days in six books; cf. Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* I 496.

18. *N.D.* 1.15.

19. Cf. Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 181.

20. Cf. *N.D.* 1.7; *Div.* 2.1-3 and Pease's notes; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte* I 500-506.

21. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 523, n. 1; Philippson, in *RE* s.v. *M. Tullius Cicero*, 1132, suggests that the scene of the third and fourth books may have been laid at Cicero's villa nearby the lake.

22. On the details of the setting in these two works cf. Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 178-180.

23. Cf. *Tusc.* 1.7-8; 2.9-10; 3.7; 4.7; 5.11.

24. Cf. *Div.* 1.8; 2.8; Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 180.

25. *N.D.* 1.15-17.

26. Cf. Philippson, *RE* s.v. *M. Tullius Cicero*, 1187.

27. See pp. 8-9 *supra*.

28. A survey of Cicero's dialogues in more than one book will confirm this observation.

*De oratore*: The first book contains the conversation of one morning, and the second and third books include the discussions held on the morning and afternoon, respectively, of the following day; cf. Wilkins, in the introduction to his 3rd edition of *De or.*, 6-7; Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 489, n. 2; Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 175-176.

*De republica*: Despite the fragmentary condition of the work, it is clear that its six books contained three days' conversations, two books to each day; cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 460; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte* I 496; Kiaulehn, "De



scaenico dialogorum," 176; on the earlier scheme of this dialogue, with nine books for nine days' talk, see n. 17 *supra*.

*Academica*: The two books of the first edition covered two successive days' discussions in two different settings. The first and perhaps the second book of the second edition had the scene laid at Varro's villa at Cumae; cf. *Ac.* 1.1; *Ad fam.* 9.8.1; on the conjectured site of the conversations in the third and fourth books see n. 21 *supra*. In any case, it is certain that at least a pause in time, if not a change in place, occurred between the second and third books since the latter had its own proem; cf. *Ad Att.* 16.6.4, which Reid, in the introduction to his edition of *Ac.*, 50, n. 5, uses without justification to conclude that each book of the second edition had its own proem.

*De finibus*: This work consists of three separate dialogues, each with a different dramatic date and setting and limited to a single day. Of the three conversations the first and second occupy two books each while the third is confined to one book; cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* 513-515; Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 178-179; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte I* 503; Philippon, *RE s.v. M. Tullius Cicero*, 1136.

*Tusculanae disputationes*: The five books of this writing comprise five separate discussions held on five successive days; see p. 10 and n. 23 *supra*.

*De divinatione*: This dialogue contains a single day's conversation in two books, each with a different scene; a change of some sort was virtually necessitated, if not originally intended, by the later insertion of the second proem which interrupted Cicero's rejoinder to his brother in what is otherwise plainly to be regarded as a continuous dialogue; cf. 2.8 (after the second proem): *nam cum de divinatione Quintus frater ea disseruisset quae superiore libro scripta sunt satisque ambulatum videretur, tum in bibliotheca quae in Lycio est adsedimus*; A. S. Pease, in the introduction to his edition of *Div.* (Urbana, Ill., 1920-1923) 16-17; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte I* 515; Philippon, *RE s.v. M. Tullius Cicero*, 1157.

*De legibus*: Whatever the dates of its composition and publication may be (on which see for a recent summary and discussion of the problem M. Ruch, "La question du De Legibus," *EtCl.* 17 [1949] 3-21; E. Lepore, *Il Principe Ciceroniano* [Naples, 1954] 274ff.), the dialogue was designed to occupy a single day; cf. 2.69: *pergo equidem, et quoniam libitum est vobis me ad haec impellere, hodierno sermone conficiam, sereno hoc praesertim die; video enim Platonem idem fecisse, omnemque orationem eius de legibus peroratam esse uno aestivo die*. Of the three books extant the first two are laid in different settings while the third continues that of the second book. A quotation from Macrobius, *Sat.* 6.8, shows that the lost fifth book also had a change of scene; cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* 474-475; Kiaulehn, "De scaenico dialogorum," 176-177; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte I* 499; Philippon, *RE s.v. M. Tullius Cicero*, 1119.

29. See pp. 9-10 *supra*.

30. Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* 534 and n. 4, calls the device by which the conversation is now ended a *deus ex machina*, for without previous notice of the passage of time further discussion on the present occasion is precluded by Balbus' remark to Cotta, 3.94: *sed quoniam advesperascit, dabis nobis diem aliquem ut contra ista dicamus*; for a similar ending cf. *Fin.* 4.80.

31. Cf. Mayor, in the introduction to his edition of *N.D.*, 1, xl-xli.

32. The most likely source of information would, of course, be his voluminous correspondence with Atticus, but no reference to a revision of the *De*

*natura deorum* is found in the extant collection. However, this silence does not justify any inferences to be drawn against the views here to be expressed for several reasons. First, the possibility of lost or unpublished letters must always be reckoned with. Further, since Cicero and Atticus were living at Rome during the first three months of 44 B. C., there is a wide gap in the correspondence between them during the very period in which the dialogue could have been revised; cf. R. Durand, "La date du 'de divinatione,'" in *Mélanges Boissier* (Paris, 1903) 180-182. Moreover, Cicero probably became quite cautious about revealing everything to Atticus concerning his unfinished dialogues after he had learned that the latter had released his *De finibus* without permission before it had received final correction; cf. *Ad Att.* 13.21a.1-2; 22.3.

33. For a definition of the Heraclidean form of dialogue, in which the participants are men of earlier times, see *Ad Att.* 13.19.4; Pease, in the introduction to his edition of *Div.*, 16.

34. *Ad Q. Fr.* 3.5.1-2.

35. See n. 17 *supra*.

36. Cf. *Ad Att.* 13.12.3: *ergo illam 'Ακαδημικήν, in qua homines nobiles illi quidem sed nullo modo philologi nimis acute loquuntur, ad Varronem transferamus*; 16.1; 19.5.

37. Cf. *Ad Att.* 13.16.1: *deinde quia παρὰ τὸ πρέπον videbatur, quod erat hominibus nota non illa quidem ἀπαιδευσία sed in iis rebus ἀτρεψία, simul ac veni ad villam, eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli. ecce tuae litterae de Varrone*.

38. As early as 54 B. C., when Cicero was still engaged upon the composition of the *De republica*, Atticus had proposed Varro for a role in a dialogue; cf. *Ad Att.* 4.16.2.

39. Cf. *Ad Att.* 13.12.3: *etenim sunt Antiochia quae iste (sc. Varro) valde probat*; 16.1-2: *nemini visa est aptior Antiochia ratio. sed tamen velim scribas ad me, primum placeatne tibi aliquid ad illum, deinde, si placebit, hocne potissimum*; 19.5: *aptius esse nihil potuit ad id philosophiae genus quo ille maxime mihi delectari videtur . . . sed tu dandosne putes hos libros Varroni etiam atque etiam videbis. mihi quaedam occurrunt; sed ea coram*; 22.1: *de Varrone non sine causa quid tibi placeat tam diligenter exquiro*.

40. Cf. Reid, in the introduction to his edition of *Ac.*, 34-35; *Ad Att.* 13.25.3.

41. Cf. *Ad Att.* 13.16.2 and 19.5, cited in n. 39 *supra*; also 17.2.

42. Cf. *Ad Att.* 13.13.1: *libri quidem ita exierunt, nisi forte me communis φιλαυρία decipit, ut in tali genere ne apud Graecos quidem simile quicquam*; 17.2; 19.3.

43. It is generally, and no doubt correctly, assumed that Varro's *De philosophia* and *De forma philosophiae* must have been written after the publication of the second edition of the *Academica*; otherwise, it would have been inaccurate and even downright insulting for Cicero to speak of him as having only slightly touched upon philosophy in his writing; cf. *Ac.* 1.9: *philosophiam . . . multis locis inchoasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum*; Reid's note *ad loc.*; H. Dahlmann, in *RE*, Suppl. 6, s.v. *M. Terentius Varro*, 1259-1260.

44. *Ac.* 1.4: *. . . itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent*.

45. Cicero was doubtless well acquainted with the scope of Varro's literary activity, although the latter's participation in the dramatized philosophical discussion was all a fiction, as the author openly admits in his epistle to Varro; cf. *Ad fam.* 9.8.1: *puto fore ut cum legeris mirere nos id locutos esse inter nos quod numquam locuti sumus; sed nosti morem dialogorum.*

46. Cf. *Ad Att.* 13.14(15).1: *etsi nomina iam facta sunt; sed vel induci vel mutari possunt*; 25.3: *sed quid est tandem quod perhorrescas quia tuo periculo iubeam libros dari Varroni? etiam nunc si dubitas, fac ut sciamus . . . sed etiam atque etiam dico, tuo periculo fiet; quae, si addubitas, ad Brutum transeamus*; also 35.2.

47. It is altogether possible that Varro was prompted by the challenge which this dialogue implied to undertake his later writings like the *De philosophia* and the *De forma philosophiae*; see n. 43 *supra*.

48. Cicero was unable to suppress the first edition of the *Academica*. Through a strange accident of transmission only the second book of the first edition has come down, while of the final version most of the first book and some fragments of the rest have survived; cf. Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte* I 501.

49. On the introduction of living contemporaries in the dialogues cf. *Ad Att.* 12.12.2; 13.19.3.

50. Cicero's *De divinatione* furnishes an analogous situation. His brother Quintus, a Peripatetic himself, offers the Stoic views on divination in the first book, but a chance to clarify his own position is also afforded him in the work itself; cf. 1.132, and esp. 2.100: *vere ut loquar, quamquam tua me oratio confirmavit, tamen etiam mea sponte nimis superstitiosam de divinatione Stoicorum sententiam iudicabam*; Pease, in the introduction to his edition of *Div.*, 17-18.

51. Cf. R. E. Jones, "Cicero's Accuracy of Characterization in His Dialogues," *AJP* 60 (1939) 307; M. Ruch, "Vérité historique, véracité de la tradition, vraisemblance de la mise en scène dans les dialogues de Cicéron," *REL* 26 (1948) 61-63.

52. *Ad Att.* 13.19.3-4: . . . *quae autem* (i.e. as opposed to the *De oratore* and the *De republica*) *his temporibus scripsi* 'Ἀριστοτέλειον *morem habent in quo sermo ita inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus.*

53. For a penetrating discussion of the involved problem see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, second edition (Oxford, 1948), 29ff.

54. Reid, in the introduction to his edition of *Ac.*, p. 25 and n. 4, understands Cicero to be referring to the dialogues on which he was working in or about the year 45 B.C.

55. Cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 544.

56. On the dramatic dates of and Cicero's participation in the later dialogues see Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 506-544.

57. Cf. *N.D.* 1.16-17; see p. 11 *supra*.

58. As pointed out above, p. 13, the dramatic date of the *De natura deorum* falls between 77 and 75 B.C. according to the generally accepted view.

59. *Ad Att.* 13.8; cf. the notes *ad hoc* in R. Y. Tyrrell-L. C. Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, second edition (Dublin, 1915) V 114 (#618).

60. Coelius is quoted by name in *N.D.* 2.8 and again in *Div.* 1.48; 49; 55; 56; 78. Except for an isolated reference in *Orat.* 230 on a matter of style, all Ciceronian historical citations from Coelius are limited to the *De natura deorum* and to its pendant, the *De divinatione*; cf. Pease, in the introduction to his

edition of *Div.*, 27 and nn. 129 and 137, with the references there cited. Less sure is the author's utilization of Panaetius' *περὶ προνοίας* in the *De natura deorum*; an allusion to this Stoic is made in 2.118. The scholars who have concerned themselves with the intricate problem of sources are not all agreed on this point; for a partial summary of views see Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte* I 511; cf. also van den Bruwaene, *La Théologie de Cicéron*, 101-102; Philippsen, in *RE* s.v. *M. Tullius Cicero*, 1151; *id.*, "Cicero, De Natura Deorum Buch II und III," *SymbOslo* 21 (1941) 12-13; M. Pohlenz, in *RE* s.v. *Panaetios*, 429, with the references there cited. However, for present purposes, it is not necessary to establish whether or not Cicero employed Panaetius' work directly in the *De natura deorum*. It suffices to point out that it was beyond reasonable doubt used in the *De divinatione*, which, as a sequel to it, presupposes its existence; cf. Pease, in the introduction to his edition of *Div.*, 26, and in his note on *ad Chaldaeorum* in *Div.* 2.87; Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte*, I 516.

61. *Ad Att.* 13.19.4, dated June 29, 45 B.C.; cf. Tyrrell-Purser, *The Correspondence* V 129 (#631); see pp. 16-17 *supra*.

62. If Reid, in the introduction to his edition of *Ac.*, 47, is correct in discerning an allusion to a projected *De natura deorum* in *Ac.* 2.147, which was published as early as May, 45 B.C. (cf. Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte* I 501; M. Ruch, "Apropos de la chronologie et de la genèse des *Ac.* et du de *Finibus*," *AntCl* 19 [1950] 13), then additional confirmation is had for the view expressed above that Cicero was already planning to write the *De natura deorum* when he defined to Atticus his current dialogic manner at the end of June, 45 B.C. Cf. also Krische, *Die theologischen Lehren* 12, who detects in *Fin.* 1.28 a reference to the eventual composition of the *De natura deorum*.

63. See p. 16 *supra*.

64. *N.D.* 2.104.

65. *N.D.* 3.95: *haec cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottae disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior*. The usual interpretation of these words as set forth above is effectively defended by Pease, "The Conclusion of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*," *TAPA* 44 (1913) 26-27, an excellent article to which the present writer is greatly indebted. Most improbable is the view which would regard *Velleio* as a brachylogical ablative instead of a dative and explain the sentence thus: "The discussion of Cotta seemed truer than (that of) Velleius, but to me that of Balbus seemed (even) more inclined to probability."

66. Cf. *N.D.* 1.17; *Ac.* 2.8; *Tusc.* 2.5; *Off.* 3.20.

67. Cf. p. 8 *supra*. On the rigid adherence of Epicureans to the dogmas of their school cf. *N.D.* 2.73; *nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis*; see also 1.66 and 72, with Mayor's notes; N. W. De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1954), 113-114.

68. The argument of *consensus* is used in *N.D.* 1.43-44; 46; 2.12; it is refuted by Cotta in 1.62-64; 3.8; 11; 16-17. Cf. De Witt, *Epicurus*, 255-256.

69. Cf. *N.D.* 3.65, where there is already an indication of the side that Velleius is going to favor.

70. *N.D.* 1.10; *qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est; non enim tam auctoritas in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum*



*iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum vident.*

71. Cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 533, who rightly points out that Cicero's positive expression of his own opinion in the *De natura deorum* is at variance with his practice in the earlier dialogues. In this connection, it is interesting to observe Cicero's procedure in the *De finibus*. There, in 5.76, he reserves for himself the Academic right to approve what seems probable: (addressing Piso) *sed nonne meministi licere mihi ista probare quae sunt a te dicta? quis enim potest ea quae probabilia videantur ei non probare?* But at the end, 5.95, Cicero still politely demurs: *atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus . . . quem si tenueris, non modo meum Ciceronem sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit.* On Academic ἐποχή cf. *N.D.* 1.1; *Tusc.* 5.11; 83; *Ac.* 1.45; 2.59; 68; 104; *Div.* 2.150.

72. See pp. 8–13 *supra*.

73. Cf. Pease, "The Conclusion of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*," *TAPA* 14 (1913) 33–37; *id.*, in his note on *scribis* in *Div.* 1.9.

74. See the collection of references in Mayor's note on *eorum* . . . *paruisent* in *N.D.* 2.8.

75. *N.D.* 1.123; cf. also 1.85; 87; 2.76; 3.3; *Div.* 2.40 and Pease's notes *ad loc.* Contrast Balbus' qualified approval of Cotta's arguments against Epicurean theology, *N.D.* 2.2: *eundem quidem mallet audire Cottam, dum qua eloquentia falsos deos sustulit eadem veros inducat*; cf. also 3.2, where Velleius remarks to Cotta: *iucundus . . . Balbo nostro sermo tuus contra Epicurum fuit.* There is an undeniable distinction to be drawn between Balbus' finding the *sermo* of Cotta to be *iucundus* and Velleius' thinking the Academic's *disputatio* to be *verior* in 3.95.

76. On Cicero's attitude toward the Epicureans cf. Reid, in the introduction to his edition of *Ac.*, 19 and 22; De Witt, *Epicurus*, 345.

77. Cf. pp. 16–18 *supra*.

78. Cf. *N.D.* 3.5–6. The direct appeal which Balbus makes to Cotta in order to remind him of his duty as a Roman pontifex to uphold the inherited religion was probably designed to anticipate criticism of the Academic's ambivalent role and thus to afford an opportunity for explanation in the way of a reply; cf. *N.D.* 2.168; 3.1; 4; 9–10; 15; 93; 95.

79. See pp. 16–18 *supra*. When Cicero had rejected Atticus' suggestion that Cotta be introduced in the *Academica*, it does not seem to have occurred to him that by sharing his role with the other Academic he need not have been a κωφὸν πρόσωπον. Hence Cicero probably preferred to play the Academic part alone.

80. See pp. 9–10 *supra*.

81. Cf. *N.D.* 1.61 and 118, with Mayor's notes; *Div.* 2.28, with the references in Pease's note on *rei publica causa*; W. Kroll, "Die Kultur der Ciceronischen Zeit, II," *Das Erbe der Alten*, 23 (1933) 1–2.

82. See pp. 13–14 *supra*.

83. For Cicero's reluctance to abandon part of a work that he had already written cf. *Ad Q. Fr.* 3.5(6).2, regarding the *De republica*.

84. Cf. the often quoted remark which Cicero himself made about his rapid productivity, *Ad Att.* 12.52.3: ἀπὸ γράφα sunt, *minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero quibus abundo.* For a proper qualification of Cicero's understatement of his own contribution see A. Goedeckemeyer, *Die Geschichte des Griechischen Skeptizismus* (Leipzig, 1905) 138, n. 8.

85. See pp. 10 and 11-12 *supra*.

86. As already mentioned, Atticus had once proposed Cotta for a role in the *Academica*, in the composition of which the author's facility in changing the *dramatis personae* is well illustrated; see pp. 14-16 *supra*.

87. Cf. *N.D.* 1.59; 79; 93; 123; 3.74. Only in 1.79 (*Q. Catulus, huius collegae . . . pater*) and in 3.80 (*avunculus meus . . . P. Rutilius . . . sodalis meus . . . Drusus*) does Cotta use terms of relationship or association not strictly applicable to Cicero. But even in these cases, with a slight omission or modification of the terms, the writer could appropriately have referred to the same individuals *sua persona*, as, in fact, he does elsewhere; cf. Mayor's notes *ad locc.*

88. Cf. *Leg.* 1.5. The combination of philosophy and eloquence constituted a high ideal which was always present in Cicero's mind and of which he evidently liked to imagine himself as the embodiment; cf. *N.D.* 2.1-2; 147; 168; *De or.* 1.95; 3.142; *Orat.* 12; *Tusc.* 1.7; *Div.* 2.4; *Fat.* 3; *Off.* 1.2-3; 156.

89. Cf. *N.D.* 3.81, with Mayor's note; see also *De or.* 3.11, with Wilkins' note; Goethe, in the introduction to his edition of *N.D.*, 13.

90. Cf. *N.D.* 1.61; 2.2; 168: 3.5-6; 94.

91. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 532.

92. Cf. St. Augustine, *C.D.* 4.27; 6.5.

93. Cf. *N.D.* 1.61; 3.5-6; 9; 43; Pease, "The Conclusion of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*," *TAPA* 14 (1913) 29, n. 24.

94. Cf. especially *N.D.* 3.95, where Cotta, after delivering his devastating attack against the Stoic arguments, says: *ego vero et opto redargui me, Balbe, et ea quae disputavi disserere malui quam iudicare, et facile me a te vinci posse certo scio*. This is more than just a courteous utterance: Cicero wished to point out that the attitude of Cotta the Roman citizen and pontiff was different from that of Cotta the Academic philosopher.

95. On Cicero's attempt to forestall adverse reaction to Cotta's position and to emphasize its purely theoretical character see p. 21 and n. 78 *supra*.

96. *Div.* 1.8-9.

97. *Div.* 1.9: *satis . . . defensa religio est in secundo libro a Lucilio, cuius disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo tertio scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensior*. Cf. also Cicero's own words in *Div.* 2.148, after his relentless assault against divination: *nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. nam et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam et eam suspiciendum admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri*.

98. See pp. 14-16 *supra*.

99. *Ad nat.* 3.7; cf. C. Koch, "Der altrömische Staatskult im Spiegel Augusteischer und spätrepublikanischer Apologetik," in *Convivium. Festgabe für Konrat Ziegler* (Stuttgart, 1954) III.

100. Cf. *Div. inst.* 1.17.4; 2.3.2; *De ira* 11.9; F. Fessler, *Benutzung der philosophischen Schriften Ciceros durch Lactanz* (Leipzig, 1913) 19 and 25.

101. Cf. *C.D.* 5.9 in *init.*: *vidit . . . quam esset invidiosum et molestum, ideoque Cottam fecit disputantem de hac re adversus Stoicos in libris de deorum natura et pro Lucilio Balbo, cui Stoicorum partes defendendas dedit, maluit ferre sententiam quam pro Cotta, qui nullam divinam naturam esse contendit;*



*ibid. ad fin.*: . . . esse Deum negat, quod quidem inducta alterius persona in libris de deorum natura facere molitus est; see also 4.30.

102. Mayor, in the introduction to his edition of *N.D.*, 3, xxvi; cf. *Div.* 2.3: *quibus rebus* (i.e. philosophical works previously mentioned) *editis tres libri perfecti sunt de natura deorum*; *Fat.* 1: *quod autem in aliis libris feci, qui sunt de natura deorum, itemque in eis quos de divinatione edidi . . . id in hac disputatione de fato casus quidam ne facerem impedivit*; see also *Div.* 1.7; 8, with Pease's note on *perlegi*; 9; 117; 2.148; O. Plasberg, in the preface to his *editio minor* of *N.D.*, revised by W. Ax (Leipzig, 1933) iv.

103. Cf. Mayor, *loc. cit.* His theory, which found favor with Plasberg, *loc. cit.*, was rejected by P. Schwenke, "Bericht über die Literatur zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1884–1886," *Bursian* 47 (1886) 284; cf. also Philippson's review of Plasberg's *editio minor* of *N.D.*, first edition (Leipzig, 1917) *BPW*38 (1918) 410; *id.*, in *RE* s.v. *M. Tullius Cicero*, 1151–1152; *id.*, "Cicero, De Natura Deorum Buch II und III. Eine Quellenuntersuchung," *SymbOslo* 21 (1941) 14. Schwenke and Philippson deny that Cicero intended to make any such distinction between the completion of the *De natura deorum* and the publication of other works, as Mayor infers from the passages quoted in the preceding note. Yet it must be admitted that Cicero was remarkably consistent in all his allusions to this dialogue in the *De divinatione*, using words that imply no more than that it was written; cf. the references in the preceding note. Schwenke deems it inconceivable that the *De divinatione* could have been issued before the *De natura deorum* since the former dialogue was designed as a supplement to the latter, while Philippson thinks it hardly likely that Cicero would refer in the *De divinatione* to the *De natura deorum* if the latter had not been published. To these objections it may be replied that Cicero perhaps intended eventually to publish the two dialogues together after the *De divinatione* was finished. Moreover, it is by no means certain that Cicero was himself responsible for the publication of the *De divinatione*; cf. W. Sander, "Quaestiones de Ciceronis Libros quos scripsit de Divinatione" (Diss., Göttingen, 1908) 1–6 (see, however, D. Heeringa, "Noch einmal de Divinatione," *Philologus* 68 [1909] 560–568); W. A. Falconer, "A Review of M. Durand's La Date du De Divinatione," *CP* 18 (1923) 310–327; W. Ax, in the preface to his edition of *Div.* (Leipzig, 1938) v.

104. Cf., e.g., the articles of Schwenke and Philippson cited in the preceding note. A final bit of evidence in support of the theory of a posthumous publication of the *De natura deorum* may perhaps be derived from the conflicting testimony for the title of the work itself. The inscriptions and subscriptions of the better manuscripts give *De deorum natura*, which is the form used also by certain grammarians, St. Augustine and others; cf. Plasberg, in the preface to his *editio minor* of *N.D.*, revised by Ax, iii, n. 1. *De natura deorum* is the title that Cicero employs when he himself refers to the work; cf. *Div.* 1.7; 8; 2.3; 148; *Fat.* 1; see also for the order of words *N.D.* 1.34; 41; 123; *Div.* 1.110; 117. Except for Birt, scholars since the time of Vahlen have generally agreed that the latter is the proper title; see the references given by Pease in his notes on *de natura deorum* in *Div.* 1.7 and 2.148. Since the manuscript evidence so strongly favors a title different from that which the author himself used of the dialogue, it would seem a plausible conjecture that this title was affixed to the work when it was prepared for publication by

some one other than Cicero. The writer had, as Tolkiehn rightly points out, a personal preference for the order *De natura deorum*; cf. J. Tolkiehn, "Der Titel der ersten religionsphilosophischen Schrift Ciceros," *PhW*42 (1922) 477-479. On the other hand, an indifferent editor might well have been inclined to adopt the other order which corresponds to titles like *De agri cultura* and *De rerum natura*.

## THE EXEGETES OF ATHENS: A REPLY

BY HERBERT BLOCH

IN a recent issue of the *American Journal of Philology*, Professor James H. Oliver attacked my treatment of the problem of the exegetes of Athens which previously had been published in that same periodical.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of my study was to reëxamine the question whether official exegetes existed in Athens during the fifth century. Up to a few years ago, this had been generally accepted as a fact, and so it had been by Jacoby in his *Atthis*. In other words, not until recently had it been a "problem" at all. It became a controversy only in 1950, when Professor Oliver in his book *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* set out to prove that the official exegetes of Athens were created only after 403 B.C., in the course of the revision of the laws of Solon.

Oliver's article has not caused me to change my stand in this matter. Moreover, Martin P. Nilsson, who had first accepted Oliver's theory,<sup>2</sup> in the second edition of his monumental *History of Greek Religion* virtually withdrew his former support, commenting on my paper that I "probably correctly regard the exegetes as more ancient [than Oliver does]." <sup>3</sup> Jacoby, too, has expressed in detail his agreement with my criticisms in the Addenda to his commentary on the *Atthidographers*.<sup>4</sup>

Under these circumstances, it would seem futile to return to the problem once more, were it not for the unfounded statements and allegations with which Oliver's article abounds and which are couched in so offensive a language that to remain silent could be misconstrued as acquiescence on my part.

After rereading repeatedly my article, I have been unable to find anything in it that could justify the venom of Oliver's response, unless dissent in itself is regarded sufficient cause for abuse. It ought to be stressed therefore at the outset of this reply that my study was written in connection with a review of Jacoby's *Atthis*, of which it originally had formed a part. It was published separately at the suggestion of the editor of the *American Journal of Philology*. To do justice to Jacoby's views, it seemed to me necessary to examine Oliver's thesis, which dealt with one of the crucial problems treated

in Jacoby's *Atthis* and yet came to completely different results. To quote from my earlier paper (p. 407): "As a compromise between Oliver and traditional opinion, now best represented by Jacoby, is patently impossible, a re-examination of the issue is all the more called for because neither author had an opportunity to make use of the arguments of the other and no reviewer of either book has been able or willing to perform this task."<sup>5</sup>

Oliver takes issue with my calling "famous" Wilamowitz' thesis of a preliterate chronicle of Athens kept by exegetes; he points out that "others have expressed surprise at the polemical tone of the attack [*sc.* upon this theory by Jacoby] and at the amount of ammunition fired at this theory, usually forgotten or ignored."<sup>6</sup> While it is amusing to see Oliver upset about the polemical tone of anyone, the implications of his statement deserve special notice: Jacoby is first upbraided for his polemical tone in attacking Wilamowitz' theory and then taken to task for not "ignoring" it altogether, as if ignoring great scholars' opinions were a commendable method.<sup>7</sup>

As for the "tone" objected to by Pearson and Oliver, it may be in order to quote Jacoby's pertinent remarks which he made when, about the same time, he challenged, in my opinion convincingly, Wilamowitz' treatment of Pherekydes:<sup>8</sup> "I could have wished that somebody else had undertaken the task [*sc.* the planned investigation]. For in view of the friendliness with which Wilamowitz judged my attempt of an edition of the remains of the Athenian Pherekydes [*FGrHist* 3], even when differing on fundamental questions, my rather violent criticism of his treatment may seem churlish. I comfort myself with the principle which was the lodestar of Wilamowitz' own life-work: *amicus Plato, magis amica veritas.*"

If I called Wilamowitz' theory famous, C. Hignett recently employed the same epithet in referring to this thesis: "Wilamowitz sought a way out by his famous assumption . . ."<sup>9</sup> When, sixteen years ago, K. v. Fritz wrote an article "Atthidographers and Exegetae,"<sup>10</sup> its very title suggested Wilamowitz' thesis as a background. R. Laqueur, in the most important modern treatment of local historiography before Jacoby's *Atthis*, dealt with this theory extensively.<sup>11</sup> And most recently G. T. Griffith in his highly useful survey of the literature on Greek historiography rightly said:<sup>12</sup> "Especially misleading had been an original assumption which passed unquestioned for many years, that it [*sc.* Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia*] derived information ultimately from an ancient priestly chronicle (of *Exegetae*) comparable to those at Rome and summarised



by an entirely unknown writer about the year 380." Wilamowitz adhered to this theory also in later years<sup>13</sup> and Beloch's rejection of it<sup>14</sup> is not much more than a statement of opinion. Anyone as seriously concerned with the problem of the origin of local historiography as Jacoby<sup>15</sup> had not only the right but the duty to take a position on Wilamowitz' thesis, which never had been refuted. That, on the other hand, historians not primarily interested in the development of Greek local historiography, like the authors of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, mentioned by Oliver,<sup>16</sup> did not discuss Wilamowitz' thesis seems natural (how could one, incidentally, seriously discuss the question, without having at his disposal the material collected in *FGrHist* III B?). Such an omission cannot serve as a touchstone of its "fame," just as the fact that Oliver treated the Constitution of Draco in the fourth chapter of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* as genuine, without as much as a hint of the existence of a debate (which had come to the opposite conclusion), does not prove that this latter debate was not "famous."<sup>17</sup>

In my article I declared (p. 407) that "Jacoby based his discussion of this theory [of Wilamowitz] on a very thorough examination of the whole evidence on the admittedly most difficult problem of the exegetes." Oliver now lists (p. 161) thirteen inscriptions which he had presented to the reader, and Jacoby had not. I was fully aware of this fact when I wrote the sentence objected to and see no reason to modify it. For none of these inscriptions contributes anything new to the solution of the problem with which Jacoby and I were concerned, to wit the problem of the creation of the exegetes. In addition, Jacoby had expressly said at the outset of his list:<sup>18</sup> "We present the material arranged in groups, the selection and sequence of which is not in need of justification." Furthermore, leaving aside *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 901,<sup>19</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 2342 and 3708 were referred to by Jacoby,<sup>20</sup> so that the number is actually reduced to ten. Of these, three are evidently so unimportant that even Oliver himself did not mention them outside his catalogue (*IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 3525, 5875; *Hesperia*, XVI [1947], p. 170), and five others figure solely in the three lists of exegetes given by Oliver on pp. 35-37 and 44 of his book.<sup>21</sup> All these exegetes belong to the Empire; most of them are later than the reign of Antoninus Pius. Without questioning the value of assembling this material and using it to elucidate the history and prosopography of Imperial Athens, as Oliver has done so well, we may simply say that such an investigation did not fall within the scope of Jacoby's work.

In discussing the literary evidence for the fourth century B. C., Oliver had not taken into consideration a passage in Plato's *Euthyphro* (9A) which was briefly mentioned by Jacoby and then referred to by me (p. 413) to challenge Oliver's opinion that early in the fourth century there did not exist a board of exegetes, although he had admitted, on the basis of Pseudo-Demosthenes, XLVII. 68-71, the existence of such a board about the year 357/6 B. C.

Oliver now, while avoiding any discussion of this passage in the *Euthyphro*, and without apparently noting what scholars of Plato have had to say about it, regards the plural used by Plato as a "generalizing plural," and calls our explanation as an ordinary plural "strained." He charges us (in italics, to call special attention to the grossness of our "error") with "trying to tell" our "readers that a plain reference to 'the exegete' is a collective singular" (p. 164). It is therefore necessary to examine more closely the passage which hitherto has neither been controversial nor now should reasonably have become such.

Euthyphro meets Socrates just before his trial, while he himself is on the way to start a law suit against his own father. The reason for this unusual action may be stated in the words of Jowett:<sup>22</sup> "A poor dependant of the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro's father, who sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the messenger came back, the criminal had died from hunger and exposure."

In 4C, Euthyphro, in reporting the case, says that his father, after binding the slayer, "sends a man to Athens to inquire from the exegete (πενσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ) what he should do." In the meantime, the murderer dies from neglect, "before the messenger had returned from the exegete" (παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ). In 9A Socrates questions the criminal nature of the action of Euthyphro's father by saying: "Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me for my enlightenment, what proof do you have that all the gods deem the death of that man unjust, who, though a dependant, had become a slayer and was bound by the master of the slain man, and died as a result of his bonds before he who had bound him had learned from the exegetes (παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν) what he should do." Every translator and commentator of the *Euthyphro* known to me has given the natural interpretation of this passage as presented here, e. g., B. Jowett, W. A. Heidel, M. Croiset, H. N. Fowler, and L. Cooper. While it is per-



fectly understandable for Euthyphro to use the singular even if a board existed, especially if, as is likely, each exegete could be consulted individually, the usage of the plural by Socrates in the second passage would be grammatically impossible if it were to signify a singular.<sup>23</sup> The two passages must be brought into conformity because they refer to exactly the same event. Our traditional interpretation of the passage in the *Euthyphro* is in complete harmony with the case of Pseudo-Demosthenes already mentioned, which, moreover, deals with a very similar problem.

One further comment may be made here in connection with Oliver's theory that the exegetes of the fourth century were the "successors" of the "chresmologoi and/or manteis" of the fifth. I had pointed to the coexistence of manteis and exegetes in Theophrastus and Plato's *Laws* as an argument against this theory, and Pritchett in a review of Oliver's book which appeared after my paper had been submitted took practically the same view.<sup>24</sup> Oliver charges me now (p. 165, n. 9) with ignoring his position "that the exegetes and manteis of the fourth century were quite distinct and official and that they replaced the undefined, unofficial activity of politicians of the fifth century who passed for chresmologoi and/or manteis." It has been overlooked, apparently, that Plato presents Euthyphro as a mantis (3E) who was wont to foretell the future in the assembly and incurred ridicule from the people in doing so (3B-C): καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου. Assuming, as seems fair, that Plato intended to give a more or less realistic picture when he chose a mantis to represent a bigot (who only in the subtlety of Plato's satire differs from Hierocles and other seers and religious humbugs in Aristophanes and Old Comedy), we find that various questions arise, as the *Euthyphro* dated in 399 B. C. is to Oliver the *terminus ante quem* for the introduction of the exegetes.<sup>25</sup> Was Euthyphro demoted or promoted in or shortly after 403? Why was he ridiculed by the populace like an old-fashioned "chresmologus and/or mantis" even after having become an "official" mantis through the reform of 403? Why did Euthyphro's father not consult his son rather than the exegete if this son until 403 had exercised, however "unofficially," the functions of an exegete? Why does Euthyphro accept as a matter of course the consultation of the exegetes by his father, if they had just usurped functions which he himself used to exercise? It seems that the situation in the *Euthyphro* is a complete confirmation of Pritchett's observation in his review: <sup>26</sup> "There are no functions

specifically mentioned in the literature as belonging to the *manteis* which exegetai need be assumed to have appropriated."

Oliver himself had listed the duties which Plato attributed to the exegetes in the ideal state of the *Laws*.<sup>27</sup> Among them Plato mentions what to do after the killing of a slave — the case of the *Euthyphro* (*Laws* IX. 865 C-D). The necessary purifications should be, he says, in the hands of the exegetes (865D): τούτων δ' ἐξηγητὰς εἶναι κυρίους οὓς ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλῃ. Is it not most likely that the aged Plato when he wrote these words remembered the situation in his earlier dialogue? Here as elsewhere when he speaks of the duties of the exegetes, Plato can be checked by the fourth century occurrences of exegetes.<sup>28</sup> Already Schöll had concluded that Plato's pertinent suggestions were based on existing law.<sup>29</sup> Hence it would not be astonishing if the formula by which Plato characterizes the exegetes ordained by Apollo should also prove to be borrowed from the law. This was precisely what Schöll discovered in his masterly treatment of the Prytaneion Decree (now *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 77). There among the groups of men to be honored with maintenance in the Prytaneion was one of men whom ]ν *ho* Ἀπόλλων ἀνῆλ[ε]ν ἐχ[σ]εγομε[νος and in which he recognized the exegetes.<sup>30</sup> Schöll's supplement ἐξηγητὰς with varying restorations of other lacunae in the lines in question was accepted by epigraphists and historians, until Hiller von Gaertringen in his edition of this inscription in *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 77 did not limit himself to replacing it by a poor conjecture of his own in the text but, contrary to all sound editorial technique, ejected Schöll's restoration even from the *apparatus criticus*, and this in a volume with the inherent authority of the *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions*. Hiller's attempt to silence the previously held opinion failed. He was immediately corrected by Preuner, and such scholars as Wade-Gery and Jacoby returned — with modifications — to Schöll's solution.

It was left to Oliver to resume Hiller's reading, which became a kind of bulwark to his whole theory of the late origin of the official exegetes. In my article (p. 417) I had taken exception to Oliver's failure to refute Schöll's main argument, the analogy in Plato, an argument which was bolstered by the occurrence of the same formula in the decree of Philoxenos, *IG* I<sup>2</sup>, 78, 3-5 (τῷ [Ἀπόλλωνι θύσαι, ἐπ]εἰδὲ ἀνείλεν ἑαυτὸν ἐχσεγετῆ[ν γεγόμενον Ἀθηναί]οις, θρόνον τε ἐχσελὲν ἐν τῷ πρ[υτανείοι). Oliver in his latest article repeatedly (pp. 164, 170, 174) terms Schöll's solution a "fantastic interpretation" or "restoration," and finally goes so far as to say (p. 173): "Bloch's attempt to pass off a mere parallel as an imposed restoration may seem only a

remarkable piece of blindness, but it is undeniably an offense against epigraphical method." While it is customary to charge with blindness those who fail to see something that others have noticed, Oliver reverses the procedure in upbraiding me for seeing something which he had failed to see. Even so, in fairness to those who have preceded me, I must decline the honor of being singled out in this manner, but rather I should share the distinction with Schöll, Persson, Preuner, Wade-Gery, Jacoby, and others.

One would expect, under the circumstances, at least one persuasive argument against this "remarkable piece of blindness." But what Oliver has to offer amounts to this:

(1) "The phrase Ἀπόλλων ἀνείλεν occurred, of course, very frequently, and the verb was usually not followed by a reference to exegetes" (p. 170). He suppresses the fact that here ἀνείλεν is followed by a form of the verb ἐξηγεῖσθαι.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, once one accepts, as all scholars including Ostwald<sup>32</sup> do (except Hiller and Oliver), that after κατὰ τὰ δεδομένα a new group begins, there remains no other possibility but to place an object to ἀνείλεν in the lacuna of l. 9, as also Ostwald admitted. The object is provided by the "formula" of the Plato passage and of IG I<sup>2</sup>, 78. For a formula it is, as E. Preuner insisted with particular clarity in his critique of Hiller's text:<sup>33</sup> "One cannot be allowed to doubt that Schöll, on the basis of Plato, Laws IX. 865D (quoted), rightly recognized in l. 9 [of IG I<sup>2</sup>, 77] the same formula ('die gleiche Formel')." Oliver went out of his way to deny precisely that, when he held up to me the example of Louis Robert (for whom I have, needless to say, the greatest respect) (p. 170): "Sometimes a restoration can be treated as an ascertained fact, but then it must be the kind of restoration Louis Robert makes so carefully, *a restoration based on recognition of an imposed formula. That is not the case here.*" (The italics are mine.)

(2) The accusative ἐχ[σ]εγομέ[νος] bothers Oliver because it follows closely upon the nominative Ἀπόλλων. This objection is not decisive, as Ostwald's reconstruction shows which accepted the nominative of the participle. Grammatically, the accusative is in order: cf. Plato, Rep. IV.427C οὗτος . . . ὁ θεὸς . . . ἐξηγητῆς . . . καθήμενος ἐξηγείται with Schöll's reading (modified) . . . ἐχσεγομάς . . . .]ν ἡ Ἀπόλλων ἀνῆλ[ε]ν ἐχ[σ]εγομέ[νος].

Incidentally, it is untrue that, as Oliver maintains (p. 173), I presented "as obligatory restorations" any particular reconstruction of lines 7-11. I did not and do not exclude the possibility that eventually a solution may be found which, while preserving the tra-

ditional interpretation of these lines, may be in some detail more satisfactory than any previous restoration.

(3) Oliver's argument that the exegetes do not appear in the lists of the *aisitōi*, which are preserved from the second half of the second and from the third centuries of our era, must be discarded as of no value. For neither do two other undisputed groups of *aisitōi* which figure in the Prytaneion Decree—namely the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton and the victors in the great games—appear in the lists of the *aisitōi*, an observation already virtually made by Schöll in 1872.<sup>34</sup> The lists contain only the Eleusinian priests and certain officials, mainly connected with the Prytanes.

IG I<sup>2</sup>, 78 requires a few additional remarks. That the language in l. 4 is analogous to the Platonic passage has never been denied. And yet Oliver suggests now (p. 168) a new restoration on the basis of a decree of 129/8 B. C. in honor of the Pythian Apollo,<sup>35</sup> which seems to me extremely doubtful, as it implies the interpretation of *exegetes* as "helper." Particularly if viewed against the background of the Peloponnesian War, such a declaration of all-out support for the Athenians on the part of the god committed to the other side would be a far cry from Daux's cautious and convincing remark about "relations normales" between Athens and Delphi during the war.<sup>36</sup> It still seems to me most likely that the god declared that he himself would be interpreter of religion to the Athenians, as Oliver also had tentatively suggested,<sup>37</sup> and this is what he is called by Plato in the famous passage already referred to, *Rep.* IV. 427C (*supra*, p. 43): οὗτος γὰρ δῆπον ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητὴς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται.

Ever since the inscription was published by Sboronos, l. 5 has been read as given above (p. 42). Hiller also in the Corpus volume accepted this reading, although he by no means slavishly followed the restorations of the *editio princeps* and although he eliminated the exegetes from the Prytaneion Decree. Oliver comments on this situation as follows (p. 169): "Now Bloch tells the reader on p. 417 . . . that this inscription specifies that a seat be reserved for the god in the Prytaneum. He does so because he has uncritically accepted a restoration by Sboronos, who had no evidence." Not a word that this has been the generally approved unanimous reading. Since the beginning of line 6 is lost, the exact connection between the first and second part of the preserved portions of the inscription cannot be established and the traditional restoration has not been refuted. Its plausibility is enhanced by a striking analogy of gods being en-



tertained in the Prytaneion, an analogy which apparently has not been used to illustrate this inscription: we know from the *Ptochoi* attributed to Chionides, but probably written during the second half of the fifth century, that the Dioscuri were dined by the Athenians in the Prytaneion.<sup>38</sup>

Oliver continues: "On top of this error Bloch misinterprets the meaning of the word ἐχσεγετέ[ν. It is not at all 'obvious' from this inscription that a plurality of pythochrestoi exegetes 'were already enjoying' public maintenance in the Prytaneum, as Bloch concludes." Here one stops and ponders: the second part of my article deals with the question whether the exegetes received public maintenance according to the terms of the Prytaneion Decree. With the overwhelming majority of scholars I came out in favor of this assumption. In commenting in this context on the later inscription *IG*, I<sup>2</sup>, 78, I said (p. 417): "Not less suggestive is the request in the same inscription that a seat be reserved for the god in the Prytaneion, obviously in his quality as exegete, and obviously because it was there that the officials ordained by him were already enjoying—in human terms—this very honor. By declaring himself exegete of the Athenians, he joins the exegetes ordained by him and partakes symbolically in their privileges [*sc.* conferred on them in the Prytaneion Decree]." It is unfathomable to me how so clear a reference (now indicated in brackets) could escape anyone, and how Oliver could make so odd an accusation.

There are many other curious passages where I am charged with various misdemeanors, e.g., on p. 171: "It must be pointed out that in a very careful and scholarly investigation M. Ostwald considered what I had to say, as Bloch does not, and then rejected my opinion." I had said (p. 415): "As Ostwald, a close adherent of Oliver's views about the official exegetes, has already rejected these restorations with good reasons, it will suffice to refer to his treatment."

Oliver, p. 165, n. 9: "Nor can I take the space to show that phrases like 'dealt with convincingly' have a purely personal meaning when used by Bloch." This refers to a passage where I had endorsed Martin P. Nilsson's rejection of the identification of chresmologoi and manteis by Oliver, contributing an additional argument (p. 408 and n. 8). Nilsson's rejection of Oliver's theory has also been accepted by Hanell and Jacoby.<sup>39</sup>

I am said to have attacked Oliver's reconstruction of the Prytaneion Decree "chiefly with an appeal to prejudice and with a

gratuitous interpretation of [his] motive" (p. 172). What is meant by "prejudice," I do not know and do not understand. When I said (p. 415) that the elimination of the exegetes was for Oliver "naturally a *condicio sine qua non*," this was a sober statement of fact, inasmuch as the Prytaneion Decree belongs to the fifth century and an appearance of the exegetes in it would have demolished Oliver's thesis that the exegetes were introduced about 403. Oliver himself uses the same type of phrase (p. 170): "an interpretation which, of course, would do away with the exegetes whom Jacoby and Bloch wish to save."

The main issue in the controversy was and is whether an ancient (or medieval) institution can be assumed to have come into existence only when it is first mentioned in a source. I had pointed to the Arval Brethren as an example (p. 411). We know them to be a very ancient priesthood, and yet they are mentioned for the first time anywhere by Varro in the second half of the first century B. C. in a casual reference, in spite of the fact that we have two detailed fully preserved accounts of early Roman history by men with strong antiquarian interests, Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, accounts which could well be compared in fullness with Philochorus' *Atthis*. This is what Oliver has to say in reply (p. 164): "but as far as I know there is nothing comparable to the Hymn of the Arval Brothers to make me accept a dream about three pythochrestoi exegetes in the time of Solon." What a strange twisting of my argument! The Carmen Arvale, one of the oldest documents of the Latin language, is preserved in the minutes of the Brethren of 218 A. D. under the Emperor Elagabal. The inscription was discovered in 1778. Before 1778 then, I take it, it would have been sound to assume that the priesthood of the Arval Brethren was created by Caesar, shortly before Varro's testimony, just as we should be compelled to believe that the exegetes of Athens only came into being shortly before 399 B. C., because it was in that year that they were (allegedly) mentioned for the first time.

What I wished to emphasize by my reference to the *fratres Arvales* is that here there exists late but incontrovertible evidence of the great antiquity of a cult which throughout half a millennium had left no trace of its existence. But this whole argument for some reason escaped Oliver,<sup>40</sup> as did also the argument about the fallacy of relying "on Roman evidence for reconstructing in detail an institution of Plato's Athens" (p. 412). The indignant protest (p. 163, n. 6): "He argues as if I thought of institutions as static, whereas



my whole book . . . is a study of the change of institutions," is refuted by the evidence: on the contrary, Oliver's treatment of the exegetes is an attempt to coerce and adapt, if necessary by force, all early testimonies to the epigraphical evidence of the late Hellenistic and Roman periods.

In his last paragraph Oliver concludes that my article "is not the independent, critical study it purports to be." There is little doubt in my mind what the objective and informed reader will think of this verdict. I for myself am content to have received publicly and privately the approval of some of the most eminent men in our field; and I shall regard the considerable time spent on this matter as not wasted, if I have succeeded in salvaging correct views held by great scholars of the past and the present from being submerged by silence or invective.

## NOTES

1. J. H. Oliver, "Jacoby's Treatment of the Exegetes," *AJP*, 75 (1954) 160-74. H. Bloch, "The Exegetes of Athens and the Prytaneion Decree," *AJP*, 74 (1953) 407-18. Cf. my review of Jacoby's *Atthis* (*ibid.*, 293-5). Oliver replied to earlier critics of his book in the article "On the Exegetes and the Mantic or Manic Chresmologians," *AJP*, 73 (1952) 406-13.

2. *AJP*, 71 (1950) 423. In addition, Krister Hanell of Göteborg enthusiastically endorsed Oliver's theory in his review, *Gnomon* 25 (1953) 522ff.

3. *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, second edition (Munich, 1955) I 637n.

4. *FGrHist* IIIb Suppl. II (1954) 535f. At the same time Jean Defradas, without knowledge of either my article or Oliver's rejoinder, rejected the latter's theory of a late origin of the *exegetai pythochrestoi*: *Les thèmes de la propagande delphique* (Paris, 1954) 196-207. Cf. also M. Chambers, *CP*, 51 (1956) 47.

5. This is true also of the reviews published at the time of or after the appearance of my paper.

6. *AJP*, 75 (1954) 160.

7. In the seven years which have passed since the publication of *Atthis*, the great importance of this book has been generally recognized and the overwhelming majority of reviewers who hailed the book from the beginning as a major contribution to our understanding of Greek Historiography has been vindicated. H. Bengtson's prediction, *HZ*, 176 (1953) 340, has come true: "Auf Grund einer exakten philologischen Methode, die wir an seinen Arbeiten und Editionen von jeher bewundern, ist er zu Ergebnissen gelangt, die so sicher fundiert sind, dass eine künftige Forschung getrost auf ihnen weiterbauen kann." Bengtson also correctly foretold that *Atthis* would stimulate research in early Roman historiography: cf. M. Gelzer, "Nochmals über den Anfang der römischen Geschichtsschreibung," *Hermes*, 82 (1954) 342-8.

8. Jacoby, "The First Athenian Prose Writer," *Mnemosyne*, ser. III, 13 (1947) 15 = *Abhandlungen zur griechischen Geschichtsschreibung* ed. Herbert

Bloch, (Leiden, 1956) 101f. in reply to Wilamowitz, Pherekydes, *SB* (Berlin, 1926) 125-46 = *Kl. Schriften*, 5, 2, (Berlin, 1937) 127-56.

9. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B. C.* (Oxford, 1952) 10.

10. *TAPA*, 71 (1940) 91-126; esp. p. 125. Cf. also his instructive remarks, *Gnomon*, 22 (1950) 216; 219f.

11. R. Laqueur, *RE*, s. v. Lokalchronik, XIII, 1 (1926), cols. 1083-94.

12. Griffith in Platnauer, *Fifty years of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford, 1954) 162, 183, n. 58.

13. See Jacoby, *Atthis* 230, n. 20.

14. *Griech. Gesch.*, second edition, part 1 (Berlin, 1912) I 25, n. 1. Cf. also Bengtson, *HZ* 176 (1953) 341.

15. Jacoby had treated this question more briefly as early as 1909 in his programmatic lecture and article "Über die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie," *Klio*, 9 (1909) 110-9 = *Abhandlungen zur griechischen Geschichtsschreibung*, 50-9.

16. There is really very little about Atthidography in the *CAH* (this is said without any disparagement); cf. III 571; V 398ff.; VII 260.

17. Oliver, *The Athenian Expounders*, 68. Cf. the critical remarks by J. A. O. Larsen, *CP*, 47 (1952) 188, and of S. Dow, *AJP*, 74 (1953) 103. Oliver later retracted his earlier position on the Constitution of Draco: *AJP*, 73 (1952) 412. Cf. also K. v. Fritz, *CP*, 49 (1954) 73-93.

18. *Atthis*, 8.

19. Oliver, *Athenian Expounders*, 160-2; *AJP* 75 (1954) 161, n. 5.

20. *Atthis*, 242, n. 40 and n. 34 (where 3708 is quoted).

21. *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, 1818, 3524, 3549, 3621; *Hesperia*, 11 (1942) 75.

22. B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, third edition (London and New York, 1892) II 67.

23. Cf. B. L. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek* (American Book Co., 1900) I 20-8; Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik* (Munich, 1950) II 41-3. It is significant that none of the reviewers of Oliver's book nor Defradas, *Les thèmes de la propagande delphique*, 195, as much as mention the crucial passage *Euthyphro* 9.

24. *CP*, 48 (1953) 66.

25. *Athenian Expounders*, 30f., 42f. See also Hanell, *Gnomon*, 25 (1953) 523f.

26. *CP*, 48 (1953) 66.

27. Cf. *AJP*, 74 (1953) 409, n. 12.

28. [Dem.] XLVII. 68: Plato, *Laws* IX. 865D; Isaeus, VIII. 39: cf. *Laws* XII. 958D; cf. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (Munich, 1941) I 602 [= second edition (1955) 635f.].

29. R. Schöll, *Hermes*, 6 (1872) 36.

30. Schöll, *Hermes*, 6 (1872) 35-7.

31. The three cases here under consideration are therefore quite different from such passages as Androtion, *FGrHist* 324 F 30 or Aristotle *Ath. pol.* 21. 6, where the phrase occurs indeed without any notion of exegetes or the verb belonging to the noun.

32. M. Ostwald, "The Prytaneion Decree Re-examined," *AJP*, 72 (1951) 33-4, 26.

33. E. Preuner, *Hermes*, 61 (1926) 471.

34. Schöll, *Hermes*, 6 (1872) 15, 50-1; Oliver, *Athenian Expounders*, 12, n. 32; *AJP*, 75 (1954) 173. On the *aisitōi* cf. also S. Dow, *Prytaneis* (*Hesperia*, Suppl. I [1937]) 22-23, and, particularly, Ostwald, *AJP*, 72 (1951) 28-9 and n. 23.

35. Oliver, *Athenian Expounders*, 142-3, I 7. The god is called (A. Wilhelm, *Wien. Sitzungsber.*, 224, Abh. 4 (1947) 37 ll. 8-10): ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀπόλλων ὁ Πύθιος ὦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πατριῶος καὶ ἐξηγητῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινῇ σωτῆρ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

36. G. Daux, *HSCP*, Suppl. I (1940) 47.

37. *Athenian Expounders*, 121; I objected only to the phrase "so that human exegetes would be unnecessary" (*AJP*, 74 [1953] 417, n. 44). The traditional interpretation is found also in P. Amandry, *La mantique apollinienne à Delphes* (Paris, 1950) 34, n. 1: "Parfois Apollon se désigne lui-même, par exemple comme exégète des Athéniens . . ." and in Defradas, *Les thèmes de la propagande delphique*, 198.

38. Athenaeus IV, p. 137E = Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (1880) I 5-6, F 7. Cf. Schöll, *Hermes*, 6 (1872) 17; Nilsson, *Gesch. der griech. Religion* I, 384 [= second edition (1955) 409]. On the date cf. F 4 and W. Schmid, *Gesch. der griech. Lit.* I 2 (1934) 537.

39. Hanell, *Gnomon*, 25 (1953) 525; Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb Suppl. II, 536.


40. K. Pritchett followed independently a similar line of argument, *CP*, 48 (1953) 66. Cf. also Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb Suppl. II 536.



HELMET B OF NEGAU

BY GUSTAV MUST

OF the twenty-six bronze helmets which were unearthed in 1811 in Ženjak (Schöniak) near Negau in Steiermark, two bear inscribed words. The inscription on one of them, the so-called helmet B, has become especially famous and has secured a notable position in text books after it was claimed to be Germanic. Linguists have repeatedly tried to interpret it, but their research has not yet been able to solve the problems involved in its interpretation; nevertheless, they have succeeded in creating a myth that it is the oldest Germanic text.

A detailed description and a thorough archaeological investigation of the inscribed helmet has been published by P. Reinecke.<sup>1</sup> K. Reichardt, who recently discussed the inscription linguistically,<sup>2</sup> also reproduced a tracing of it. The inscription is engraved on the rim of a helmet of an Etruscan-Italic type that was in use for about half a millennium since about 500 B.C.<sup>3</sup> It is written in a North Etruscan (Sub-Alpine) alphabet in retrograde direction (that is, from right to left) without word division: . According to the general opinion, the text consists of fourteen letters (ending with the last A). It is followed by three slanting strokes, which may be marks of punctuation,<sup>4</sup> and two more symbols; there are also other signs on the helmet, which probably are numerals. The inscription is engraved legibly and neatly and is well preserved. Only the form of the fifth letter (from right to left) is not quite perfect, for its upper strokes do not join exactly on the hasta; however, it obviously is the letter  $\Psi$  [ $\chi$ ].

Th. Mommsen<sup>5</sup> and A. Fabretti<sup>6</sup> transliterated the inscription as *hariχastiteivaiiup*. C. Pauli read the text as *harinastite* and saw in it Etruscan names *harinas* and *tite*.<sup>7</sup> General interest in the inscription was aroused when C. J. S. Marstrand interpreted the first part of it as a Germanic personal name, *Harigast*, which he thought to be in a Celtic grammatical form (genitive in *-i*) or, if Germanic, dative singular.<sup>8</sup> Marstrand's reading of the second part of the text as *teiva . i .*<sup>9</sup> or *Tei Fa*, that is, *Teii filii Faber* (or *Fabrica*)<sup>10</sup>



has not met with approval. P. Kretschmer claimed the whole text to be Germanic and read it *Harigasti Teiwa*.<sup>11</sup> In *Teiwa* he saw the name of the Germanic war god, \**Teiwaz* (cf. ON *Týr*, OHG *Ziu*); he took the whole as a votive inscription with a possible meaning "Harigasti to Teiwa."<sup>12</sup> The first name is assumed to be a compound consisting of *hari-*, which is connected with PGmc. \**harja-*, Gothic *harjis*, dative plural *harjam* (from PIE \**korjos*), and *gasti*, cf. Gothic *gasts*, ON *gestr*, etc. (PIE \**ghostis*); *teiwa* is regarded as a case form of a correspondence of PGmc. *Tiwaz*, cf. OHG *Ziu*, OE *Tīw*, ON *Týr* (PIE \**deiyos*).

Although this interpretation has met with general approval, scholars have to concede that it involves serious difficulties. First, the diphthong *ei* in *teiwa* disagrees with Germanic phonology: as is well known, PIE *ei* became *ī* in Proto-Germanic and all old Germanic dialects retained the *ī*. It has been conjectured that the change *ei* > *ī* may have taken place relatively late in Germanic and the inscription under discussion may have been written before the change. *Alateiviae* (in the inscription of Xanten) and Finnish-Karelian *Runkoteivas* meaning 'rye god,' which has been regarded as a possible old Germanic borrowing, have been presented as evidence for this assumption.<sup>13</sup> But *Alateiviae*, if a Germanic name at all,<sup>14</sup> may follow the Latin tradition of writing *ī* with *ei*. *Runkoteivas*, which occurs in folk songs, certainly presents no adequate evidence, since it only is one of the variants differing all the way from *Rukotivo* (again in folk songs) to *Rongoteus* (in M. Agricola's list of Karelian pagan deities, 1551).<sup>15</sup> If the second component of this name can be connected with an Indo-European word coming from PIE \**deiyos*, an old borrowing from Baltic seems more plausible, cf. OPruss. *deiwas*, Lith. *diēvas* (from *deivas*). Germanic *ī* (from PIE *ei*), however, is represented by long *i* in all certain old Germanic loan words in Finnish, e.g. Finn, *viisas* 'wise' (PGmc. \**wīsaz*, cf. OHG *wīs* (*i*), OS OE *wīs* etc.), *riita* 'quarrel' (PGmc. \**strīðā-*, cf. ON *strīð*, OHG *strīt*).

Another difficulty in the prevailing interpretation is the absence of the vowel *a* from the end of the first component of the assumed name *Harigasti*. All the oldest examples of Germanic compounds with *harja-* as their first element retain the connecting stem vowel, e.g. *Chariovalda*, about 100 A.D., χαριόμνηρος from the third century A.D., *Hariobaudes* from the fourth and fifth centuries, and *-ja-* occurs as late as in the fourth and sixth centuries in *Ariaricus* and *Ariarith*.<sup>16</sup> We do not encounter forms with definitely established syncope until the sixth century A.D. (*Charibertus*, Runic

*kunimu*[*n*]*diu* etc.). *Harimellae* (dative), presumably the name of a Germanic goddess (on the inscription of Birrens in Scotland), shows the same phonological feature. Its time is unknown. According to W. Krogmann, it may date from the third or fourth century A.D.<sup>17</sup>

The inscription on the Negau helmet B, however, is generally assumed to date from the third or second century B.C., half a millennium earlier. F. Specht postulates an *i*-stem side by side with the Gmc. *ja*-stem;<sup>18</sup> but a PGmc. stem *\*hari-* does not exist. Recently E. P. Hamp joined the lines of defense of *Harigasti* and attempted to justify the *-i-* (instead of *-ja-*), reconstructing a PGmc. *\*/xari+ / or /xaryi+ /*.<sup>19</sup> He took *harigasti* as an attested form and proclaimed the "attested compounds in *-ja-* . . . later analogies."<sup>20</sup> However, we still have more confidence in attested forms than in reconstructions, especially if the correctness of the latter is doubtful. It is impossible to reconstruct forms for Common (or Proto-) Germanic, ignoring Old Saxon and Old High German; for example, *-es* in OHG gen. sg. *hirtes*, *kunnes* can go back only to *-jas*.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, there is no evidence for claiming Runic *aljamarkiR*, Gothic *aljakuns*, *lubjaleisei*, and so on, as analogous. There is no doubt that *-ja-* actually existed in Proto-Germanic. It is further evidenced by oldest Germanic loan words in Finnish and other Finnic languages, for example, Finn. *karja* 'herd, flock' from *\*χarja* (acc.), *patja* 'mattress, upholstery, pillow' from nominative, accusative neuter *\*baðja* (cf. OE *bedd*, OHG *betti*, etc.), Estonian *haldjas* 'sprite' from *\*haldjiaz* etc. Also the Finnish compound *Harjavalta*, which can be regarded as a Germanic loan word<sup>22</sup> belonging to a later layer of borrowings (because of *h-*), has *-ja-*. Thus scholars have not succeeded in finding convincing reasons for so early an appearance of the syncopation of the stem vowel *-a-* in a compound in Germanic.

Further, the case forms of the asserted names, *Harigasti* and *Teiwa*, have received no plausible explanation, and there is no agreement on the syntactic relation between them. Kretschmer already became involved in difficulties when he attempted to explain the endings as Germanic case terminations. He took *Harigasti* as a nominative and *Teiwa* as a dative.<sup>23</sup> He also pondered some other possibilities, for example, the interpretation later supported by G. Neckel,<sup>24</sup> that both names might be datives, *teiwa*, 'god,' being an apposition to a god's name *Harigast*; according to this supposition the text would mean "to the god *Harigast*." However, Kretschmer himself stated that the addition of an appellative 'god' to a god's name was

unexpected because it does not occur in old inscriptions.<sup>25</sup> Neckel also proposed the interpretation of both words as nominatives.<sup>26</sup> But, in addition to the fact that a votive inscription consisting of two nominatives would make no sense, neither *Harigasti* nor *Teiwa* can be nominative singular forms. In the nominative singular of Gmc. *a*-stems and of *i*-stems with a long first syllable, the stem vowel was dropped earlier than final *-z*, as is evidenced by Gothic *dags*, *gasts*, ON *dagr*, *gestr*, and so on; the loss of the vowel is attested also for West Germanic by the dative plural forms in *-mis*, such as *Vatvims* and *Aflims* in religious inscriptions<sup>27</sup> (cf. Runic *gestumR*). Furthermore, *teiwa* cannot be a dative form, because the PGmc. dative singular of *a*-stems (PIE *o*-stems) ended in *-ai* and this became *e* in West and North Germanic. K. Reichardt also denied the possibility considered by P. Kretschmer that *-a* could represent the ending of the PIE instrumental in *-ē* like in Gothic.<sup>28</sup> After a detailed analysis and critical examination of all possible case forms of the two words and of all possible combinations of the cases, Reichardt arrives at the decision that no conclusion can be reached "that will not be open to grave doubts."<sup>29</sup>

To sum up, the analysis of the crucial points — the diphthong *ei* in *\*Teiwa*, the absence of the stem vowel *a* in *\*Hari-*, the discrepancy between the endings of the assumed words and Germanic case endings, and the absence of proper syntactic relations between the words — reveals that this inscription cannot be Germanic.

Before arriving at this conclusion, I too made efforts to explain the inscription as Germanic; I weighed the possibility of interpreting it as *harigas ti teiwa* "sacred to Tīwaz," taking *harigas* as a PGmc. adjective, cf. OE *herig*, *herg*, 'lucus, nemus; fanum, delubrum, idolum,'<sup>30</sup> which comes from PGmc. *\*harigaz*, and OE *hearg* idem, OHG *harug*, *haruc* 'lucus, nemus, fanum,' ON *horgr* 'Steinhaufe, -altar; Tempel, Berg'<sup>31</sup> from PGmc. *\*harugaz*, and separating *ti* as identical with the preposition OS *ti*, OHG *zi*, 'to.' Although this interpretation eliminates some of the difficulties of the previous interpretations, it creates some new ones and therefore is not cogent either.

Any inscription which is written without word division may be divided into different segments that resemble the words in several languages. Homonymy can be accidental and therefore is not a sufficient criterion. The segments are actual words of a certain language only if they agree with it in morphology and syntax, as well as in its phonological features. If we bear in mind this presupposition, we

find there is no definite evidence for claiming that this inscription is Germanic.

Another important criterion for assigning an inscription to a certain language is the alphabet which it uses. The inscription on the helmet B of Negau is written in a North Etruscan (Sub-Alpine) alphabet; its symbols agree with those of the Magrè alphabet.<sup>32</sup> As J. Whatmough has proved,<sup>33</sup> the inscriptions of Magrè (as well as those of Bolzano and Sondrio) were written by the ancient Raeti. The use of a Raetic alphabet on the helmet B of Negau suggests the assumption that it is a Raetic inscription — and the language of the inscription is a Raetic dialect. In order to prove this postulate, we must determine whether the inscription shows Raetic forms. We do in fact find these forms if we divide the text into the segments *hariχas* and *titeiva*.

The first word ends in *-as*. Since *ō* became *ǣ* in Raetic (cf. *elanu: Elonius*, *val.tikinu* : Venetic *voltiχenei* etc.),<sup>34</sup> *-as* is obviously identical with the Indo-European masculine termination of the nominative singular case, *-os*. That this ending of the nominative singular masculine actually occurred in Raetic is evidenced by *χemalaz*, *enotinaz*, etc. in western Raetic inscriptions.<sup>35</sup> (As regards the variation of *-z* and *-s*, *z* probably was used, according to Whatmough, merely as a variant of *s*.<sup>36</sup>) A further analysis shows that the first word is derived with the suffix *-iχα*. As we know, there exists a variation of *k~χ* in Raetic (e.g. *pinake* — *pinaxe*, *val.tikinu* — *val.teχnu*, *kvil* — *χvil*).<sup>37</sup> Consequently this suffix can be identical with the IE suffix *-iko-*. This was widely used, and many derivations using it occur among personal names, especially in Illyrian and Venetic (e.g. *Boicus*, *Classicus*, *Hanicus*, *Laevicus*, *Staticus*, *Teuticus*, *Truppicus*, etc.).<sup>38</sup> The stem to which *-iχas* is added is *har-*. Because of the development of *ō* to *ǣ* in Raetic, the vowel of the stem is ambiguous in its original quality. It may perhaps correspond either to Venetic *hariso*<sup>39</sup> (formed with the derivative suffix *-is-*) or to Venetic names containing *hor-* (e.g. *Horea*, *Horion*).<sup>40</sup> *Har-* is recorded also in a divine name of the Raeti — deus *Har <cecius>* (near Brezgenz).<sup>41</sup> If the *a* of *har-* in our inscription originates from PIE *o*, it may be considered tentatively that the stem goes back to a PIE root *\*g̑her-*, *\*g̑hor-*, perhaps with the meaning 'to shine, glitter, etc.'<sup>42</sup> (which is suitable also for a divine name). Consequently, the first word of the inscription, *hariχas*, is most likely a Raetic personal name.

In the second word, *titeiva*, a derivation from the popular Etrus-



can personal name (praenomen) *tite* is easily recognizable. This name spread into the other languages of ancient Italy, including Latin (*Titus*), and was used in a wide area. Although we have no records of a name *Titeiva*, there are names ending in *-va* in Etruscan, for example, *selva*, masculine, *alaiva*, feminine, *eθausva*, feminine (divine names) *selva-* also in gentile names,<sup>43</sup> and gentile *Capivas*. This formative suffix occurs also in Latin names (with Latin endings added), such as *Saleivius*, *Ambeivia*, *Ambivius*, *Satrivius*, etc.<sup>44</sup> Thus an Etruscan gentile name *Titeiva* should be entirely conceivable. Although it ends in *-a*, it can be masculine, since Etruscan masculine names (also gentilicia) often end in *-a*; they were used also in Latin.<sup>45</sup> Masculines with the ending *-ua*, which is of Etruscan origin, also occur frequently in Raetic.<sup>46</sup> Likewise there are masculine names ending in *-a* in Illyrian.<sup>47</sup> Since *Titeiva* is a derivation from an Etruscan name, it is probable that it contains the Etruscan suffix *-va*. Thus it is most likely that the inscribed name, *hariχas titeiva*, is a masculine personal name, consisting of a praenomen and a nomen gentilicium. Contrary to the general Indo-European use of only one, individual, personal name, the system of two names — a praenomen and a nomen gentilicium — is characteristic of ancient Italy (and often three or even more names were used in Rome). The use of surnames was due to Etruscan influence.<sup>48</sup> Gentile names were mostly patronymica, derived from praenomina.<sup>49</sup> This seems to be the case also with *titeiva*.

It is remarkable that the first name of the man called *Hariχas Titeiva*, then, was Indo-European, and the second, the surname, was of Etruscan origin. This however is in full agreement with our knowledge of the ancient Raetic language, namely, that it was a language which consisted of Indo-European and Etruscan elements. Which of these elements constituted the original language and which was due to later influence has been much disputed. Some decades ago it was generally assumed by the linguists that Raetic was Etruscan influenced by Indo-European, until J. Whatmough, the foremost authority on Raetic, proved that the Raeti were of Indo-European — mixed Celto-Illyrian — stock with considerable Etruscan intermixture and that Raetic was an Indo-European language that had been affected by Etruscan influence.<sup>50</sup> Thus it is entirely probable that one name of a Raetic warrior was Indo-European and the other was ultimately of Etruscan origin. Since it was customary to write the name of the owner on his helmet,<sup>51</sup> *Hariχas Titeiva* was probably the owner of the helmet.



The helmets, of which one bears the inscription under question, were found in the border area of ancient Noricum and Pannonia, east of Raetia. It is quite possible to imagine, together with P. Reinecke,<sup>52</sup> that they were carried to that place by soldiers who wore them in a battle, after which the helmets were taken from the battlefield and stored or hidden (they were stacked in one another). Of course the owner of the helmet had already inscribed his name on it (or had it inscribed for him) in his native country (or at the place where the army unit was stationed). It is also possible that he was not the last owner of the helmet, since numerals that may mark troops are repeatedly inscribed on it. As with all portable objects, it is the case also with our helmet that the place of its discovery and the conjectured time when it was brought there need not coincide with the place and time of its inscription. The known inscriptions of Magrè are mostly assigned to the third century B.C.<sup>53</sup> Because of the older style of the letters — note that of *h*, *e* and *v* — and because of the absence of Latin influence, which is observed in North-Etruscan inscriptions of the first century B.C.,<sup>54</sup> a date not later than the second century B.C. seems appropriate for the inscription under question. As was intimated above, this does not exclude the possibility that the precious piece of fighting equipment was worn repeatedly and carried to the place of its discovery somewhat later.

Thus the inscription on the helmet B of Negau most probably is a Raetic inscription and represents the name of its Raetic owner, *Hariḡas Titeiva*. It perhaps offers further evidence of the intermixture of Indo-European and Etruscan elements in the Raeti and their language and is a valuable addition to the scanty material of Raetic, although it consists only of two proper names.

## NOTES

1. "Der Negauer Helmfund," 32. *Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 1942, 32 (Berlin, 1944, issued 1950) 117-198, with photographs and tracings.

2. *Language*, 29 (1953) 306-316.

3. Reinecke, "Der Negauer Helmfund," 127, 162ff.

4. Cf. J. Whatmough, *The Prae-Italic Dialects of Italy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1933) II (containing part 3) 506.

5. *Nordetruskische Alphabete* (Zürich, 1853) 209, table 1.

6. *CII* (Torino, 1867) 8 (no. 61).

7. *Altitalische Forschungen*, I: *Die Inschriften norditalischen Alphabets* (Leipzig, 1885) 44ff.

8. *Symbolae Osloenses*, 3 (1925) 59, 64; *Avhandlingar utgitt av det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo* 1926 (1927) 17.
9. *SymbOslo* (1925) 63.
10. *Avhandl.* 1926 17.
11. "Das älteste germanische Sprachdenkmal," *ZDA*, 66 (1929) 1-9.
12. "Das älteste germanische Sprachdenkmal," 5.
13. T. E. Karsten, *Germanisch-finnische Lehnwortstudien* (Helsinki, 1915) 5; H. Hirt, *Handbuch des Urgermanischen* (1931) 38f.; K. Reichardt, *Language*, 29, 307.
14. See M. Schönfeld, *Wörterbuch der altgermanischen Personen- und Völkernamen* (Heidelberg, 1911) 11.
15. E. N. Setälä, *Finnisch-ugrische Forschungen*, 13 (1913) 442; K. Krohn, *Suomalaisten runojen uskonto* (Helsinki, 1914) 4.
16. M. Schönfeld, *Wörterbuch*, 126ff., 25f.
17. *KZ* (*Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*) 64, 260ff.
18. *KZ*, 60, 130ff.
19. *Language*, 31 (1955) 1-3.
20. p. 3.
21. *Language*, 29, 304.
22. Setälä, *FUF*, 13, 363.
23. *ZDA*, 66, 5.
24. *KZ*, 60, 283f.
25. *ZDA*, 66, 5f.
26. *ZDA*, 66, 6.
27. Schönfeld, *Wörterbuch*, 3, 259.
28. *Language*, 29, 311f.
29. *Language*, 29, 316.
30. C.W.M. Grein-J. J. Köhler, *Sprachschatz der ags. Dichter* (Heidelberg, 1912) 320.
31. O. Schade, *Altdeutsches Wörterbuch* (Halle a.d.S., 1872-82), F. Holthausen, *Wörterbuch des Altwestnordischen* (Göttingen, 1948).
32. See the Table of Alphabets, J. Whatmough, *Prae-Italic Dialects*.
33. "Inscriptions from Magrè and the Raetic Dialect," *CQ*, 17 (1923) 61ff.
34. Whatmough, *Prae-Italic Dialects*, II, 3, pp. 81f.
35. E. Vetter, *Glotta*, 30 (1943) 67ff.
36. *HSCP*, 67 (1936) 207.
37. Whatmough, *Prae-Italic Dialects*, 581.
38. W. Schulze, *Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen* (Berlin, 1904) 29; H. Krahe, *Lexikon altillyrischer Personennamen* (Heidelberg, 1929) 149.
39. *Prae-Italic Dialects*, I, 2, p. 294.
40. loc. cit.
41. *Prae-Italic Dialects*, I, 2, p. 458.
42. J. Pokorny, *Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 441f.
43. Eva Fiesel, *Das grammatische Geschlecht im Etruskischen* (Göttingen, 1922), pp. 6, 7, 10, 15. There is no grammatical gender in Etruscan (p. 113).
44. W. Schulze, *Gesch. lat. Eigennamen*, 225, 397.
45. Schulze, *Gesch. lat. Eigennamen*, 63ff.; E. Fiesel, *Das grammatische Geschlecht* 7, 15f., 113ff.; F. Solmsen (ed. E. Fraenkel), *Indogermanische Eigennamen als Spiegel der Kulturgeschichte* (Heidelberg, 1922) 138.

46. J. Whatmough, "Tusca Origo Raetis," *HSCP*, 68 (1937) 192; *Prae-Italic Dialects*, 548, 583.
47. Krahe, *Altilyr. PN.*, 60.
48. E. Pulgram, "The Origin of the Latin Nomen Gentilicium," *HSCP*, 58-59 (1948) 187.
49. Schulze, *Gesch. lat. Eigennamen*, 65; Solmsen, *Idg. Eigennamen*, 140.
50. "Inscriptions from Magrè and the Raetic Dialect," *CQ*, 17 (1923) 69; *Prae-Italic Dialects*, 4-6. He has successfully defended his view in "The Raeti and their language," *Glotta*, 22 (1934) 27-31; "Tusca Origo Raetis," *HSCP*, 68 (1937) 181-202, see especially p. 193.
51. Reinecke, "Der Negauer Helmfund," 174f.
52. "Der Negauer Helmfund," 183.
53. Whatmough, *Prae-Italic Dialects*, 520.
54. Whatmough, *Prae-Italic Dialects*, 519f.



## ON THE SYSTEMIZATION OF SCHOLIA DATES FOR PINDAR'S PYTHIAN ODES

BY H. C. BENNETT, JR.

SINCE Pindar's Olympian and Pythian odes have already been dated by the ancient critics, modern scholarship in these cases is largely guided by or forms a critique of ancient dating; it is not a subject with its own origins and modes of development.<sup>1</sup> Concomitantly, the dating of the Nemean and Isthmian odes has always remained very largely a matter of conjecture. The only major addition to our list of ancient sources since the beginning of modern Pindaric scholarship is a papyrus discovered in the last decade of the nineteenth century which gives us Olympic victors for 480, 476, 472, 468, 456, and 452.<sup>2</sup> This papyrus has been felt to provide a watershed between the two centuries of Pindaric scholarship, perhaps not altogether justly; for it would be well to bear in mind to what degree the papyrus supports earlier critics' emendations of the scholia dates, as well as the possibly mistaken use that has been made of information from the papyrus. But even if the publication of this papyrus has not solved all major problems of Pindaric dating, thereby outmoding previous work and certifying the validity of more recent conclusions, it has been decisive in settling some problems and in establishing certain assumptions. Work on Pindaric chronology at the turn of the century, which had this ancient list available, led immediately to conclusions which have never been re-examined.

In 1900 C. Gaspar published his *Essai de Chronologie Pindarique*.<sup>3</sup> In this he stated that the numbers given for the Pythian festivals in the Pindaric scholia must be correlated in our chronology with dates four years later than those to be arrived at by using the foundation date of the Pythian festival as given by Pausanias and, for the most part, subscribed to by nineteenth-century editors in their dating of Pindar's odes.<sup>4</sup> The origin of the Pythian games, that is, would be placed in 582 B.C. rather than in 586 B.C., and the number of a given Pythian festival dated on that basis. In other words, according to Gaspar, if we follow the scholia numbers for



the Pythian festivals in dating Pindar's odes, we shall place the latter four years later than scholars had assumed in their adherence to Pausanias. Secondly, Gaspar goes on to declare that the scholiasts' use of a system dating the *Pythians* four years later has been confirmed by the papyrus.<sup>5</sup> Precisely the same double claim had been made by the editors of the papyrus itself on its publication.<sup>6</sup>

Since 1900 scholars have either repeated these assumptions without examining the bases for them or, without stating any definite allegiance as far as the choice of Pythian systems is concerned, have posited dates for Pindar on the basis of these assumptions as foregone conclusions. One critic, it is true, Wilamowitz, had already tried to offer independent evidence for this new dating of the *Pythians*.<sup>7</sup> Generally speaking, however, fifty years of dating Pindar's Pythian odes by this later system is not to be interpreted as a dozen independent minds arriving at similar conclusions. Dissent from these conclusions will obviously necessitate a basic disturbance of currently accepted Pindaric dating, but such dissent is not to be viewed as simply an idiosyncrasy in the face of general agreement. It is, rather, that for the first time since it was propounded it has been felt that the foundations of Gaspar's assumption should be re-examined.

But it is only honest to admit that the present reëxamination of that assumption did not start from any initial doubt of Gaspar's work. An interpretation of *Pythians* 1, 10, and 11 suggested dates possible for those odes in agreement with scholia dating only if it were assumed that the scholia were using the earlier system of dating the *Pythians*. This conviction grew as these Pythian odes took their place in relation to clearly dated odes from other series. These new interpretations need not be presented here, however, since they have no direct bearing on this discussion of Gaspar's conclusion. Yet, if the system whereby the Pythiads must be dated later was supported, as had been claimed, by evidence in the scholia, confirmed by the papyrus, and further strengthened by outside evidence presented by such a scholar as Wilamowitz, this whole new schema was insecure. The striking thing is that a survey of the evidence for these claims shows them to be in large part a matter of too facile interpretations which had immediately been transformed into working hypotheses.

In regard to the problem of whether the Delphic games actually commenced in 586 or 582 (or some other date), no answer is attempted here. An examination of the evidence regarding the sixth-

century origin of the games lies outside the scope of this article. In any case, the solution of that problem would not advance the present investigation, since the issue is not when the Pythian games did, in fact, begin but when, according to the scholiasts' lists, they were assumed to have begun. The answer to the problem as to what dates we are to assign to the scholia numbers for the Pythiads will, of course, depend either on how the scholiasts synchronized their Olympic and Pythian numbers, or how they related the number for a given Pythiad to an event external to Pindar which we can date from other sources. The issue at stake in this discussion is whether the numbers for the Pythiads are consistently synchronized with the Olympiads by the scholiasts so as to necessitate, if one is to follow the scholia dates at all, the use of the later system for dating the *Pythians*. I hold, first, that the scholiasts were not conscious of choosing any system, but that what synchronization they suggest can be better used to support the earlier than the later dating. Secondly, I hold that the evidence from the papyrus, if anything, seems to confirm the earlier, not, as has been held, the later system. This does not mean that the scholia advance any argued case for synchronization with Olympic numbers on the basis of the earlier system. Their evidence is corrupted and confused. All the same it cannot be used to support a later system in contradiction to Pausanias.

To back his view, now current, that the scholiasts did synchronize their Pythiads and Olympiads on the later system, Gaspar cites the scholia on *Pythian* 3 *ad init.*, *Olympian* 12 *ad init.*, and *Olympian* 9.17.<sup>8</sup> In the inscription to *Pythian* 3, a scholion states that Hieron succeeded to the throne of Syracuse in the 76th Olympiad within which the 28th Pythiad falls.<sup>9</sup> Gaspar takes this declaration as support of the later system, inasmuch as the 76th Olympiad begins in 476, and to fall within it the 28th Pythiad would have to be dated from 474 (the later system) rather than from 478 (the earlier system). This numerical deduction is correct but is based on an error of fact which Gaspar has strangely overlooked. Unfortunately for his argument, Hieron did not in fact succeed to the throne of Syracuse in the 76th Olympiad but in the 75th Olympiad (478 i.e. Ol.75.3).<sup>10</sup> The historical evidence for this date has never been questioned, and the correct date is given by a scholion on *Pythian* 1 *ad init.*, some evidence, be it noted, that the scholiasts knew the correct date for Hieron's accession. Therefore, if the Olympiad number at the beginning of *Pythian* 3 is corrected from 76 to 75, the

Pythiad that lies within it can be synchronized only by using the earlier system. That is, the 28th Pythiad would have to begin in 478, not 474. The scholion of *Pythian* 3, then, can only be used to show that the scholiasts were using the earlier or Pausanian system for dating the Pythians.

It is true that this argument in refutation of Gaspar depends on two assumptions which the precarious condition of numbers in the scholia might not seem to warrant. One assumption is that the number in the scholia for the synchronized Pythiad, 28, is correct, whereas the number for the Olympiad, 76, has been corrupted. The related assumption is that the scholiasts knew the correct Olympiad number for Hieron's accession, and that the number given is the result of corruption in transmission, not of ignorance. If the Pythiad number could be changed, for example, to 27, or if the scholiasts, in their ignorance, are correlating the 76th Olympiad with the 28th Pythiad, this correction of Gaspar is not clearly certified. Luckily, however, the scholion includes further information which when correlated with what has just been presented makes it quite certain both that the scholiast knew the correct date of Hieron's accession and that the Pythiad number is correct as given.

We owe this information to a problem which, though it need not detain us here, not only plagued the scholiasts but continues to baffle Pindaric critics: the relation of *Pythian* 3 to Hieron's first two Pythian victories with which it is concerned. Hieron won the single horse race at the 26th (486 or 482) and 27th (482 or 478) Pythians, as correctly stated in this very scholion. Yet the ode itself mentions him as king, a title he did not hold until 478. It is this problem which has caused the introduction of the date of his accession in the scholion. The poet, the scholion says, also sings of things which have taken place since the time of the Pythian victories: he sings of Hieron as king. The very fact that this is thought of as a problem, the fact that the scholiast is aware that the poem must follow the two Pythian victories by a considerable space, is itself a strong indication that the scholiast is synchronizing by the earlier system, since by that system Hieron's second Pythian victory precedes his accession by four years, whereas by the later system it coincides precisely with the year he becomes king, 478.

Had the scholiast been using the later system, there would have been no need for him to have raised the problem in the first place and shown the interval between Hieron's Pythian victories and his accession. But the argument need not rest merely on this fairly

sound deduction. Immediately following the dating of Hieron's accession, the scholion goes on to say, "Consequently, this epinician [is to be dated] beyond a shadow of a doubt after the second Pythian victory which took place in the 76th Olympiad." Once again the Olympiad number must be incorrect. Schroeder has suggested a correction to the 75th Olympiad; I would suggest the 74th. For the purposes of this argument, however, the point to be made is that the 28th Pythiad, to which the scholion says this ode must be dated, is said to have followed beyond a shadow of a doubt a victory listed by the same scholion as taking place in the 27th Pythiad, whereas the 76th Olympiad is said to have followed a 76th Olympiad. The sequence of Pythiad numbers stands; the Olympiad numbers are in clear contradiction within one and the same scholion.

This first example cited by Gaspar is probably the most clearcut attempt made by the scholia to synchronize Pythiad and Olympiad numbers. If, it was stated, the Pythiad number in which Hieron's accession was said to have fallen could be shown to be correct, and if the scholiast was aware that this event followed by some time a victory in the 27th Pythiad (482 or 478), then this scholion on *Pythian* 3 can only be used to show that the scholiasts were using the earlier system to correlate their Olympic and Pythian dates. Hitherto no one seems to have noticed that Gaspar failed to check the actual date of Hieron's accession and hence to have realized the impossibility of his hypothesis.

Greater confusion exists in regard to the two scholia inscriptions to *Olympian* 12.<sup>11</sup> The two inscriptions do not agree with one another. One of them makes a statement contradicted by the evidence of the papyrus. Neither of them has accounted for the list of victories given in Pindar's poem. The corruption is such that it is hard to see how, in all fairness, the evidence can be claimed to support either the earlier or the later system.

Both inscriptions correctly give the victor, Ergoteles, an Olympic victory at the 77th Olympics, 472. Inscription *a.* then goes on to give him a victory in the next following Olympics, a victory which is not listed in the papyrus for 468. Inscription *b.* gives Ergoteles a Pythian victory at the 29th Pythians (474 or 470), whereas *a.* gives him a victory in the 25th Pythiad (490 or 486), which is clearly a mistake. It is true that *b.*, which lists the 29th Pythiad, seems to state that this follows the 77th Olympiad of 472, though if we accept the reading of Mommsen at this point the reference is to a following Olympic victory. It is undoubtedly this dubious sug-



gestion which has led Gaspar and more recent commentators to take this scholion as confirmation of the later system, since to date the 29th Pythiad in 470 after the 77th Olympics is support of the later system. There is no need to argue the point, however, since no matter how we argue the evidence of inscription *b*. there is a fact, which has again escaped the notice of Gaspar, that undermines any attempt to synchronize Olympic and Pythian numbers at this point.

It is clear from line 18 of *Olympian* 12 itself that Ergoteles had won two Pythian victories. This fact has most unaccountably escaped any notice on the part of the scholia. But more unaccountably it has not been seen by modern scholars that this discrepancy between the evidence from Pindar and the scholia must invalidate any conclusion reached on the basis of synchronizing one Pythian victory with Ergoteles' Olympic victory. It seems impossible to decide now precisely how the omission of one Pythian victory or the conflation of both in a single reference occurred in the scholia. It would be arguable, for example, that the scholiasts had evidence of a Pythian victory following the 77th Olympics (the 30th) and at the same time, quite naturally, a reference to a victory in the 29th Pythians and carelessly confused the two references. They have also signally failed to date Ergoteles' second Olympic victory correctly. With the evidence as it stands, any number of hypotheses are possible. The important point to bear in mind is that the scholia do not have any sure grasp of Ergoteles' Pythian victories, despite Pindar's clear statement, and hence cannot be trusted to establish any clear synchronization of Olympiads and Pythiads at this point.

The third and last possible synchronization of Olympiads and Pythiads by the scholiasts is to be found in the scholia on *Olympian* 9 which attempt to date a Pythian victory referred to in line 12 of this Olympic ode.<sup>12</sup> The statements in the scholia should perhaps be carefully rehearsed here, since the able editors of the papyrus have claimed that the evidence in this case clearly supports the later system for dating the Pythian odes of Pindar, and Gaspar and Farnell have reasserted this claim.<sup>13</sup> Grenfell and Hunt, in their interpretation of this evidence in the light of the papyrus, have presented a summary of the evidence of three scholia which may be somewhat misleading. They have not presented any analysis of the conflicts in the scholia, nor have they gone into the problem of the relation of the scholia information to the sequence of Pythian and Olympic victories as suggested by Pindar's ode itself. If a careful distinction is made between the conflicting scholia, and if their relation to Pin-



dar's ode is examined, the conclusion that proof is given for the later dating of the Pythian odes becomes extremely tenuous.

Scholion *a.* on line 17 states that Epharmostos, the victor of *Olympian* 9, won his Pythian victory in the 33rd Pythiad. Scholion *a.* on line 18 states that Epharmostos won his Olympic victory in the 73rd Olympiad. Scholion *b.* on line 18 states that the Pythian victory was won in the 30th Pythiad. No reference is made in this last scholion to the Olympic victory, a fact which should be carefully borne in mind. The papyrus discloses that Epharmostos won his Olympic victory in the 78th, not the 73rd Olympiad, thus controverting the testimony of scholion 18*a.* The Pythian number in 17*a.* is now ignored as being impossible of reconciliation with the 78th Olympiad. The number in 18*b.* for the Pythiad, 30, has been reconciled with the corrected Olympiad number from 18*a.*, since the 30th Pythiad does fall either before or after the 73rd Olympiad, depending on which system one uses. And this reconciliation is then read as proof that the later system is being used by the scholiasts on the assumption that the Pythiad number given in one scholion must follow the corrected Olympiad date from a different scholion.

Yet the scholion from which the now accepted Pythiad number is taken makes no reference to, and hence attempts no synchronization with an Olympiad number. Furthermore, Pindar's ode gives no indication that the Pythian victory followed the Olympic victory. The claim, then, that the scholia on *Olympian* 9 support the later system for dating the Pythian odes rests on two very dubious assumptions, the assumption of a sequence of Pythiad and Olympiad numbers not stated by the scholia and the assumption of a sequence of Pythian and Olympic victories for Epharmostos not stated by Pindar. This present reading does not challenge the evidence of the papyrus or suggest a new interpretation of the evidence in the scholia. It merely challenges those two assumptions. The reverse assumptions are not, perhaps, provable either; but they might be shown to be more likely.

First, because most important, the evidence from Pindar's ode itself should be carefully considered when trying to interpret the information in the scholia. *Olympian* 9 is incontrovertibly an Olympic celebration. The opening lines are just one of the many Pindaric elaborations of the stylized presentation of Olympic *kudos* for a victor. Following this Olympic opening two references, in lines 12 and 17, are made to a Pythian victory won by Epharmostos. Though the relation in time of this victory to the Olympic victory is not

stated by Pindar, surely the most natural assumption by a reader unaware of the problem of conflicting Pythian systems would be that the Pythian victory had preceded a recent Olympic victory for which this ode is, unquestionably, the celebration. It is more elaborate and unnatural to assume that the Pythian victory had followed the Olympic victory, but that this ode, pushing the more recent Pythian victory to one side, had gone back to a preceding Olympic victory to find its occasion. Surely there is no other example of a Pindaric ode that a critic can point to as a parallel. On the other hand, where Pindar is faced with a distant series of varied victories he often makes a joint celebration. Two examples, *Pythian* 7 and *Olympian* 12, are under discussion in this paper, and there are others. Nor did Pindar ever hesitate in a Pythian ode celebrating a recent Pythian victory to refer back to Olympic honor won by his subject or even his ancestors. *Pythian* 10.13 and *Pythian* 8.36 might be cited. Previous Olympic honor could still shine brightly in a Pythian ode. It seems quite unlikely, then, that between *Olympian* 9 and its occasion, an Olympic victory of 468, there stands a Pythian victory of 466. It is much more natural to assume that the Pythian victory, and hence the 30th Pythiad, is to be dated to 470. This would be proof that the scholiasts synchronized their Pythiad with their Olympiad numbers on the basis of the earlier system.

Judging from Pindar's text alone, then, one would assume that Epharmostos' Pythian had preceded his Olympic victory. Nor does the evidence of the scholia contradict this easy assumption. In this connection it is to be repeated that the scholion which gives us the Pythian number, whose correlation with the papyrus date for the Olympic victory is our only basis for synchronizing the two series, makes no reference to the Olympic date. But it is hard to see how even the rejected scholia can be used to support the proposition that the scholiasts were synchronizing by the later system. They nowhere state that the Pythiad in which Epharmostos won followed his Olympic victory. But even if this were the unexpressed assumption behind the now rejected scholia, the figures they do present would argue for the earlier rather than for the later system of synchronization. Though one must always be wary of correcting Greek numbers or of guessing the source of corruption, it is clear that the Greek for 30, λ', cannot be easily corrupted into 33, λγ', the erroneous figure of scholion 17*a*. That means that if the now rejected scholia were implying that Epharmostos' Olympic victory had been followed by a Pythian victory in 466, which Pindar's ode does not

bear out, they might conceivably be held to have corrupted 31, λα', for the Pythiad number, which would be the correct date for 466 by the earlier system, but they could hardly be held to have corrupted 30, λ', which is the correct number for 466 by the later system. There is no way, in other words, to read even the rejected scholia as proof of the scholiasts' use of the later system of synchronizing Pythiad and Olympiad numbers.

These, then, are the three scholia adduced by Gaspar and his followers to show that the scholiasts were following a system for dating Pindar's Pythian odes which would make them four years later than dates to be assigned on the basis of Pausanias' dating of the origin of the Delphic games. It is to be hoped that this reëxamination of the scholia has shown that they cannot be used to support this proposition. On the contrary, if we are justified in correcting the date of Hieron's accession in the scholion on *Pythian* 3, and if the Pythiad number with which it is synchronized is correct, the scholiasts can only have been using the earlier system for dating Pindar's Pythians. Similarly, if we can assume that the Pythian victory referred to in *Olympian* 9 has preceded the Olympic victory, then the number now accepted for that Pythian victory must be dated in 470, which again is an indication that the scholia agree with Pausanias' foundation date for the Pythian festival. It must be granted that the scholia on *Olympian* 12 cannot clearly substantiate either system, since they fail to take into account the two Pythian victories of its hero which Pindar's ode declares. In all these cases we are faced with corrupted or corruptible numbers, so that no hypothesis can claim absolute proof. But despite the statements of Grenfell and Hunt, Gaspar, Farnell, and other critics, there is no evidence in the scholia which would justify our disregarding Pausanias in attempting to date Pindar's Pythian odes.

Wilamowitz, followed by Gaspar and Farnell, has tried to present *Pythian* 7 as proof of the need to use the later system of dating the Pythians.<sup>14</sup> He synchronizes a reference in Aristotle to the life of the possible victor of this ode, one Megacles, with a scholia number for one of the victor's two (or possibly three) Pythian victories.<sup>15</sup> His argument is, perhaps, the weakest of all those adduced to support the later system of dating the Pythians. One scholion lists the 25th Pythiad (490 or 486) as the date of a Delphic victory of Megacles.<sup>16</sup> Aristotle tells us that one Megacles went into exile in 487. Therefore, says Wilamowitz, this Pythian victory must be dated in 486, after Megacles' banishment, rather than in 490, thus providing

proof of the later system for synchronizing Pythian and Olympic dates. Even before we examine the historical situation of this ode it can be seen that at best this is an *argumentum ex silentio*. There is no *a priori* reason why Megacles could not have won a Pythian victory three years before going into exile as handily as the year after. And the argument from silence collapses in this case when one sees that this ode gives the victor two Delphic victories previous to the victory celebrated in the ode.

As a matter of fact, there is no reason to quarrel either with the scholia number for one of the victor's Pythian victories or with Wilamowitz' exegesis of the Aristotle passage *per se*. As will be seen shortly, Wilamowitz' identification of the victor of this ode may well be accepted in contradiction of the scholia. Perhaps because the surface handling by such a master as Wilamowitz is so skilful and neat, no one has registered the slightest doubt of his conclusions. But they are based on two untenable assumptions. The date of this ode cannot be determined by the date of one of its victor's two (or three) Pythian victories. Secondly, the historical situation set forth by Aristotle is not, as will be shown, the historical setting demanded by our ode. Nothing at all, then, is proved by synchronizing two events, neither of which is determinant of the date of this ode.

*Pythian* 7 presents in the briefest compass a variety of problems. We cannot be sure, in sum, what victory is referred to, when it was won, or precisely who won it. We cannot even be sure that this ode is properly classified as a Pythian at all, and it may have to join *Pythian* 2, *Nemeans* 9, 10, and 11 among those odes that have been listed in one set or another for convenience. The inscriptions in the scholia put it down variously as Olympian, as Isthmian, and as Pythian, just as they assign a variety of dates and quarrel over the person to whom it is dedicated. Nor does the ode itself answer the problem of the festival. It says that Megacles or his family have won five Isthmian, one Olympian, and two Pythian victories and then adds in line 14, "I rejoice in the new accomplishment." There is no necessary connection between this "new accomplishment" and any one in particular of the previous list of victories. The only sound argument for listing the ode as Pythian is the invocation of Apollo in line 8. But Apollo was the patron of other games, minor ones like the Aeginetan Delphinians, for example, and the way in which the new accomplishment is slurred over to let the emphasis lie on the great list of previous victories would argue for a minor victory in a less honorific festival. Or possibly the religious function at which



this ode is being performed as an offering for all the victories may have determined the apostrophe to Apollo. Besides there was a very good reason as far as Megacles was concerned for making Apollo the patron.

If it is not clear which Megacles figures in this ode, it is perfectly certain what family he belonged to. He was an Alcmaeonid, of the family which had produced in the previous century Megacles, the opponent of Peisistratus, Cleisthenes the reformer, and, in the next generation after our Megacles, Pericles. It was the most distinguished family of Athens. Back in the sixth century it had built the new temple for Apollo at Delphi, a point which Pindar rehearses in this ode. He says, in fact, that the Athenians, "the townsmen of Erechtheus," had built the temple, though it was in their exile from Athens that the Alcmaeonids were traditionally recorded to have contracted for its construction.<sup>17</sup> Pindar's softening of this note of pride in an ode for a member of the family should be borne in mind. At any rate, the Alcmaeonids had a special connection with Apollo at Delphi, which could well explain an offering to him of their victories at various games. Since the ode is for all the victories, and the "new accomplishment" is not tied to any of the previous lists, it may very well refer to a minor victory near home that could be used as the occasion of an ode. It follows, then, that the date of one Pythian victory (and the ode in any case refers to two others, if the ode itself be considered Pythian) cannot determine the date of the ode.

Of equal importance is the possible identification of the victor, Megacles. Wilamowitz has identified him with Megacles, the son of Hippocrates, who, we know, was banished from Athens in 487, and he takes Pindar's phrase in line 15 about the "envy which has requited the noble deeds" of the Alcmaeonids as referring to his ostracism.<sup>18</sup> The scholia, on the other hand, tell us that Hippocrates was "related" to Megacles, which could as well make him his uncle as his father, and that the "envy" is the divine envy of human happiness expressed in Hippocrates' death.<sup>19</sup> This, they state, was a recent occurrence and Pindar wrote a threnody for the deceased. They also tell us that there was another Megacles in the family winning victories at the same time.<sup>20</sup> Hence it had been earlier held that the Megacles of *Pythian* 7 was the cousin of the banished Megacles, son of Hippocrates, and was himself the son of Cleisthenes.<sup>21</sup> Wilamowitz' position, then, rests on conjecture that cannot be confirmed. Nevertheless, this conjecture of Wilamowitz can be accepted as reasonable, so long as it is seen to be conjecture, not fact, and if



its significance is not misjudged. The scholia are often confused about family relation, even where Pindar makes it clear.<sup>22</sup> The *phthonos* or envy could refer both to the ostracism and to the death of Hippocrates, since divine and human envy can be mingled in Pindar, and from the family standpoint are both misfortunes following noble deeds. Wilamowitz' ferreting out of the allusion to ostracism appears acceptable, if not provable, despite the testimony of the scholia.

But the conclusions which Wilamowitz, followed by Farnell, builds on these conjectures are unwarranted. After his perhaps skilful coupling of the Megacles of this poem with the Megacles, son of Hippocrates, who was ostracized in 487, Wilamowitz tells us that Pindar wrote this poem at Delphi shortly afterwards, that consequently it can be definitely dated to 486 after one of the Pythian victories listed by the scholia.<sup>23</sup> This is an untenable position. The words of the poem itself make it most difficult to believe that it was written during Megacles' exile or while the Alcmaeonids were out of favor at Athens, nor is it likely that it was composed at Delphi. It is far more natural to assume that it was composed at Athens. The whole point of this brief ode is to couple the Alcmaeonids with Athens, even at the cost of tempering one of their dearest claims to fame by revising it as an Athenian claim to fame. This ode must, in fact, be dated after Megacles' return from exile, which we know from the same source in Aristotle took place in 480 in the face of the Persian invasion. Though written for a member of the noblest house at Athens, this brief poem, in effect, echoes those famous apostrophes to Athens which have come down to us in the fragments.<sup>24</sup> The use of one word — the sign of that metaphorical power which endeared Pindar to Athenian hearts — might possibly place this ode in precisely the same season, 477, to which both the fragments in praise of Athens and *Nemean* 2 may well belong.<sup>25</sup>

Athens, the great city, is the loveliest prelude for laying the foundation of song for the powerful house of the Alcmaeonids in honor of their horse victories. For in what fatherland, what house of brighter fame in Greece could you be said to dwell? For to all the cities goes out the name of the townsmen of Erechtheus who built, Apollo, thy temple at holy Delphi, glorious to behold.

*Pythian* 7.1-9.

This "prelude" is, in fact, precisely half the poem. It remains to recount the victories of the house, to regret the envy that has re-

quited noble deeds and end with the saw that happiness is not a constant condition. The prelude carries the one sustained note of the poem: the happy union of Athens and Alcmaeonid.

Perhaps Pindar's use here of *κρηπίδα*, the "foundation" of song, should not be pressed. He uses the word twice in undateable fragments and once again as late as *Pythian* 4.138. But he uses it metaphorically, as here, in the fragment, no. 65, from Plutarch about the "sons of the Athenians who have laid the *foundation* of freedom at Artemesium," and *Pythian* 7, like that poem, is concerned with the glory of Athens. The use of this word may well indicate, though not surely, a contemporary inspiration. It is more important, however, to notice three other points.

First, it is perfectly clear that the fame of the Alcmaeonids, without blush or apology or diplomacy, is made a part of the great glory of Athens itself. This is precisely what we should expect of a fully accepted great family at Athens in her great hour which is trying in its public pronouncements to associate itself with Athens' greatness. It is not at all the note suitable for the Alcmaeonids in all the questionable activities of their exile, when they were out of sympathy with the policies and leaders of Athens at the moment. It is the correct note to strike for Megacles, whether son of Cleisthenes or exiled son of Hippocrates, after the return of the family to good grace at Athens in 480.

Secondly, it is to be noted that Apollo is invoked in the statement that the Athenians had built his temple at holy Pytho, *Πυθῶνι*, line 9. There is, admittedly, no definite sense of distance in this phrase, but such an adverbial construction often implies it. At least one should not assume from this phrase that the ode is being sung at Delphi. The more natural assumption is an invocation of Apollo at Athens with a reference to the temple at Delphi. Were the ode being performed at the shrine referred to, Pindar would almost certainly have made that connection clear, as in *Olympian* 8.9, *Pythian* 11.4, or *Pythian* 6.4, to name three random examples. In fact, he might have invoked the site or god himself, as in *Olympian* 8.1 or *Paeon* 6.2. Pindar does not use the adverbial construction in any parallel situation. From the language itself, therefore, one would most naturally assume that this ode was performed at Athens, not at Delphi.

In this connection note may again be taken of Pindar's change in the accepted story that the Alcmaeonids in their sixth-century exile had built Apollo's Delphic temple.<sup>26</sup> If the situation of this

poem were again that of an Alcmaeonid in exile at Delphi, it would be natural to rehearse, if not the previous and parallel situation, at least the previous glory of the exiled family. It would be most strange in such a situation to do what Pindar does and to ascribe the building of the temple not to the Alcmaeonids but to the Athenians themselves. But for a newly returned family, anxious to avoid future *phthonos*, it is a superbly fitting note. They make an offering, as it were, of their pan-Hellenic monument at Delphi to their city and its fame. It is as Athenians that they wish now to be hailed. Their fame has become a part of Athens' fame.

This ode must, then, be dated after 480, and the likeliest time is in conjunction with the other poems on Athenian greatness in the spring or summer of 477. If these arguments have been convincing, *Pythian* 7 cannot lend itself to the support of the attempted transposition of Pythian dates. Indeed, we cannot even be sure that this poem is a Pythian ode. But even if we accept it as such without qualification, we should still have to take account of the dates of three Pythian victories, inasmuch as the poem refers to two gained previously to this "new accomplishment." Nothing is established by relating one of the victories to an event of 487. Furthermore, on historical grounds alone it seems impossible to date this ode before the peaceful return of the Alcmaeonids to Athens in 480. The poem is, in essence, a coupling of the family and the city at a time when a pan-Hellenic poet can hail Athens' name as the fairest in all Hellas, the hour of glory after Salamis and Artemesium.

There is one further piece of evidence that can and has been used to support the later system of dating the Pythians. It should be considered here together with the evidence on Pindar's work itself, namely Bacchylides, *Ode* 4. It should be admitted at the outset that a rereading of Pindar's *Pythians* themselves and an examination of the outside evidence for the synchronization of Olympic and Pythian dates had convinced this critic of the necessity of returning to the earlier system of dating the *Pythians*. The evidence of Bacchylides 4, in other words, was not approached with an open mind but with a view to reconciling it to the conclusion reached in regard to Pindaric dating generally, and such *a priori* conviction undoubtedly led to the solution advanced here. Yet this instinct has merely led to the revival of the most natural reading, the reading given by the first English publication of Bacchylides, in a problematical crux in this fragmentary poem.

Bacchylides 4 is for Hieron's third Pythian victory, by which is

undoubtedly meant his chariot victory at the 29th Pythians (474 or 470).<sup>27</sup> This is the same victory which is celebrated in Pindar's first *Pythian*, so that the date of that ode as well as the general system for dating the Pythians must be reconciled with the date for Bacchylides 4. Beginning with line 14 of the poem we find:

παρ' ἐστίαν ἀγχιάλους τ[ε Κί]ρρας μυχοῖς  
 μοῦνον ἐπιχθονίων τάδε  
 μῆσάμενον στεφάνοις ἐρέπτειν  
 δύο τ' ὀλυμπιονίκας  
 αἰίδειν.<sup>28</sup>

As it stands, this passage is very difficult to construe, and hence the interpretation of particular words in it is problematical. It is hard to see what governs the two infinitives, and Blass proposed to change παρ' ἐστίαν to πάρεστίν νιν to provide a finite verb, an interpretation followed by Jebb in his edition.<sup>29</sup> There remains the problem of keeping the two infinitives and their objects in a parallel construction. The object of the first infinitive is clearly Hieron, who "alone of mortals has contrived" three Pythian victories. But current interpretation makes the object of the next infinitive nonpersonal. Jebb, for example, interprets δύο τ' ὀλυμπιονίκας as two "Olympic victories." But this is a most rare meaning for the word. Jebb can quote only one possible parallel, and the most recent editor, Snell, has felt forced to transform the papyrus text into ὀλυμπιονικ<ί>as in order to get a word more clearly designating Olympic victory.<sup>30</sup> The common meaning for ὀλυμπιονίκης is Olympic victor, and so Kenyon, who first edited this poem for publication, took it.<sup>31</sup> Not only is Olympic victor the more natural interpretation of the word, but it alone can keep the two objects parallel as persons to be honored by the chorus. Unfortunately the lacuna before line 13 probably contains the secret for the total grammatical construction of this passage, so that one cannot posit an interpretation definitively as it now stands. Yet from the wording alone one might well prefer the usual meaning and Kenyon's reading of δύο τ' ὀλυμπιονίκας as "two Olympic victors." If accepted, this interpretation changes the now usual dating of this poem.

If the reading "two Olympic victories" is allowed, this poem which, like *Pythian* 1, celebrates Hieron's chariot victory of the 29th Pythians, would place the 29th Pythiad in 470, rather than in 474, in order to follow Hieron's second Olympic victory of 472. This is clear support of the later system of synchronizing the Pythiads and



Olympiads. On the other hand, if the correct interpretation is "two Olympic victors," the reference is joint acclaim of Hieron and his brother Gelon. Hieron had won the single horse race in 476, Gelon the chariot race in 488. In this case, the poem should be dated to 474 to follow Hieron's first Olympic victory of 476. This would be substantiation of the earlier system for dating the Pythiads.

Now it is to be noted that in the opening line of this poem the emphasis falls on Syracuse, to which the mention of even Hieron is made subordinate. The city's fame overshadows that of the tyrant. Such emphasis is paralleled, of course, by the opening of *Pythian* 2, just as the appellation of Hieron in line 13 of this poem as the "son of Deinomenes" can be paralleled from Pindar. These notes on the Bacchylides poem and their parallels in Pindar may not seem significant in themselves, but they become significant when taken with *δύο τ'ὀλυμπιονίκας*. In *Pythian* 2.18 when Pindar sees Hieron as a Deinomenid, he sees him as a representative both of his family and of the might of Syracuse, which, as in this poem, is first and principally apostrophized. He sees him, that is, not merely as the individual tyrant but as the ruler of an ancient city and the successor of Gelon. The parallel in *Pythian* 1 is even more instructive for our purposes, since that poem was composed for the same victory as Bacchylides 4. There, in line 79, Pindar couples the reference to Hieron directly with that to Gelon, calling them "sons of Deinomenes" and hailing them as the twin victors of Himera. That coupling reference in the exactly contemporaneous *Pythian* 1 parallels the appellation of Hieron as son of Deinomenes in Bacchylides 4 and accounts for the reference to the two Olympic victors. For it was Gelon, another of Deinomenes' sons, who won the chariot victory in the 73rd Olympiad.<sup>32</sup> Since this was the victory which Hieron most coveted but had not yet attained, to couple Hieron's own Olympic victory in the single horse two years earlier with his family's attainment of the more glorious victory bespeaks great tact on Bacchylides' part. Bacchylides' brief ode, it may therefore be concluded, followed Hieron's Pythian victory very closely and chose to integrate Hieron's own fame with that of his family and city in order to achieve the maximum of splendor in the briefest compass. This is, of course, common practice in many of Pindar's odes. This poem of Bacchylides, it is to be noted, is a Pythian ode, not an Olympian ode. In other words, the reference to victors at Olympia is, in any case, an attempt to widen the scope of athletic reference, and on this score Gelon's great triumph enters most naturally. Lastly, Hieron's



Pythian victory on this occasion had been in the chariot race, and at this time, as all editors would agree, the only previous chariot victory in the family would have been Gelon's at Olympia.

If these arguments are valid, and the restoration of the original reading of the critical line in Bacchylides' poem as "two Olympic victors" is sound, there is no need to reconcile the date of this poem or the parallel *Pythian* 1 with Hieron's second Olympic victory of 472. The 29th Pythiad, then, would follow Hieron's first Olympic victory of 476 and fall in 474, not 470.

The three attempts in the scholia to synchronize Olympiads and Pythiads, Wilamowitz' exegesis of *Pythian* 7, and the dating of Bacchylides 4 seem to be the only external arguments that have been used to establish the view prevailing in the present century that the numbers used by the scholia for Pindar's Pythian odes would date them all four years later than those derived from Pausanias' date for the beginning of the Delphic games. A reëxamination of the three examples of synchronization in the scholia strongly suggests that where the numbers themselves are now accepted as uncorrupted, the scholiasts were using the same dates for the Pythian festivals as Pausanias. *Pythian* 7 would appear to fall more naturally in the period after Megacles' return to Athens than, as Wilamowitz argued, during his exile. In any case, to date an ode on the basis of one of three indicated Pythian victories is highly problematical. Finally, the use of Bacchylides 4 to support the later system of dating Pythian numbers depends on an emendation of a papyrus text or a mistranslation of *ὀλυμπιονίκας*. The original text may be taken more naturally to refer to Hieron and Gelon as Olympic victors, and the ode itself to fall soon after Hieron's Pythian victory of 474, also celebrated in Pindar's first Pythian, rather than after his second Olympic victory of 472.

In consequence, Gaspar's arguments for the later dating of the Pythiads fail, and where the scholia numbers are now accepted for the poems of Pindar, they must be dated four years earlier than the current editions or handbooks maintain. This redating in turn, of course, will require a fresh correlation of the internal allusions in the Pythian odes to contemporary history and Pindar's own relation to it. That investigation will be the subject of a later paper.

## NOTES

1. The beginning, for all practical purposes, of the modern attempts to unravel the dates for Pindar's odes was Eduardo Corsini's admirable and pains-

taking *Dissertationes IV quibus Olympiorum, Pythiorum, Nemeorum atque Isthmiorum tempus inquiritur ac demonstratur* (Firenze, 1747).

2. B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt, eds., *Oxyrhynchi Papyri* (London, 1899) II 85f., hereafter cited as P. Oxy. II.

3. C. Gaspar, *Essai de chronologie pindarique* (Brussels, 1900). For his dating of the Pythia see p. 3.

4. Pausanias 10.7.3.

5. Gaspar, *Essai*, 9.

6. P. Oxy. II, 92.37.

7. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin, 1893) II 323f. Also see his *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922) 155f.

8. Gaspar, *Essai*, 8.

9. For the scholia see A. B. Drachmann, ed., *Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903-1927) (hereafter cited as Drach.) II 63 (*Pythian* 3), I 349 (*Olympian* 12), I 272 (*Olympian* 9). At this point see the scholia on *Pythian* 3, Drach. II 63.

10. For Hieron's accession see Diodorus Siculus 11.38 and 48. Compare also the scholion on *Pythian* 1, Drach. II 5.

11. See scholia on *Ol.* 12, Drach. I 349.

12. See scholia on *Ol.* 9, Drach. I 271-2. See also P. Oxy. II 89 and 92.37.

13. Gaspar, *Essai*, 141; L. R. Farnell, *Works of Pindar*, 3 vols. (London, 1930-32) III 67.

14. See above nn. 3, 7, 13.

15. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 22.

16. Drach. II 201.

17. Herodotus 5. 62.

18. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 155. For the exile see n. 15 above.

19. Drach. II 204.

20. Drach. II 201.

21. See J. E. Sandys, *Aristotle: Constitution of Athens* (London, 1893) 87.

22. Compare *Pythian* 6.46 with the scholia inscriptions to the ode, or the scholia on *Isthmian* 6.16 where the scholiasts have misunderstood Lampon for Themistios.

23. Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, 324-326; see also *Pindaros*, 154-156.

24. Frs. 64, 65 (Bowra).

25. That the fragments and *Nemean* 2 belong in 477 is a conclusion reached in my unpublished thesis, *The Chronology of Pindar's Persian War and Sicilian Odes*, on deposit in the Harvard University Archives.

26. See above n. 17.

27. Bacchylides 4.4.

28. The text is that of Snell, but excluding Maas' emendation in line 17, which Snell accepts.

29. R. C. Jebb, *Bacchylides* (Cambridge, 1905) 268.

30. See Jebb, *Bacchylides*, 269; compare B. Snell, *Bacchylides* (Leipzig, 1949) 14.

31. F. G. Kenyon, *Poems of Bacchylides* (London, 1897) 33.

32. Pausanias 6.12.1.

## THUCYDIDES AND PERICLES\*

BY MORTIMER H. CHAMBERS

### I

STUDIES of Thucydides in this century have not been content to treat the old problems of elucidation of the text with line-by-line commentary. We have, to be sure, gained the inestimable benefit of all that has been learned of Greek history through the more expert study of inscriptions and wider excavations; but scholars have also tried, while not neglecting the text and the events themselves, to find and to understand, behind the preserved work of Thucydides, a pattern or an evolution in his thought. The mind of Thucydides, not merely his work as historian, was the subject of Schwartz' brilliant *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Bonn 1919), in which the author sought support for a nonunitarian view of the composition of the work by showing that toward the end of his life Thucydides attained a larger conception of the causes of the Peloponnesian War, and that not all of Book I can be called representative of this later view. Few, perhaps, of the nonunitarians today subscribe to all of Schwartz' stimulating theories about the disposition of Thucydides' literary remains by his unknown editor, but Schwartz' book has remained the chief inspiration to the whole argument. Other scholars too have made their own attempts to recover information about Thucydides' mind and opinions. This is difficult, for Thucydides was aloof from his material — he does not often come forward to speak in the first person — and his compressed style, as Gomme has said, signals the complexity of his mind.<sup>1</sup>

Thucydides has frequently been caught in small errors, even though most of his statements are accurate: and, in broader terms, something has been hoped for from attempts to determine personal prejudice in him for or against particular persons. Such discoveries are rewarding; but in this search it is easy to misinterpret, or to overinterpret, Thucydides' words. For example, from his judgment on Antiphon (8.68.1) it has been thought possible to postulate a close

\* This paper was completed and in the hands of the editors before the appearance of the second and third volumes of Gomme's *Commentary on Thucydides*. — Edd.

personal relationship between the two men that may not have existed.<sup>2</sup> Again, Gomme has recently suggested, perhaps rightly, that definite bias, more than mere personal dislike, can be discovered in Thucydides' treatment of Cleon's conduct of the Amphipolis campaign.<sup>3</sup>

In the present paper I should like to state some features of Thucydides' attitude toward Pericles.<sup>4</sup> In treating this large issue, I first ask what can be said about Thucydides' political views, especially as they relate to Pericles. I then survey the relevant historical events in an effort to trace Periclean strategy before and in the early years of the war. The object of such a study ought to be first of all the recovery of the historical truth. In the light of what we recover from history, we may make the necessary corrections, if there are any, in Thucydides.

## II

We must of course be careful not to transfer to Thucydides our own attitude toward Pericles. Modern scholars are, and should be, deeply impressed with Pericles' remarkable achievements, and particularly with his ability to maintain continuous leadership for years in the shifting currents of Greek politics.<sup>5</sup> Yet there is some danger of exaggeration. H. T. Wade-Gery, for example, has declared that "the younger Thucydides was caught wholly by the glamour of Perikles; he thinks his Principate (gained over the older Thucydides' body) most admirable."<sup>6</sup> Wade-Gery further believes that Thucydides "had for Pericles a regard comparable to Plato's for Socrates, and an equal regard for Pericles' Athens."<sup>7</sup> R. W. Macan, in questioning Thucydides' alleged impartiality, rebukes him for "his determination to allow no flaw in the statecraft of Pericles."<sup>8</sup> And recently, Bayer has found that the essential element of the immortality of Thucydides' work is "das Sich-Versenken des Historikers in die ewige Gültigkeit des perikleischen Werkes."<sup>9</sup> Other citations could be offered to show that Thucydides' view of Pericles at least needs restatement.

This modern "Pericleanism" is partly due to the effect made by Pericles' funeral oration (2.35-46).<sup>10</sup> The oration is magnificent literature, full of attractive *ιδέαι*, and justly revered. But have we the right to assume at once that all the ideals expressed in the speech are Thucydides'? Pericles was the speaker: this point should be pressed and insisted on. He was the most powerful man in Athens in 431 (1.139.4). It would be entirely consistent with Thucydides'



principles of selection to present one funeral oration, not only as an example of the *patrios nomos*, but also as a dramatic picture of the aspirations and glory of Athens at the beginning of the war. Having made such a choice, Thucydides would naturally write the oration in his own heroic style. And, although I do not propose to discuss the nature of the speeches, I submit that there is a mixture of Thucydidean and Periclean thought in this oration. Surely it is what Pericles might have said, compounded with what Thucydides would have liked him to say — a dramatic portrait, in short, of the Athenian democracy as ideally it might have been. Yet one questions that Thucydides himself would have spoken so warmly of the “radical” democracy which Athens then practised. His admiration for Pericles would be satisfied by having accorded to him this place in the work; but the idealized, almost transfigured, image of Athens in the funeral speech need not be a confession of Thucydides’ own faith.

Further support for Thucydides’ admiration for Pericles has been sought in the famous estimate of Pericles at 2.65, especially 65.8–10, where the great superiority of Pericles to his successors is discussed. Not only did Pericles have outstanding qualities of personal leadership and integrity, but he was able to judge and partly to control public opinion; his successors, on the other hand, being more nearly alike in power, had to flatter the people until it came to the point of turning public affairs over to persons unable to manage them. The chapter contains emphatic approval of Pericles’ personality and *Realpolitik*. But it is to be noted that Thucydides, in praising the political arrangements of Pericles, is far from speaking of the democracy itself with favor. On the contrary, he was pleased that the democracy existed in name only, and that in fact Pericles exercised a kind of one-man rule. Thucydides found no fault with democracy so long as Pericles led it, but without such a leader the workings of a free state could lead to very bad government.<sup>11</sup>

The Periclean constitution was not a “Mischverfassung,” as the great scholar W. Schmid has recently claimed.<sup>12</sup> Schmid was trying to bring 2.65 into agreement with 8.97.2, where we have a brief political testimony from Thucydides himself. The historian there says that the constitution of the Five Thousand which succeeded the oligarchy in 411 was the best constitution practised by Athens at any time within his life.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, this time includes the constitution of the radical democracy of Pericles, of which Thucydides certainly did not approve. The distinctively excellent feature of the “best” government was the judicious mixture, *ξύγκρασις*,<sup>14</sup> of the upper and



lower classes. Such was the "Mischverfassung," and interpretation of 2.65 must, and easily does, agree with 8.97.2; and any other interpretation accords ill with the words of 2.65.9, "in theory (λόγῳ) there was a democracy, but in fact (ἔργῳ) a rule by the leading citizen." Thucydides was no radical democrat; perhaps the chief trait that he admired in Pericles was his ability to check the masses.<sup>15</sup> If Pericles had not maintained this aristocratic authority, it is doubtful whether Thucydides, whose family had traditionally cool relations with the Alcmeonids (Marc. *Vita* 2) would have accepted him so warmly. But it may be repeated that if anyone wishes to speak of Thucydides' worship of Athenian democracy, when he speaks of "the school of Hellas," he must search the text for praise, not of Pericles as statesman and as general, but of government by the free masses. Nor will such be found.

### III

There is another important question in Thucydides' view of Pericles. Even though his explicit statements about him and his constitution have been shown to imply no blind hero worship, is it possible that Thucydides may have been under sufficient prejudice in favor of Pericles to distort his view of the war and to make veracity in military strategy impossible? Such has been the bold suggestion of Wade-Gery, who believes that the strategy of the war should be divided into two different plans.<sup>16</sup> Pericles' original plan was to win the war with sudden offensive action, but the revolt of Potidaea (432) and the plague at Athens (430)<sup>17</sup> forced him to the defensive, that is, to a policy of keeping up the naval arm and of trying to gain no empire in the war (2.65.7).<sup>18</sup> Thucydides, Wade-Gery claims, was reluctant to face this failure, and accepted the defensive policy as Pericles' testament; he later sided "with the defeatist officer class against the revived offensive of Cleon."

Wade-Gery thus explains some remarkable failures of Thucydides to emphasize the significance of offensive action. This, he says, may be why the Megarian Decree, which looms so large in contemporary authors,<sup>19</sup> is mentioned but not stressed by Thucydides.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, as he shows, at 4.73.4, the capture of Megara is regarded as almost trivial by the Athenians, and they are unwilling to commit many men in an effort to take it. Conversely, the Boeotians appear (4.72.1) to take some interest in the issue: for them the danger was intimate, not ἀλλότριος. Nor is the Megarian incident fully narrated in Thucydides' account of the "immediate causes" of the war (1.24-88). So

too the offensive of Phormion in Acarnania is not dated except that it occurs before the war.<sup>21</sup>

Now, we must agree with Wade-Gery that the evidence strongly suggests that in the years immediately preceding the war and in the first years of the war Athens, under Pericles, was pursuing a policy of ambitious expansion in the north and in the west; and, down to the death of Pericles (429: 2.65.6) at least, the main theatre of the war was the western mainland and the western Peloponnese. Athens was, in fact, using her eastern empire to build empire in the west.<sup>22</sup> In his aggressiveness toward the west, Pericles was perhaps following part of the strategy of his great countryman Themistocles.<sup>23</sup> In the north, expansion was aimed at the old dream of Athens, possession of the Strymon area and of the mines in Thrace.<sup>24</sup> Already about 476 (1.98.1) the Delian League had captured Eion on the Strymon; this was during the "war of pursuit" (Wade-Gery) against Persia.<sup>25</sup> The league never succeeded, however, in dislodging Masakmes from Doriscus, where he had been left by Xerxes.<sup>26</sup> But Athens continued to try to establish position in this area: such was the motivation for the incursions at the expense of the Thasians and for the abortive attempt to found a colony at Ennea Hodoi in 465.<sup>27</sup> Pericles inherited this policy and approved of it. The following table will show Pericles' continuation of the expansion in the north.<sup>28</sup>

c. 445. Projected colony at Brea in Thrace.<sup>29</sup> We know nothing of the later fortunes of this expedition.

437/6. Foundation of Amphipolis (4.102.3) on the Strymon. The partial fulfillment of the cherished hope.

c. 436. Athenian alliance with King Perdiccas of Macedon.<sup>30</sup>

? 435/4. Expedition of Pericles to the Pontus. Foundation of As-takos, Amisos, and Sinope in Pontus and Propontis.<sup>31</sup>

432. Athens commands Potidaea to pull down her wall (1.56.2); she revolts (1.58.1).

431. Sitalkes of Thrace is won over to the Athenians; he in turn brings Perdiccas back to the Athenian side (2.29).

Concurrent with, and more important than, the northern expansion was the aggressive action of Athens toward the west. The main Periclean accomplishments westward from Athens were these:

c. 462-460. Athenian seizure of Naupactus and the settlement there of the subdued Helot rebels (1.103.3); Naupactus was a place of the first strategic importance.

456/5. Tolmides, on his *periplous* round the Peloponnese, takes Chalcis near Naupactus (1.108.5 with Gomme).<sup>32</sup>

454/3. Athens makes alliance with Egesta.<sup>33</sup>

c. 450. Athens makes alliance with the Amphictyonic League.<sup>34</sup>

444/3. Foundation of Thouria.<sup>35</sup> Although this foundation was pan-Hellenic, Athens was the moving force, and it was she who first responded to the plea for help from New Sybaris.<sup>36</sup>

443/2. Athenian alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi.<sup>37</sup>

433. Alliance with Kerkyra (1.44.1). Thucydides states that the Athenians were thinking specifically of the west in making the alliance (1.44.3), and Kerkyra had stressed, to the point of misrepresentation, her advantageous position.<sup>38</sup>

? 432. (see n. 21) Phormion in Acarnania.

? 432. The Megarian Decree.<sup>39</sup>

432. Action against Aegina (a related action, although not in the west). Aegina's normal tribute was 30 talents; but in spring 432 she paid either 9 or 14 (the first digit of her recorded quota payment is missing), and this default exposed her to an unknown Athenian punishment. She complains (1.67.2) that her autonomy has been violated.<sup>40</sup>

431. Thuc. 2.7.2-3. Information about Athenian alliances in the west. The Athenians confer with their allies (Kerkyra, Kephallenia, Zacynthus, Acarnania) regarding their plans to "fight it out round Peloponnese" (πέριξ . . . καταπολεμήσονται). These allies are mentioned at 2.9.4 in the roster of states.

431. Within the campaign year itself the following aggressive action is taken. One hundred ships attack Peloponnese and take Sollion, the Corinthian fort (2.30); annual invasions of Megara are begun (2.31) with Pericles in command; Atalante, the uninhabited island off Locris, is taken and a fort is built on it (2.32); Phormion is installed as guard at Naupactus (2.69.1).

From the foregoing it is clear that in the years preceding the war Pericles had vastly strengthened the Athenian position, and that he was apparently prepared to follow an aggressive strategy in order to win the war quickly. Pericles did not want a long war; he was aware of the danger of rebellion within the empire (1.143.5) and he was realistic enough to know that the allies would not long pay tribute, on which alone Athens kept up her empire, if they could default. The Peloponnesians were better prepared for a long war, because they depended mainly on their own bodies and will power and had not to find pay for oarsmen in a large navy.

Moreover, Pericles himself was at least sixty at the beginning of the war and was not eager to commit the state to a long struggle.<sup>41</sup> The offensive expansion carried on by Athens in the years before the war might even suggest that Pericles desired a definitive test of

strength, if it was ever to come, while he would still be alive to lead Athens. Such was the opinion, in part no doubt malicious, of some Greeks.<sup>42</sup>

The plague and the revolt of Potidaea did rob Athens of the initiative. In 430 the main theatre of the war was Epidaurus (2.56.1-4); but despite that large assault, the general opinion was that Pericles' strategy was too conservative. This was especially the opinion of the wealthier, land-owning Athenians, who had the misfortune to stand on the Acropolis or Pnyx and to see their land ravaged by the Spartans (2.21.2); yet Pericles refused to commit the Athenians to large infantry operations in Attica (2.21.3-22.1-2); his strategy was to attack Peloponnese with the navy alone (2.65.7). The Athenians of the hoplite class rightly felt that they were engaged in a war whose strategy was directly inimical to their economic interests. When popular resentment of Pericles' policy had gained sufficient strength, he was removed from office and fined (2.65.2-4) — and quickly reëlected, "such is the habit of the rabble."

After Pericles was forced to make this change in his plans, it is just this revised or defensive strategy that is emphasized most heavily by Thucydides in recording the public speeches of Pericles<sup>43</sup> and in drawing the final judgment on him as statesman (2.65). The section 2.65.12, and surely the whole chapter, was written after the end of the war, and in this chapter the sharpest contrast is drawn between the prudent strategy of Pericles — especially in keeping the free assembly from meddling in affairs — and the reckless audacity of his successors.

#### IV

Does the Periclean strategy agree with the analysis of Wade-Gery? There are really three questions to keep before us:

- (1) Did Pericles change his strategy within the war?
- (2) Did Thucydides understand this change?
- (3) Can we make any corrections in Thucydides, or is his narrative adequate?

As to the first question, Wade-Gery is right in his perception that Pericles was unable to continue his offensive plan. The evidence surveyed shows clearly that Pericles continued, even after the Thirty Years' Peace of 445, to press forward with his post-Themistoclean aggrandizement. The same strategy would have been prosecuted in the Peloponnesian War, but circumstances compelled Pericles to ac-



cept a depressing passiveness. It is also true that Pericles left the defensive war as his testament.

Thucydides nowhere explicitly says that Pericles had to change his plans, and for this failure he might be criticized. Yet he does recognize that the plague was extremely destructive to the Athenian war effort,<sup>44</sup> and the scrupulous record of the expenses of the siege of Potidaea (2.70.1) suggests that Thucydides recognized how serious that action had been. And the very fact that we can reconstruct Periclean strategy in the war from Thucydides alone ought to show that he did not wholly misunderstand the movements.

Nor can Thucydides' understanding be exploded by the answer to our third question. It is on this large question that we should follow Wade-Gery most reluctantly. The historian sided, it is said, "with the defeatist officer class against the revived offensive of Cleon."<sup>45</sup> Perhaps I miss the point in some way, but it does not really seem that the officers as a whole were defeatists regarding offensive action. Demosthenes, Laches, Phormion, and Hippocrates all carried on offensive campaigns, occasionally erring on the side of aggressiveness (Delium); and Xenophon and his colleagues showed no defeatism at Spartolus in 429, not long before the death of Pericles.<sup>46</sup> Demosthenes himself later invented the brilliant stroke, aggressive in the extreme, at Pylos, even though Cleon made it his great success. And in 415 above all, if Thucydides is to be trusted, everyone conceived a passion for the Sicilian War, officers and rabble alike.<sup>47</sup> The unforgettable departure from the Piraeus fairly breathes with optimism, and the Sicilian War failed partly just because the Athenians were always *εὐέλπιδες*. We are likely to forget, perhaps, how quickly the Greeks, and more especially the Athenians (as their antagonists the Corinthians said of them, 1.70) sprang back from disaster, as in 413 (cf., above all, 7.28.3) and early in the fourth century. Indeed, to speak generally, the courage and hardness of Athenian leadership is one of the strongest impressions that we carry away from Thucydides.

Thucydides certainly does give a critical, it may be a malicious, report of Cleon. But the main reason for this is not that Cleon was pursuing an offensive policy, but that Thucydides thought him a scoundrel — he kept the war going as a screen for his own crimes, it is said (5.16.1), and this assertion, although strong, cannot be disproved, nor Cleon rehabilitated by any ancient testimony. It is noteworthy that none of the better sort of officer is criticized for his offensive policies; even 2.65.12, although it appears to be a gen-



eral condemnation of aggressive warfare, is more critical of capricious commitments made by the demagogues in order to cling to popular favor. The Sicilian War was an error — that could be seen after 404 — but the error lay more in the intrigues of the politicians, especially concerning Alcibiades. Once again it was the pernicious influence of Cleon and his fellows that exercised Thucydides most strongly. He castigates only incompetence and irresponsibility.<sup>48</sup>

An alternate view of Thucydides' attitude toward Periclean strategy might be the following. He was aware that Pericles, perhaps by means of the Megarian Decree, was the main stimulus to war (1.144.3, 145; 2.59.2, 60.4-5) and that his personal responsibility for the war was paramount. But he regarded the war (at least in the latest stage of his thought) as the inevitable result of the expansion of Athens to the disadvantage of Sparta and Corinth (such was of course Pericles' policy), although the Peloponnesians, led by Sparta, put off going to war until the last possible moment (1.23.6, 33.3, 88, 118.2). The war once begun, Thucydides was aware of the policy of aggression, particularly in western Greece. When Pericles saw fit to adopt a defensive policy and to try to pull through,<sup>49</sup> Thucydides, who had great respect for Pericles' judgment, instantly accepted this strategy, as Wade-Gery points out. The death of Pericles left the stage open to Cleon, who made one lucky (4.39.3, 40.1) stroke at Sphacteria and then encouraged the people to try for too much (4.41.4). His timing and his recklessness, arising from his character, were worse than his grand strategy. Cleon dragged the war on, although both sides had wanted peace for some time before 421, and for this he merited rebuke. When the war reopened, the great armada of 415 offered every prospect of success to most Athenians, and it might well have happened so if the campaign had been rightly directed. Despite the disaster in 413, Athens held out for another eight years.<sup>50</sup> And it was not, after all, the Spartans (they were the most convenient enemies, 8.96.5) but the inability of the Athenian leaders to work together that — in Thucydides' view — ended the Athenian empire.<sup>51</sup>

The examination of the strategy does not indicate that Thucydides was too prejudiced concerning Pericles to give an accurate report. The most that might be said is that Thucydides did not draw attention explicitly to the change in strategy noted by Wade-Gery. As to the old question of Pericles' personal responsibility for the war, we have no information not known to Thucydides, and our decision to accept or to reject his reasons for the growth of a warlike climate

of opinion will be more or less subjective. On the view taken here, Pericles was only in part the creator of circumstances; nor must it be forgotten that a decision for war did have to be passed by the independent voters of the assembly. Pericles was prepared to risk war to preserve a large naval empire, but he thought that an ingenious system of alliances would enable him to win it quickly. He did not himself create the critical situation between Corinth and Kerkyra, when Athens had to choose between alliance with the latter and the virtual certainty that Kerkyra's navy would soon pass over to the Peloponnesians; but he welcomed the hour of decision (I.140.1, 144.3).

To summarize, Thucydides' attitude toward Pericles was favorable, but he was suspicious of sovereign action by a popular free assembly. He understood, and helped to document, Pericles' expansionist policy in the Greek world, and we can satisfactorily reconstruct from him the strategy of the war.<sup>52</sup>

## NOTES

1. A. W. Gomme, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1954) 125.

2. So e.g. Busolt, *Gr. Geschichte* III 2.622, finds a "liebevolle Würdigung" in Thucydides' text. But even the words ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς ὕστερος may imply no more than objective appraisal and recognition of merit, as is recognized by Busolt, 669. The praise of Antiphon also suggested that Thucydides had been a rhetorical pupil of the oligarch: Caecilius *ap.* [Plut.] *Mor.* 832E.

3. "Thucydides and Kleon: The Second Battle of Amphipolis," *Hellenika* 13 (1954) 1-10.

4. Naturally this subject has been much discussed. The longest recent treatment known to me is E. Bayer's "Thukydides und Perikles," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft*, 3 (1948) 1-57, esp. 44-57.

5. Plut. *Per.* 16.3 says that he held the generalship after the ostracism of Thucydides the son of Melesias not less than fifteen consecutive times. Wade-Gery, *JHS* 52 (1932) 206, has put this fact in its historical context (the fifteen years were 443-429).

6. *JHS* 52 (1932) 221.

7. *OCD* 904, "Thucydides." This article has been praised elsewhere, and rightly so.

8. *CAH* V 413.

9. *WJA* 3 (1948) 57.

10. It is not necessarily crucial to the question of Thucydides' judgment on Pericles, but in my opinion Pericles delivered a funeral oration in 431. Jacoby, *JHS* 64 (1944) 57, n. 92, doubts this, as do others.

11. That 2.65 is not an enthusiastic recommendation for democracy has not, I think, always been coolly realized. In general I agree with Busolt, III 2.668, and with G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, in *Historia* 3 (1954) 31ff.

12. *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.* (1948) I<sup>5</sup> 121.

13. It really does not much matter whether we translate οὐχ ἡκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ κ.τ.λ. as "they were best off during the first period" of this government (so, as the latest, von Fritz, *CP* 49 [1954] 92) or as "now for the first time they had their best government" (toward which I lean). Thucydides is still saying that the Five Thousand had the best constitution that he had ever known in Athens.

14. It could be shown that here Thucydides employs a familiar concept of Ionian science and latterly of contemporary medical literature, and applies it to politics. Cf. *Vorsokr.*, sixth edition, Alcmaeon B4, Parmenides B16, Empedocles A28, A86; *On Ancient Medicine* 14; *Airs, Waters, Places* 12. For full discussion in the medical literature, A.-J. Festugière's ed. of *L'ancienne médecine* (Paris 1948) 37-38 of the commentary.

15. κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, 2.65.8; so Alcibiades would be complimented as one who could κατασχεῖν τὸν ὄχλον in 411: 8.86.5.

16.  *OCD* 904.

17. D. L. Page has made an impressive case for identifying the plague with a severe epidemic of measles: *CQ* NS 3 (1953) 97-119; but cf. W. P. MacArthur, *CQ* NS 4 (1954) 171-74, with Page's reply.

18. Gomme, *JHS* 71 (1951) 70, n. 4, objects that Pericles would not have recommended inactivity along with naval action, and would read ἡσυχάζοντάς τε <τῷ δπλατικῷ>.

19. E.g. Andoc. (?) 3.8, "we went to war διὰ Μεγαρέας"; Aristophanes, *Pax* 609f. (cf. van Herwerden *ad loc.*), *Ach.* 530ff.

20. 1.139.1, 140.4; cf. 1.42.4, 67.4.

21. 2.48.7-9 with 2.9.4. 432 is not an unlikely date for this expedition: so Wade-Gery, *JHS* 52 (1932) 216, n. 45. A contradiction in this uncertain matter has slipped into Gomme's pages: *Commentary* I 199, "nor, one would suppose, early in 432," with 367, "possibly early in 432."

22. Within the empire, Chios and Lesbos were not "tributary" at the beginning of the war (1.19) and continued to supply ships toward the alliance (2.9.5).

23. Themistocles seems to have had some interest in the west. According to Herodotus (8.62) he threatened in 480 to lead his Greeks westward to Siris in Italy; and he had two daughters named Italia and Sybaris (Plut. *Them.* 32.2, quoted by Stein *ad loc.*). He had also aided Kerkyra (Thuc. 1.136.1): the scholiast here says that he prevented punishment of Kerkyra for her neutrality in the Persian War.

24. The wealth of Thrace, 2.97.3, Hdt. 6.46.

25. The scholiast to Aeschines 2.31 dates the capture of Eion to 476/5. This date is probably ultimately from Hellanicus, but the siege may have taken some time. Thucydides' narrative suggests that this was the first campaign of the new League; the siege began in 477 and ended in 476.—The scholiast to Aeschines is generally held to be trustworthy, but he has been attacked by Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (ATL) III (Princeton 1950) 170-71 ("convincingly discredited," Meiggs, *CR* NS 2 [1952] 99). The scholiast may not have used Hellanicus directly, but the ultimate source of his dates is likely to have been Hellanicus: cf. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford 1949) 88-89.

26. Hdt. 7.106. Gomme, *Commentary* I 281, 291, n. 1, is reluctant to ac-

cept what seem the clear implications of Herodotus' words, viz. that Maskanes was never dislodged and that he died in possession: Xerxes had honored him and Artaxerxes continued the honors to his family.

27. 1.100.2-3; the scholiast to Aeschines 2.31 is usually corrected to ἐπὶ Δυσίθεον (465/4).

28. A full survey of the evidence, G. F. Hill's *Sources for Greek History*, second edition, revised by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes (Oxford 1951). See index, pp. 345-47.

29. *IG*, second edition, I 45 = Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, second edition (Oxford 1946) I, no. 44. Cf. A. G. Woodhead, "The Site of Brea," *CQ* NS 2 (1952) 57-62.

30. He broke the alliance by 432: Thuc. 1.57.2. An inscription perhaps relevant to this alliance has been restored and dated c. 436 in *ATL* III 313, n. 61. A markedly different text is given in *SEG* X 86, and is there dated to 423/2.

31. Little is certain here. The expedition itself is noticed by Plut. *Per.* 20.1-2. Diod. 12.34.5 mentions Athenian foundations in Propontis under 435/4 (his text is usually emended, but Propontis is secure). It is reasonable to suppose that these two narratives are to be associated, and that Pericles was responsible for Diodorus' cities (so Miltner, *RE* 37 [1937] 775.8, Gomme, *Commentary* I 368, and others). Nor is there any reason why Diodorus' date cannot be correct. Cf. *ATL* III 114-17, where it is suggested that Pericles' expedition may have occurred c. 450, mainly by calculations concerning the probable age of Lamachus at this time. But the age of Lamachus does not seem crucial to the chronology; and *ATL* here passes over the date offered by Diodorus (cf., however, *ATL* I 472 with n. 1, III 288, n. 68).

32. This date too depends on the scholia to Aeschines 2.75. This date too has been questioned by *ATL* (III 171), but is here retained.

33. *IG* second edition, I 19 = Tod 31. The date 454/3 must be retained: Pritchett, *CP* 47 (1952) 263. It is idle to object that the alliance follows too closely on the Athenian defeat in Egypt in 454 (for this date, Gomme, *Commentary* I 410) and should therefore be dated in another year. Hundreds of assumptions are made in the study of Greek history, and many could be made to account for this sequence of events. Meanwhile Diod. 11.86 provides the best historical framework for dating the decree.

34. *IG* second edition, I 26 = Tod 39; last discussion: Meritt, *AJP* 75 (1954) 369-73. Meritt dates the decree c. 458; *SEG* X 18, c. 450/49; Meiggs and Andrewes (*supra*, n. 28), "before 445," as Tod. Any mid-century date may stand for our purpose.

35. Dated [Plut.] *Mor.* 835 D. *Thouria* is the correct Thucydidean form: Wade-Gery, *JHS* 52 (1932) 217, n. 48. Cf., however, Ehrenberg, *AJP* 69 (1948) 149, n. 1.

36. Diod. 12.10 (under 446/5). Cf. Wade-Gery (*supra*, n. 35) 217-19, who shows that the foundation was favored by two Periclean *oikists* and conjectures that Thucydides the son of Melesias opposed unilateral Athenian action.

37. These treaties were renewed in 433/2: *IG* second edition, I 51-52 = Tod 58-57. It is inferred that they were ten-year alliances; and 443/2 would fit well with the known foundation of Thouria one year earlier.

38. On the Kerkyra-Corinth debate, Calder, *CJ* 50 (1955) 179-80, esp. 180, n. 3.



39. We do not know when the decree was passed save that it was before late summer 432 (1.67.4). Völkl, *RhM* NF 94 (1951) 330, n. 3, has misunderstood the scholiast to Ar. *Pax* 605, who speaks only of the complaint, not about the passing of the decree; rightly Brunt, *AJP* 72 (1951) 271, n. 8; but Brunt wishes to date the decree some years before 432.

40. *ATL* III 303, n. 10; 320. The quota record, *ATL* II list 22, I. 88. Perhaps it is worth noting that B. W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta* (London 1927) 8, n. 1, thought that the missing digit was 50.

41. *IG* second edition, II 2318. 9-11: he was *choregos* for Aeschylus (*Persians*) in 472, and was therefore born c. 490 at latest. The consideration of Pericles' age seems to me to weigh against the suggestion of de Sanctis, *Pericle* (Milan 1944) 249, that Pericles wanted to delay the war until 421, when Argos would be free of her thirty-year treaty with Sparta and would be able to join Athens.

42. E.g. Diod. 12.38.2-4 (Ephorus): he had to conceal his improper use of public funds; so too Aristodemus, *FGrHist* 104 F 16.4; Thucydides may be replying to this accusation in 2.65.8; cf. Plut. *Per.* 30-32. Thucydides allows Pericles to admit that the Athenians thought that he has persuaded them to go to war, 2.60.4.

43. E.g. 1.141.5, 143.5; 2.13, esp. 13.9.

44. The plague was "the most injurious and in part destroyed them," 1.23.3.

45. I do not wish to be oversubtle, but I pause over the concept of an officer class in the Athenian army. No doubt prominent aristocrats like Alcibiades and Nicias held some post of command even when they were not generals, and to this degree an officer class existed. But it must be remembered that there was no regular Athenian officer corps as there is in modern armies; and I am unable to find evidence showing that a man could not serve as e.g., a *taxiarch* or *lochagos* one year and as a private hoplite the next. If the soldiers in the army of the Ten Thousand followed normal Greek practice when they had to choose new officers (Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.38-47), as seems likely, officers below the level of strategos were also chosen by mass vote, and "class" distinctions might not always be controlling.

46. 2.79; Pericles died about September 429 (2.65.6), that is, a little later in the summer, probably about the time of Phormion's victories at Naupactus: in the narrative, the summer ends at 2.92.

47. At 6.24.3 Thucydides gives the several reasons that attracted everyone toward the venture, carefully distinguishing the upper classes, it would seem, from "the common people and the soldiery."

48. 2.65's comments on Pericles' successors are rather rhetorical. Thucydides accuses the demagogues of undertaking many plans "seemingly extraneous to the war, for the sake of private ambition and private profit," and says that they planned badly "for themselves and for the allies." But he also admits that sometimes these plans succeeded (65.7). He gives no details, but he was perhaps thinking of Cleon's audacious raid at Pylos. But should a successful raid be criticized merely because it was undertaken for private glory? Thucydides thought so: he was disgusted with Cleon personally, and did not always separate this feeling from his verdict on Cleon's strategy.

49. *περιέτεσθαι*, 1.144.1; 2.13.9, 65.7.

50. For *τρίτα*, 2.65.12, read *δκτώ*. So far I agree with R. Shilleto *ad loc.*



But I do not think that in *τριαμεν* "a participle is lurking"; and there is no difficulty about *μὲν. ὀκτῶ μὲν ἔτη* should be taken as coördinate with *καὶ οὐ πρότερον* farther on (Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, second edition [Oxford 1954] 374).

51. The folly of the demos after Arginusae was another severe blow to Athenian leadership. Yet Ferguson argues strongly (*CAH* V 361) that the end of the war was not predictable; and the surprise of Aegospotami need never have happened. Truly "with the suddenness and unexpectedness of a clap of thunder from a clear sky the great war was over."

52. I am very grateful to Professors H. Bloch and S. Dow and to Mr. W. M. Calder for generous assistance. I owe a special debt to Professor H. T. Wade-Gery, without whose inspiring teaching this paper would not have been written.

## THEOPHRASTUS AND STYLISTIC DISTINCTIONS

BY GEORGE A. KENNEDY

THE theory that there are three types or characters of style — one elevated, one intermediate, and one plain — is an important part of the rhetorical theory of the first century B.C. and has usually been regarded as at least somewhat older. Until about fifty years ago everyone was confident that it was originated by Theophrastus in his work *On Style*. Did not Dionysius of Halicarnassus expressly say (*Dem.* 3) that Theophrastus had chosen Thrasyarchus as an example of the mixed style? In 1904, however, Professor Hendrickson of Yale attempted to prove <sup>1</sup> that Theophrastus had spoken of the style of Thrasyarchus not as intermediate between an elevated and a plain style, as everyone had supposed, but as conforming to a "peripatetic" mean between two vices. In the following year Hendrickson advanced his own theory of the origin of the three stylistic characters, which he thought to be derived from the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic.<sup>2</sup> Not long afterward Stroux similarly denied the Theophrastan authority of the characters <sup>3</sup> and soon other scholars subscribed to the same view.<sup>4</sup> More recently there has been a partial reversal of opinion, at least in Europe. Jensen produced some evidence to show that the characters were a part of poetic theory by the time of Crates of Mallos <sup>5</sup> and later found signs of the existence of the same situation as early as the fourth century before Christ.<sup>6</sup> Körte, too, questioned Stroux' conclusion,<sup>7</sup> and in the authoritative Pauly-Wissowa article on rhetoric <sup>8</sup> Kroll returned to the old position that the stylistic characters were known to Theophrastus.<sup>9</sup> On this side of the Atlantic Hendrickson's authority has prevailed and was recently supported by G. M. A. Grube in two studies of Theophrastus' place in literary criticism.<sup>10</sup>

This protracted dissension seems to me to result from two related factors: first, the failure of many scholars to recognize that the theory of the characters, or something like it, is a quite necessary part of any theory of style, and second, their consequent failure to see that this theory begins at a very early date. Any theory of style worthy of the name must recognize that different writers, or even a single writer at different times, will write equally well, but in quite

different ways. That is, it must distinguish some categories of style other than just "good" and "bad." It need not recognize three categories labeled "grand," "middle," and "plain," each with a distinctive diction and each with an exemplary author, but it must, if it is to have any wide applicability, recognize at an early date some sort of stylistic distinctions. Throughout antiquity a single, gradually developing theory of style was current. It was accepted by an overwhelmingly distinguished and widely varying series of literary artists. One of the reasons for its success was probably its provisions for diversity and originality of expression, provisions which were incorporated at a very early point in its development.

Practically all elements of traditional rhetorical theory seem to have had some beginnings by the middle of the fourth century B.C. In *elocutio*, the theory pertaining to style, this is true of the accounts of the virtues, tropes, figures, composition, amplification, and commonplaces. It also seems true of the characters, the first germ of which I see in Plato's *Republic* 397C. Plato there distinguishes two types of poetry which roughly correspond to the dramatic and narrative. He then proceeds to describe the "narrative" as involving a single suitable pitch and rhythm, while the other requires every kind of variation:

Ἐὰρ οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυχάνουσι τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἐξάμφοτέρων τινὶ ξυγκεραννύντες; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

"Do not all poets and orators make use of one of these types of style or a mixture of the two?"

"They must," he said.

Plato, therefore, acknowledges, though with different motives from the later rhetoricians, a division of literature into at least three styles, one involving much stylistic variation, one very plain, and one mixed. He is not only making stylistic distinctions, but they are threefold.

This theory (or a collateral form of it) seems to have been taken up and developed first by the writers on poetics rather than by the rhetoricians. Plato himself is, of course, talking primarily about poetry. Furthermore, the doctrine of three or more styles serves primarily an analytical purpose. That is, it describes existing qualities in existing writers, but hardly teaches future writers how to produce the same qualities. This analytical point of view is characteristic of poetic theory which is most often concerned with the

evaluation of existing poetry. Rhetoric, on the other hand, has always a primarily educational purpose: to teach men to speak, not to describe what has been spoken. There are, of course, works of an analytical nature which make use of portions of the rhetorical system, and it is no accident that the characters of style are most highly developed in such works. I have in mind, for example, Cicero's *Brutus* and Dionysius' *On The Ancient Orators*, which, though didactic enough, are not rhetorical handbooks and thus not part of the pure rhetorical tradition.

The most important passages on stylistic distinction in poetry are, naturally, those in Aristotle. First comes a fragment of the dialogue *On The Poets* preserved by Diogenes Laertius (8.57; cf. Rose *Arist. Frag.* 70):

ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ποιητῶν φησιν ὅτι καὶ Ὅμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονεν, μεταφορητικός τε ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος.

This passage does not necessarily prove that other styles were completely determined, but it can hardly be doubted that something corresponding to a grand style was understood to exist. In the *Poetics* (1447b) Aristotle objects to the classification of Empedocles as poetry on the basis of the subject matter, and it is thus quite clear that the classification here is purely stylistic.

The *Poetics* itself does not contain an explicit distinction of styles of poetry. It does, however, contain a distinction which may be described as not unrelated. In 1460b Aristotle says:

ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ μιμητῆς ὁ ποιητῆς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἢ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμείσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν τι αἰεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷα φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει (ἢ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν) ἢ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς. καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεως ἐστί, δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς.

What some of these styles of diction are may be seen in 1459a:

τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλὰ μάλιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς διθυράμβοις, αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς, αἱ δὲ μεταφοραὶ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἥρωικοῖς ἅπαντα χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμείσθαι ταῦτα ἀρμόττει τῶν ὀνομάτων ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσαιτο.

Thus, as in the dialogue *On The Poets*, the epic is equated with a grand style making use of all forms of ornate diction, while iambic poetry is singled out for its simple conversational style, and the dithyramb is given a middle place.

There are, therefore, a number of indications that by the middle

of the fourth century the critics were dividing poetry into elaborate, intermediate, and simple styles, whether on the basis of pitch and rhythm, as in Plato, or diction, as in Aristotle.<sup>11</sup> It is to be expected that these distinctions would influence the rhetoricians. But to what extent did they do so?

Diogenes Laertius (6.15) attributed to Antisthenes (cf. L. Radermacher, "Artium Scriptores," *SBWein* 227 [1952] B XIX 4, p. 120) a work entitled *On Style, or On Characters*. To say, however, that this discussed the three characters of style is probably going too far.<sup>12</sup> I believe that it did involve stylistic distinctions, but of a different sort than those which concern us here. Consideration of this topic will have to be deferred to a future article.

More closely connected with the development of the characters of style is Isocrates' *Panegyricus* 11:

καίτοι τινὲς ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ιδιώτας ἔχουσι καὶ λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοις. καὶ τοσοῦτον διημαρτήκασιν ὥστε τοὺς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν πεποιημένους πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς περὶ τῶν ιδίων συμβολαίων σκοποῦσιν, ὥσπερ ὁμοίως δέον ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς μὲν ἀφελῶς, τοὺς δ' ἐπιδεικτικῶς, ἢ σφας μὲν διορῶντας, τὰς μετριότητας, τὸν δ' ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενον λέγειν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν.

Here seem to be recognized two *genera dicendi* corresponding in general to two *genera causarum*, but with the addition of a middle course, which is apparently regarded as a mixture of the other two.

A similar form of this stylistic distinction appears in Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1413b):

δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστω γένει ἀρμόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστικὴ, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανικὴ. ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι.

A few lines further on Aristotle outlines the qualities of a demegoric, of a dicanic, and of an epideictic style. The outstanding difference between them is the amount of "finish" (*ἀκρίβεια*), the same quality with which Isocrates was concerned. It is to be most marked in epideictic, least in deliberative oratory.

From these passages it seems safe to conclude that like the poetic critics, the rhetoricians of the fourth century were accustomed to distinguish types of style, and that ordinarily the number of types was three, no matter what the basis of distinction might be. In Aristotle there are at least two such bases, that of diction, utilized in the *Poetics*, and that of the *genera causarum*, utilized in the *Rhetoric*.

We may, therefore, regard it as certain that Theophrastus could have distinguished types of style, since such distinctions were being



made in and before his day. It seems most likely that he would be influenced by the forms of those distinctions made by Aristotle.

In demonstrating that he was so influenced, I would like to avoid as much as possible the controversial third section of Dionysius' *Demosthenes*. It is, however, essential to assume that the third book of Cicero's *De oratore* has been heavily influenced in organization and in its rhetorical *praecepta* by Theophrastus' *Περὶ λέξεως*. This view has been generally accepted and was adequately demonstrated by Stroux.<sup>13</sup> The organization on the basis of the four virtues of style is the primary indication. Such an assumption leads to the conclusion that Theophrastus may be regarded as a kind of half-way point between Aristotle and Cicero. On many points Cicero presents a fully developed theory corresponding to hints or short comments thrown out by Aristotle. Usually these topics have the same relative position in the organization of the two works, and it can often be demonstrated from other sources that they were elaborated or developed by Theophrastus, who is thus Cicero's source. The reconstruction of Theophrastus must thus be based on a comparison of the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with the third book of the *De oratore*, and upon such explicit references to Theophrastus' teachings as can be found.

In *De oratore* III Cicero discusses stylistic distinctions in three principal passages. In the third of these, section 210, Cicero takes up the fourth of the virtues of style, propriety, and discusses it in terms of what style to use on what occasion. Criminal trials, he says, require one kind, civil another; different audiences will be better suited by different styles. Then (212):

Itaque hoc loco sane est quod praecipi posse videatur, nisi ut figuram orationis plenioris et tenuioris et item illius mediocris ad id, quod agemus, accommodatam deligamus.

This discussion, which as we see here involves the three types of style, constitutes the topic of propriety and follows immediately on that of ornamentation. It corresponds to the twelfth chapter of the third book of the *Rhetoric*, which we quoted above (p. 96), which is also devoted to propriety, and which, as in Cicero, follows immediately after the discussion of ornamentation. On the basis of this correspondence alone it is likely that the topic of the appropriate style was discussed by Theophrastus, but there is even more positive evidence, and evidence pointing to a threefold stylistic distinction. Aristotle, it will be remembered, made his different styles

correspond to the three different types of oratory — deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Theophrastus did much the same thing according to the explicit testimony of Quintilian (3.8.61–62):

Verborum autem magnificentia non validius est adfectanda suasorias declamantibus, sed contingit magis; nam et personae fere magnae fingentibus placent, regum, principum, senatus, populi et res ampliores; ita cum verba rebus aptentur, ipso materiae nitore clarescunt. Alia veri consilii ratio est, ideoque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omni adfectione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem, sectus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui, quanquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet.

This seems to me to be sufficient proof of the presence in Theophrastus *Περὶ λέξεως* of a discussion corresponding to *Rhetoric* 1414a and *De oratore* 3.210ff. It must be noticed that Quintilian says *sermonem* — “diction” — and implies throughout the passage that difference in style is a difference in diction. We may conclude that Theophrastus distinguished a diction which was appropriate to deliberative oratory, and perhaps that he also distinguished a style of diction for forensic and epideictic oratory.

Now this distinction of three styles on the basis of diction is, as we have seen, a characteristic of poetics, not of rhetoric, and particularly of Aristotelian poetics. Theophrastus seems to have applied the styles of diction as outlined in the *Poetics* to the types of oratory of the *Rhetoric*, thus combining two separate distinctions of his master. He then discussed the topic in a passage corresponding to *Rhetoric* 1414a and to *De oratore* 3.210ff., which means that it was at the end of the work. Did it first appear there or had he already referred to it?<sup>14</sup>

Probably he had already done so in a passage of which a part is preserved in *De oratore* 3.2.5ff. The argument may be presented somewhat as follows: It has been suggested<sup>15</sup> that a portion of the beginning of the *Περὶ λέξεως* is preserved in Ammonius' commentary to Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (p. 65, line 31 Busse). According to Ammonius, Theophrastus divided the study of language into two parts, one having reference to the subject matter, the other to the audience. Poetics and rhetoric belong to the second part. There is nothing very extraordinary about such a division, which goes back at least to Plato's *Ion* and was an important part of poetic criticism.<sup>16</sup> This is not, however, a point of view with which Cicero could be expected to agree. In making use of the *Περὶ λέξεως* he quite reverses the meaning, but nevertheless it is a corresponding idea with

which he begins the technical discussion of the third book of *De oratore* immediately after the preface (3.19):

Nam cum omnis ex re atque verbis constet oratio, neque verba sedem habere possunt si rem subtraxeris neque res lumen si verba semoveris.

This is then developed into a short discussion of unity which precedes our passage on diverse styles. Again, after the discussion of styles, comes the distinction of the Theophrastan virtues (37). The fact that the passage in question is both preceded and followed by passages of a Theophrastan origin is the first indication of its own Theophrastan origin.

Furthermore, the passage itself contains material from an Aristotelian source which is quite likely to have been transmitted by Theophrastus. When Cicero at last takes up literary style he begins with the poets (*De or.* 3.27). Aristotle had done the same thing in *Rhetoric* 1404a20, but gave a cross reference to the *Poetics* for further information. It seems likely that Theophrastus followed up the cross reference and incorporated material from the *Poetics* at this point. The latter work repeatedly connects diversity in literary styles and diversity in artistic styles<sup>17</sup> and these same topics are found in close proximity in the very section of *De oratore* under consideration. Of the artists cited by Aristotle only Zeuxis is also referred to by Cicero. In place of the others Cicero adds three fourth-century artists who would have been known to Theophrastus, but whom Aristotle would perhaps not have regarded as sufficiently classic to be used as examples. The comparison of artists and orators becomes a commonplace of ancient rhetoric. Probably the most extensive discussion is in the tenth chapter of the twelfth book of Quintilian. It begins (12.10.3):

Primi quorum quidem opera non vetustatis modo gratia visenda sunt, clari pictores fuisse dicuntur Polygnotus atque Aglaophon.

That the source of this statement is Theophrastus is proved by Pliny the Elder (7.56.205) who remarks that the Egyptians were the first to paint pictures:

Et in Graecia Euchir Daedali cognatus ut Aristoteli placet, ut Theophrasto Polygnotus Atheniensis.

It is exceedingly unlikely that Quintilian made direct use of Theophrastus.<sup>18</sup> He probably began with the material in *De oratore* 3.26, since all the artists referred to by Cicero are mentioned by

Quintilian, and then amplified the account from Varro or some other author in the Xenocratic-Antigonan tradition of art criticism in which the Theophrastus fragment was buried. The Xenocratic tradition made use of an historical basis completely lacking in *De oratore*, but present in Quintilian. The situation in *De oratore* indicates that the Theophrastan form was also nonhistorical, and thus the statement that Polygnotus was the first painter was probably merely parenthetical.<sup>19</sup>

Of course, we do not know that the reference to Polygnotus necessarily came from the *Περὶ λέξεως*, and it is true that Polygnotus does not appear in the passage in *De oratore*. But these objections are not unanswerable. The list of the works of Theophrastus in Diogenes Laertius (5.42) does not include any works on art or painting to which it would be necessary to attribute the fragment. Second, Polygnotus is one of the artists cited by Aristotle for stylistic comparison (cf. *Poetics* 1448a and 1450a) and thus a logical artist for Theophrastus to cite, and third, Quintilian's source coupled Polygnotus with Aglaophon. Cicero does have Aglaophon.

Finally, proof of the Theophrastan origin of the comparison of artists and orators is preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Isoc.* 3). At the beginning of the chapter Dionysius says:

καθόλου δὲ τριῶν ὄντων, ὥς φησι Θεόφραστος, ἐξ ὧν γίνεται τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ περιττὸν ἐν λέξει . . . ,

at the end:

δοκεῖ δὴ μοι μὴ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τις ἂν εἰκάσαι τὴν μὲν Ἰσοκράτους ῥητορικὴν τῇ Πολυκλείτου τε καὶ Φειδίου τέχνῃ κατὰ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ μεγαλότεχνον καὶ ἀξιωματικόν, τὴν δὲ Λυσίου τῇ Καλάμιδος καὶ Καλλιμάχου τῆς λεπτότητος ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς χάριτος.

The similarity of the triad μέγα, σεμνόν, περιττόν το μεγαλότεχνον, σεμνόν, ἀξιωματικόν clearly points to the assumption that *τις* is Theophrastus. The Isocrates-Polycleitus comparison is also in accord with *De oratore* 3.26 where Polycleitus is similarly the example of the middle style.<sup>20</sup>

At this point we need more source material and can find it only in the introduction to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' essay on Demosthenes. We shall still ignore the explicit reference to Theophrastus in chapter three other than for the purpose of noting that Theophrastus was in Dionysius' mind at the time. But many of the qualities of this introduction — by which I mean the first seven sections — seem to me to resemble what we now know of Theophrastus' *Περὶ λέξεως*.



First of all, Grube has clearly shown<sup>21</sup> that the stylistic distinctions of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are made on the basis of diction. Not only was this true of Theophrastus' distinctions, but the distinctions themselves correspond. The style of Thucydides is called by Dionysius (*Dem.* 1 *ad fin.*): ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἅπασι συμπληρωμένη.

This is the grand poetic style taken over by Theophrastus at Aristotle's suggestion from the *Poetics* 1459a. Similarly the plain style is based in both cases (*Dem.* 2 *init.* and *Poetics* 1459a) on common conversational language, and the third stands between the other two.

Second, it must be noted that throughout Dionysius' introduction there is not one word of Demosthenes. The styles of diction are discussed and illustrated on the basis of authors whose artistic reputation was accepted in Theophrastus' time, whereas the study of the style of Demosthenes does not seem to have begun until about the middle of the third century.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, they are the authors whom one would expect Theophrastus to use. In the source passage from the *Rhetoric* (1404a) Gorgias is taken as the example of poetic diction in prose. Theophrastus undoubtedly made similar use of him. As in Dionysius and practically all ancient rhetoricians Lysias was probably the example of the plain style. Both Cicero and Dionysius speak of his precision (*subtilitatem* in *De or.* 3.28 and τὸ ἀκριβές in Dionysius, *Dem.* 4), and since the quality is used in distinguishing style by Aristotle (cf. *supra* p. 96) it too is probably Theophrastan. Gorgias and Lysias are near contemporaries. If Thrasymachus was the example of the middle style (as of course Dionysius says he was) all three examples were contemporaries, as Dionysius remarks (*Dem.* 2). I see no reason to believe that Theophrastus instanced either Thucydides or Plato in his distinction of styles. Their inclusion by Dionysius is a typical development of the first century which systematically extended rhetoric to include history and philosophy, partly perhaps because of the disappearance of political oratory. Isocrates may, however, have been included. He was an orator, he had been frequently used as a source of examples by Aristotle, he is mentioned by Cicero in the related passage (*De or.* 3.28), and *suavitas*, there attributed to him, may correspond to the καλλιλογία which Dionysius mentions (*Dem.* 4).

The final point in common between Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Demosthenes* and what we know of Theophrastan stylistic distinction is that in both style is related to a certain extent to the *genera causarum*. At the beginning of the Dionysius passage Gorgias is



especially connected with epideictic, as the polished style was connected by Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1414a). In the second chapter it is said that deliberative and forensic oratory employ mostly the plain style. Aristotle similarly grouped these classes into what he called agonistic oratory and which he opposed to the high finish required of written epideictic (*Rhetoric* 1413b).

In the face of all this evidence, there can hardly be any doubt of the meaning of the reference to Theophrastus in the third chapter of the *Demosthenes*:

τρίτη λέξεως . . . ἦν ἡ μικτή τε καὶ σύνθετος ἐκ τούτων τῶν δυεῖν, ἦν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἀρμοσάμενος καὶ καταστήσας εἰς τὸν νῦν ὑπάρχοντα κόσμον ἔτε Θερασύμαχος ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ἦν, ὡς οἶται Θεόφραστος, εἴτε ἄλλος τις, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Clearly this means that there was a third style of diction which was, in the opinion of Theophrastus, first employed by Thrasyarchus and which has some of the elements of the poetic style of Gorgias and some of those of the simple style of Lysias. From the Aristotelian passage quoted earlier (cf. *supra* p. 95) it is likely that Theophrastus allowed to this middle style the use of words coined by compounding and the use of metaphors, but not of glosses, which belong only to the elaborate Gorgianic diction.<sup>23</sup>

There remain two points to consider. The first is the relation of section 199 of the third book of *De oratore* to Theophrastus. It discusses the three styles, but neither relates them to diction nor to the *genera causarum* and is thus probably not basically Theophrastan and was probably inserted by Cicero into the Theophrastan structure, as were the lists of figures which immediately follow. The second point is the location in the *Περὶ λέξεως* of the discussion of the three styles. It seems to have taken its origin from the mention of Gorgias and the cross reference to the *Poetics* at the end of the first chapter of the *Rhetoric*. Thus it belongs near the beginning of the work and constituted a kind of introduction. Theophrastus then probably remarked that all three styles, nevertheless, demanded the same four virtues, and the work proceeded as Stroux arranged it. This is confirmed by the reference to the artists and poets, as well as to Isocrates, in *De oratore* 3.25ff., the fact that a much amplified version of the same was used as an introduction by Dionysius, and by the fact that the three *figurae* are the first topic of *elocutio* in the *Ad Herennium* (4.11), where the discussion is also closely connected to diction. Thus the characters took on a kind of commonplace value as a preface. That part

of the *Περὶ λέξεως* which corresponded to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1413b and Cicero's *De oratore* 3.209ff. undoubtedly only revived the topic and treated it, largely in terms of the *genera causarum*, under stylistic propriety. The revival of the topic here at the end of the work no doubt served the additional purpose of tying the whole together.

There are greater problems suggested by the study of the ancient characters of style, but it seemed first necessary to clarify their early history which has been so obscured. My conclusions on that subject have been drawn on the basis of a comparison of Aristotle, Cicero, and Dionysius. They are, in brief, that stylistic distinctions were commonly made in the fourth century B.C., that the topic was known to Theophrastus, and that he touched upon it in the beginning and again at the end of the *Περὶ λέξεως*.

## NOTES

1. G. L. Hendrickson, "The Peripatetic Mean of Style and the Three Stylistic Characters," *AJP* 25 (1904) 125-146.

2. G. L. Hendrickson, "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style," *AJP* 26 (1905) 249-290.

3. Johannes Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi* (Leipzig 1912) 89ff. and esp. 119-120. Also Stroux' review of Kroll, *BPW* 34 (1914) 106-7.

4. Theodor Herrle, *Quaestiones rhetoricae ad elocutionem pertinentes* (Leipzig 1912) 18-20 and Hermann Mutschmann, review of Stroux, *BPW* 34 (1914) 195-203.

5. Christian Jensen, *Philodemos ueber die Gedichte, fünftes Buch* (Berlin 1923) esp. 170-4. This had been believed before, cf. Mutschmann, review of Stroux in *BPW* 34, 200.

6. Christian Jensen, "Herakleides vom Pontos bei Philodem und Horaz," *SBBerlin* (1936) 303-7.

7. A. Körte, "Character," *Hermes* 64 (1929) 69-86, esp. 79-83.

8. *Supplementband* 7, col. 1074.

9. Earlier discussions of the characters of style were W. Schmid, "Zur Antiken Stillehre," *RhM* 49 (1894) 133-61, L. Radermacher, "Theophrast *Περὶ λέξεως*," *RhM* 54 (1899) 374-80 (a reply to Schmid), and W. Kroll, "Randbemerkungen," *RhM* 62 (1907) 86-101 (a reply to Hendrickson).

10. G. M. A. Grube, "Thrasymachus, Theophrastus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus," *AJP* 73 (1952) 251-267 and "Theophrastus as a Literary Critic," *TAPA* 83 (1952) 179. Cf. also F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJP* 62 (1941) 183.

11. If Jensen's reconstruction is correct, the poetic theory of Heracleides Ponticus included still another distinction, one on the basis of intensity and weight. (Cf. Jensen, "Herakleides vom Pontos," 303-4.) The Heracleidean authorship was not much approved by A. Rostahni, "Cronache E. Commenti" *RFIC* n. s. 15 (1937) 99-100, but was accepted by Kroll, *RE* suppl. 7, col. 1074. The passage, but badly preserved in Philodemus, might be translated somewhat as follows: "And how do poems which lack tension differ from

those which are expanded? And how is it that he [Heracleides, according to Jensen] thinks these poems and those in the middle style only are fit subjects for ornamentation? And how is it that narrative is a prerogative of the middle style and even more so of light poems? And for that matter, what sort of a poem is heavy and not light?"

The important fact here is that poetry is divided into classes not on the basis of its subject matter or even its outward form (narrative or dramatic), but on the basis of literary qualities of the poetry itself. Even if Jensen is wrong in identifying Heracleides as the author of the theory to which Philodemus objects, nevertheless, such distinctions were at least being made in the following century. Jensen's study of Crates of Mallos (cf. *Philodemos* 146ff. esp. 170-174) shows clearly the process of classification of authors and works which continued throughout the Hellenistic period. In connexion with the distinction of characters of style by the grammarians it should be remembered that Tauriscus, the pupil of Crates, discusses *πλάσματα καὶ χαρακτῆρες* as a part of criticism. (Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Math* 1.248.)

12. Cf. C. Jensen, "Herakleides vom Pontos," 305, n. 4 and A. Rostagni, "Un Nuovo capitolo della retorica e della sofista," *Studi Italiani di filologia classica*, n. s. 2 (1922) 150-154.

13. Cf. J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti*, esp. 54ff. The recent attempt of Grube ("Theophrastus as a Literary Critic," *TAPA* 83 [1952] 180-1) to refute Stroux does not seem to me to succeed. The theory of four virtues is surely older than Cicero, who attributes (*Orat.* 79) all four to Theophrastus, and I see no reason to doubt him. They arise easily from the qualities demanded of style by Aristotle and accord with the other forms of classification practised in the fourth century.

14. Stroux is surely wrong (6off.) in trying to reverse the last two virtues of style in Theophrastus from their arrangement in *De oratore*, for Cicero and Aristotle correspond in this respect.

15. Cf. G. L. Hendrickson, "Origin and Meaning," 255-6 and n. 1.

16. Cf. J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1934) I 173-6.

17. Cf. 1448a; 1450a; 1460b; and 1461b.

18. Cf. Otto Angermann, *De Aristotele rhetorum auctore* (Leipzig 1904) 28-50.

19. On the history of art criticism cf. E. Sellers, *The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art* (London 1896) xiii-C, and R. G. Austin, "Quintilian on Painting and Statuary," *CQ* 38 (1944) 17-26.

20. There are a number of other comparisons of writers to artists in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but they contain non-Theophrastan elements, e. g., the idea of imitation (Dinarchus 7 *ad fin.*) or the historical approach (*Isaeus* 4).

21. G. Grube, "Thrasymachus, Theophrastus," 263-7.

22. Engelbert Drerup, *Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums* (Würzburg, 1923) 92.

23. The passage on Thrasymachus in Dionysius' *Lys.* 6 seems to relate only to composition and not to be part of the theory of styles.

## LUCRETIUS' INTERPRETATION OF THE PLAGUE

BY H. S. COMMAGER, JR.

ACCORDING to his editors, Lucretius in his account of the plague at Athens (6.1138-1286) is guilty of mistranslation, misrepresentation, and a general lack of competence with regard to his source, Thucydides. Munro finds that he "more than once misapprehends or misinterprets his [Thucydides'] words"; Bailey notes several "serious mistakes in interpretation," while Ernout and Robin go so far as to suggest the existence of a Latin translation which Lucretius uses.<sup>1</sup> In general, however, a close and direct dependence upon the Greek author is recognized: editors must, after all, assume this before they can attack Lucretius for his divergences. Hence to exclaim over every similarity would be fatuous. On the other hand, it is not within the scope of this paper to catalogue every alteration or addition which Lucretius makes.<sup>2</sup> Rather, I would examine in detail some of the errors singled out most frequently. The prevailing view assumes that these represent random lapses from an otherwise faithful account; yet if considered together they betray a remarkable pattern. Lucretius appears to be viewing physical phenomena in moral or psychological terms, especially the terms of fear and desire, held by Epicurean doctrine to be the two principal obstacles to happiness. And from this tendency to see physical facts and events in nonphysical terms, rather than from the carelessness imputed to him by his editors, Lucretius' deviations from Thucydides arise.

The first of these changes occurs in 6.1152:

morbida vis in cor maestum confluxerat aegris,  
inde ubi per fauces pectus complerat et ipsum  
omnia tum vero vitae claustra lababant. 6.1151-3

*Cor*, as every editor since Victorius has pointed out, is a mistranslation of Thucydides' καρδίαν (2.49.3) which means stomach.<sup>3</sup> Lucretius, moreover, adds *maestum*, for which there is no warrant in the Greek.<sup>4</sup> The mistranslation *cor maestum*, Bailey (*ad loc.*) notes, "anticipates the misinterpretation of μετὰ ταλαιπωρίας" (2.49.4). Here Lucretius uses *anxius angor* (1158). This is an unusual phrase, particularly as applied to physical pain. Lucretius



uses these words only rarely, and in each case in a striking context. *Anxius angor* as a phrase occurs only once otherwise, referring to Tityos, the mythological representative of man beset by passionate desire:

sed Tityos nobis hic est, in amore iacentem  
quem volucres lacerant atque exest anxius angor  
aut alia quavis scindunt cuppedine curae. 3.992-4

*Anxius angor* here has clear reference to the psychological fact of *cupido*, which with *metus* forms the principal obstacle to a life of happiness, according to Epicurean dogma.<sup>5</sup> *Anxius* alone appears again in the proem to the sixth book: *anxia corda* remain in human beings, despite their physical comforts (6.14). That they remain is the result of *cupido atque timor* (6.25).<sup>6</sup>

These are the only uses of *anxius*. *Angor*, besides its reference to Tityos (*anxius angor*, see above), occurs only twice. Rejecting the *timor* that there may be a life after death, Lucretius ridicules the notion that any *angor* for our former selves afflicts us (3.853). Again the context is not a physical one, but that of the fear of death. The other use of *angor*, only fifty lines later, is actually a hendiadys, identifying *angore metuque* (3.903). Man after death, affirms Lucretius, will be subject to no *doloribus aegris* (905). *Angat*, the verbal form, occurs only once, in reference not to fear, but to its companion desire:

nequiquam, quoniam medio de fonte leporum  
surgit amari aliquid quod in ipsis floribus angat.

4.1133-4

If, then, *anxius angor* is a "mistranslation," it is a remarkable one. Both these words are for Lucretius immensely evocative ones, occurring elsewhere only in contexts of fear or desire, a realm of psychological significance rather than of physical description. Moreover, the substitution of *anxius angor* for Thucydides' merely physical symptom is but a single illustration of a pervasive tendency: two other similar changes occur within ten lines, each exhibiting the same movement away from a biological statement towards one with mental or psychic connotations. First, Lucretius makes the addition of *animi interpres* (6.1149) to Thucydides' flat γλῶσσα (2.49.2):

atque animi interpres manabat lingua cruore.

6.1149



Secondly, he adds a line:

morbida vis in cor maestum confluxerat aegris,  
omnia tum vero vitae claustra lababant.

6.1152-3

Leonard and Smith<sup>7</sup> here compare *animus vitae claustra coercens* (3.396). If the mind habitually preserves the "fastnesses of life," when they "totter" (*lababant*) presumably the mind has been affected. We thus have strong contributory evidence that *cor* (6.1152), if not actually synonymous with *animus*, has at least strong non-physical overtones.<sup>8</sup> The addition of this line (6.1153) is not very impressive in itself, and in isolation might seem to represent no more than the "poetic elaboration" which Lucretius' editors offer as an explanation.<sup>9</sup> Yet the cumulative effect of the changes and additions in this section form substantial evidence that something more radical is concerned. The two gratuitous insertions (*animi interpres* [1149], and line 1153 as a whole) and the two important changes (*cor maestum* [1152] and *anxius angor* [1158]) all within ten lines betray a remarkable imaginative progress away from Thucydides' clinical description.

An identical process may be observed in yet another of Lucretius' changes. Robin summarizes lines 1208-12<sup>10</sup> as follows:

Dans ces cinq vers, L. a commis un nouveau contresens, signalé de bonne heure par Victorius (*Var. lect.* 25.8; cf. Munro *ad loc.* et au vi. 1151) et contre lequel Lambin défend en vain le poète. Le sens général de la description de Thc. . . . est que la *perte* [italics Robin's] des organes génitaux, des pieds ou des mains, des yeux, était, pour quelques-uns, la condition de leur *salut*. Mais L. a compris que, *par crainte de la mort* (1208, 1212, cf. 1240) et *pour rester dans la vie* (1210 sq.), ils se faisaient enlever volontairement (1209) les extrémités atteintes.

Or, as Munro (*ad loc.*) points out, Lucretius is then in a position to "take advantage of his own error to point his favourite moral." He may now add two lines to Thucydides, which frame the picture:

et graviter partim metuentes limina leti      6.1208  
usque adeo mortis metus his incesserat acer      6.1212

Bailey here compares

et saepe usque adeo, mortis formidine, vitae  
percipit humanos odium lucisque videndae.      3.79-80

Again, what was in Thucydides a baldly factual account becomes in Lucretius one freighted with moral overtones.<sup>11</sup>

This "moralizing," in its broadest sense, of physical description appears again forty lines later.

nam quicumque suos fugitabant visere ad aegros,  
vitai nimium cupidos mortisque timentis  
poenibat paulo post turpi morte malaque,  
desertos, opis expertis, incuria mactans.      6.1239-42

Thucydides describes (2.51.5) two types of people who die: the sick who are unaided and die alone (*ἀπώλλυντο ἐρημοί*), and those who visit the sick and catch the disease. Lucretius, on the other hand, makes those who refuse to give aid the ones who die *desertos, opis expertis* (1242). Introducing ethical terms masquerading as clinical ones (*turpi . . . malaque*, 1241), he makes the plague a punishment (*poenibat*, 1241) for those displaying *cupido* and *timor* (1240), an idea quite alien to Thucydides.<sup>12</sup> What is rightly only physical narrative has been altered and erected into a moral question.<sup>13</sup>

One last fairly minor alteration is perhaps worth noting. Thucydides records the crowding into the city of the country people, compelled, of course, by the Spartan invasion of Attica. Lucretius rather allows the plague to embrace the countryside as well, broadening its scope rather than concentrating it. Every shepherd, herdsman, and farmer is affected (1252); only in Lucretius does the *robustus curvi moderator aratri* (1253) appear. He seems to represent a kind of Everyman, much as he did at the end of the second book, where he bore gloomy witness to the earth's decay: *caput quassans grandis suspirat arator crebrius . . .* (2.1164).

These changes betray something more than carelessness, poetic elaboration, or the inevitable consequence of writing in Latin rather than in Greek. We have seen Lucretius describe physical ills in a psychological vocabulary, treat clinical phenomena as emotionally motivated actions, change medical data to ethical commentary, and broaden the plague's area in defiance of historical fact. In simplest terms, his additions and alterations display a marked tendency to regard the plague less in physical terms than in emotional, moral, and psychological ones. These changes might be seen as a sort of verbal weathervane, pointing the direction towards which Lucretius' imagination seems to be heading. They not only allow but encour-

age us to inquire if Lucretius might have felt the plague to represent something more than a historical event.

Two questions must be answered before this can be a legitimate approach. First, is Lucretius in the habit of viewing physical things as representative, or symbolic? There can be little question here: the whole of the *De rerum natura* is predicated upon the assumption that we can grasp *res caecae* from *res apertae*. Lucretius of necessity sees sermons in stones: to have a mind which habitually imagines intangibles in terms of tangibles is a prerequisite for explaining Epicurean physics.<sup>14</sup> Secondly, granting that his mind generally sees things as representative, is there any evidence that he might feel the plague, in particular, to be susceptible of symbolic treatment? Perhaps the best way to answer this is to start at the other end. As his alterations show, psychological elements, particularly *timor* and *cupido*, persist in obtruding themselves into a supposedly physical account.<sup>15</sup> If it can be shown that Lucretius often views certain states of mind as a disease, this would lend substance to the supposition that he might conversely see in the plague an emblem of mental or psychological states.

We have at least one definite statement on this:

Huc accedit uti videamus, corpus ut ipsum  
suscipere immanis morbos durumque dolorem,  
sic animum curas acris luctumque metumque. 3.459-61

This parallel between physical disease and care, grief, and fear, only explicates what often inheres in the language itself. The victim of *metus* is described as *aeger* (3.1070), with all the proper medical symptoms: *aegris luctibus* (3.933) and *doloribus aegris* (3.905). *Cupido* similarly appears clothed in a clinical vocabulary: *ulcus vivescit et interascit alendo inque dies gliscit furor atque aerumna gravescit* (4.1068) . . . *cures* (1071) . . . *sanis* (1075) . . . *redit rabies eadem et furor* (1117).<sup>16</sup> Even the aftereffects of passionate love are described in this manner: *languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans* (1124).

This use of a clinical vocabulary to define *cupido* and *metus* is not to be dismissed either as literary convention or as a handy metaphor invoked for clarity and organization. Rather it stands as an impassioned declaration of mankind's predicament: *mortalibus aegris* (6.1) is less a casual reference than an epitome.<sup>17</sup> The whole of the *De rerum natura* is directed towards the healing of man's inner

sickness; Lucretius would have been the first to inscribe his name beneath a later Epicurean's strikingly similar declaration:

Since as I have said most men suffer alike from false opinions as if in a plague, and the number of sufferers increases, since by copying one another they catch the disease like sheep and it is right to give help to future generations, for they are ours even if they are yet unborn, having regard further to the love of mankind and the duty of giving help to strangers who are at hand, forasmuch as the benefits of the written word are spread abroad I decided to use this colonnade and set forth in it the means of safety (*τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας φάρμακα*) for all to see.<sup>18</sup>

This *σωτηρίας φάρμακα* is precisely what Lucretius is trying to administer; and his abiding concern finds expression in the formalization of his relationship to his readers as that of a doctor to his patients.

sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes cum dare  
conantur, prius oras pocula circum contingunt mellis  
dulci flavoque liquore, ut puerorum aetas inprovida  
ludificetur labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum  
absinthii laticem deceptaque non capiatur, sed potius  
tali pacto recreata valescat, sic ego nunc . . .

1.936ff., 4.11ff.

Though traditional, the passage presents not merely a perfunctory simile, but expresses a basic impetus of the poem. Wrote Epicurus:

We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality: for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health.

Vain is the word of philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either, if it does not expel the suffering of the mind.<sup>19</sup>

And for Lucretius no less than Epicurus, this correspondence between body and mind was no stylistic flourish, but a controlling assumption.<sup>20</sup>

The concept of a sick mankind, to be cured by the healing draughts of Epicureanism, was then a familiar one to Lucretius. This imaginative habit, when combined with the use of symbols as a sanctioned educational method, makes it not unlikely that he should see in a physical description of disease an emblem of the human estate in its unregenerate form. Perhaps in transcribing Thucydides' account Lucretius became aware — or even only half aware — of the poten-



tialities it held for his purpose. His alterations do not indicate a deliberate verbal dexterity: he does not use *anxius angor* because he recalls his previous uses and intends his reader to remember them also. Rather he seems to be himself responding imaginatively to a half-felt similarity between the victims of the actual plague at Athens and the sufferers from the psychic plague of fear and desire. Lucretius' language betrays this; it does not proclaim it, issuing a directive to us to compare the various passages. A contrast with Vergil's practice may illuminate this. He writes of the emperor:

Penatibus et magnis dis,  
stans celsa in puppi.

8.680

This represents a conscious hat-tipping, a deliberate attempt to associate Augustus verbally, as he claimed to be genealogically, with Aeneas and Anchises. Vergil intends us to remember that both half-lines have been previously applied to Augustus' great forebears, the first line to Aeneas (3.12), the second to Anchises (3.527).<sup>21</sup> Lucretius, by contrast, tends to associate emotionally rather than refer intellectually. He responds in a similar verbal way to what he feels to be similar situations: is spontaneous rather than calculated, impulsive rather than formal.<sup>22</sup>

With this reservation, let us then take the path which the alterations from Thucydides point to, and look at Lucretius' account as at least tending towards metaphorical statement. As we have seen, Lucretius' habit of conceiving mental sicknesses in terms of physical disease might have encouraged him to see in the physical plague the emblem of a mental one. Several other elements in Thucydides' account might have similarly appealed to Lucretius' imagination as being the physical actuality for terms he himself had used as metaphors for fear and desire; as being the objective equivalent of mental or psychological truths. Situations which for Thucydides represented historical fact might for Lucretius embody a depth of moral significance and possess a symbolic resonance gained from his own handling of them as figures in nonphysical contexts. His discovery, in Thucydides' factual account, of particular situations which held for him a wealth of symbolic reference, might also have influenced him, consciously or unconsciously, to treat the whole plague as, in a sense, a metaphor for life.<sup>23</sup>

Psychological speculation is, however, less rewarding than an examination of the text: what are these situations which might have



held for Lucretius this rich suggestiveness? Consider the diseased, plunging headlong into wells and streams in a vain attempt to satisfy their thirst:

insedabiliter sitis arida, corpora mersans,  
aequabat multum parvis umoribus imbrem. 6.1176-7

Not dissimilar is the striking image of those seeking to satisfy their thirst for life, and quell their fear of death: *sitis aequa tenet vitae semper hiantis* (3.1084).<sup>24</sup> The same metaphor characterizes the ambition-stricken man; hell's emissaries surround us:

Sisyphus in vita quoque nobis ante oculos est  
qui petere a populo fascis saevasque securis  
imbibit . . . 3.995-7

Those seeking to satisfy their craving for life by an accumulation of wealth or honors are doomed to this perpetual thirst.<sup>25</sup> Desire, as well as fear, takes on this metaphoric guise:

in medioque sitit torrenti flumine potans. 4.1100

The only precedent for the burning thirst of the Athenians is to be found in those suffering from the diseases of fear or desire.<sup>26</sup>

The element of frantic and pointless struggle might have struck Lucretius as forcibly as that of insatiable thirst. The very height of the plague finds men still fighting over burial sites: *multo cum sanguine saepe rixantes*.<sup>27</sup> Yet how better than this is the struggle for false ends that plagues mankind?

proinde sine incassum defessi sanguine sudent,  
angustum per iter luctantes ambitionis. 5.1131-2

The exhausting fight for wealth (5.1421ff.) or honors (5.1124; cf. 2.11ff.; 3.59ff.) is, rightly viewed, no better than the race for tombs. Passionate love is similarly marked by this total exhaustion and vain endeavor.

adde quod absumunt viris pereuntque labore.<sup>28</sup>

To the Athenians the plague came only once; but for the mass of a sick and unenlightened mankind struggle and exhaustion are among the very attributes of existence.

Finally, Lucretius might find in the uncertainty of medical treatment an analogue to the lack of any sure knowledge on the part of those infected by fear or desire: <sup>29</sup>

nec ratio remedi communis certa dabatur;  
 nam quod ali dederat vitalis aeris auras  
 volvere in ore licere et caeli templa tueri,  
 hoc aliis erat exitio letumque parabat.  
 illud in his rebus miserandum magnopere unum  
 aerumnabile erat, quod ubi se quisque videbat  
 implicitum morbo, morti damnatus ut esset,  
 deficiens animo maestus cum corde iacebat,  
 funera respectans animam amittebat ibidem.

6.1226-34

This passage embodies one rather odd alteration from Thucydides. For Thucydides two things are "most dreadful" (2.51.4): on the one hand the apathy, on the other, the danger of contagion. Lucretius sees only one thing as *miserandum magnopere* (6.1230). He makes the apathy (*deficiens animo*, 1233) all important, while the spread of the disease becomes subordinated (*quippe etenim*, 1235).<sup>30</sup> A mental, or psychological, despair, resulting from the failure of any *certa ratio*,<sup>31</sup> appears to Lucretius as the central issue. The physical aspect is relegated, with considerable grammatical confusion, to a dependent position. *Implicitum morbo* (1232) seems to indicate the way Lucretius' thoughts are moving. The word occurs only once elsewhere. Man could escape from the toils of love, *implicitus*, unless he stood in his own way: *nisi tute tibi obuius obstes* (4.1150). I do not imply a direct relationship, but there is a certain similarity of feeling. External forces are no longer of equal importance, as they were for Thucydides. Man's own despair before his incurable state is most significant --- he stands in his own way.

Exploiting these verbal parallels is only a sharply specific method of demonstrating a closeness of general impression, not an effort to point out subtle verbal echoes. I suggest only that Thucydides' portrait of a diseased population, burning with an insatiable and self-destructive thirst, weary and uncertain, may have obscurely reminded Lucretius of his own image of man. And for this reason he appropriates Thucydides' account. It becomes not merely the physical climax to the physical manifestations of the sixth book, but the moral culmination of the whole poem. Where Thucydides recorded the plague as an aid to future generations (2.48.3), Lucretius borrows it as an emblem of a present mental sickness. To recognize it man is to look not ahead, but within.

An analogy based on the common elements of thirst, exhaustion, and uncertainty, would not be a very telling one. Luckily we have

Lucretius' specific alterations (pp. 105-108 above) to initiate the comparison which a more general view has confirmed. Again let me repudiate any suggestion that Lucretius was seeking to articulate any formal doctrine. Only an incorrigibly symbolic imagination appears to be at work, not a calculated mental effort: there is nothing approaching the definitive austerity of an allegory. If we do acknowledge that Lucretius consciously or unconsciously may have felt the plague's symbolic potentialities, we can see why he ended his poem here.<sup>32</sup> By broadening the plague's applicability, heightening its intensity, and deepening the controlling moral awareness, Lucretius gives to it a monumental solidity of reference. The architecture of the poem culminates here, as the various perceptions of man's folly unite in a final despairing integrity of vision.

## NOTES

1. H. A. J. Munro, *T. Lucr. Cari Libri Sex* (Cambridge, 1893) III 391; C. Bailey, *T. Lucr. Cari Libri Sex* (Oxford, 1947) III 1728; A. Ernout and L. Robin, *T. Lucr. Cari Libri Sex* (Paris, 1928), *ad* 6.1138. I use Bailey's text and numbering throughout.

2. Especially such minor changes as the substitution of "eighth or ninth day" (6.1197) for Thucydides' "seventh or ninth" (on which see Munro *ad loc.*) Nor do I make any attempt to discuss an alternative source for such a catalogue of symptoms as appears in 6.1182-96 (probably derived from the writings of Hippocrates: see Munro and Ernout-Robin *ad loc.*) Munro and Bailey give fairly exhaustive listings of all additions and alterations, and see also W. Lück, *Die Quellenfragen im 5 und 6 Buch des Lukrez* (Breslau, 1932) 175ff. None of the changes I discuss involves any question of another source, Hippocratean or otherwise. All occur within sentences which are a direct translation of Thucydides, and are of such a nature that his Greek may in each case be seen behind them.

3. Cf. Scholia to Thuc. quoted *ad loc.* by Creech, *T. Lucr. Cari Libri Sex* (London, 1835): οἱ παλαιοὶ ἱατροὶ τὸν στόμαχον καρδίαν ἐκάλουν, καὶ καρδιῶγον τὸν πόρον τοῦ στομάχου.

4. This conclusively disposes of Lambinus' attempt to prove that *Lucr.* uses *cor* for "stomach" (see Munro, *ad loc.*). *Maestus* is an adjective never used of physical pain by Lucretius: *deficiens animo maesto cum corde iacebat* (6.1233) does not refer to a stomach ailment. Cf. *perturbata animi mens in maerore metuque* (6.1183). If *cor* ever refers to anything but "heart" it is surely "mind." Its use in 6.5, as applied to Epicurus, seems to have a primarily intellectual connotation, for nowhere is he signalized but for his mental prowess. *Vivida vis animi* (1.72) appears less an attribute than a definition. Cf. 3.1043, *ingenio superavit*; 3.14-15, *tua ratio . . divina mente coorta*; and the proems to books three and five *passim*. For the use of *cor* as implying intellect see 4.44; 5.882; 1456 (reading, with Bailey, *clarescere corde videbant*). Cicero (*Tusc. disp.* 1.9.18) equates *cor* and *animus*, and gives several examples demonstrating the in-

tellectual sense of *cor*. Without entering the vexed question of exactly where the seat of thought was located, it should be noticed that the *cor* is for Lucretius the faculty subject to fear (3.116; 874; 6.14) and desire (4.1059; 1138). In this connection it should be noted that *maestus*, in its only uses outside the description of the plague, refers each time to fear of the gods (1.89; 99; 4.1236).

5. Usener, *Epicurea* (Teubner, 1887) frg. 485(p.305), 203(161), *Kuriai Doxai* 10(73). Lucretius devotes his third book to a systematic attack on the immortality of the soul (and hence the fear of death), and the end of the fourth to a similar attack on *cupido*. There are, of course, shorter passages on fear and desire *passim*.

6. These *anxia corda* are signalized by *infestis querellis* (6.16), much as the *anxius angor* of the diseased was the constant companion of *gemitu commixta querella* (6.1159).

7. W. E. Leonard and S. B. Smith, *T. Lucr. Cari Libri Sex* (Madison, 1942).

8. See note 4. above.

9. "He now seeks to satisfy his poetical feeling . . ." (Munro, III 392). For an equally unsatisfactory alternative see Bailey's explanation: "Here must be recognized not so much the difference between prose and poetry, but, as Giussani has pointed out, the difference in the genius of the two languages, the Latin author tending naturally to the fuller and more emotional description." (Bailey III 1723) Both of these suggestions contain an element of truth, but neither should be accepted as a complete explanation, any more than an easy reference to Lucretius' carelessness or ignorance should be.

10. et graviter partim metuentes limina leti  
vivebant ferro privati parte virili,  
et manibus sine nonnulli pedibusque manebant  
in vita tamen, et perdebant lumina partim:  
usque adeo mortis metus his incesserat acer.

11. P. Maas, however, defends Lucretius on the grounds that *στερισκόμενοι* (2.49.8) might refer to the operations of surgeons, and that Lucretius does also (Bailey, *addenda*, III 1759). This would require some distortion of the Greek, and even if we accept the idea that Thucydides may refer to surgeons, it does not follow that Lucretius does. Vergil, in his imitation of Lucretius, has the horses wound themselves (*Geor.* 3.514). In any case, Maas' attempt to rehabilitate Lucretius' scholarship succeeds in obscuring the most interesting point, which is not whether Lucretius thought doctors were involved, but that he here saw fit to introduce a moral comment.

12. See Ernout and Robin, *ad loc.*

13. Lucretius also acknowledges that the socially-minded contract the disease (6.1243-6). Like Thucydides he allows "all the most virtuous" (Bailey's translation of *optimus quisque*, 6.1246; cf. *οἱ ἀρετῆς μεταποιούμενοι*, 2.51.5) to die. But this is a different matter from his substitution of those who are unaiding for those who are unaided.

14. Thus the "first beginnings" find illustrations in the letters of the alphabet (1.196-8; 823-7; 2.688-94), sheep on a mountain side (2.317), military manoeuvres (2.323) or motes in a sunbeam (2.114). Lucretius is committed to the discovering of *vestigia notitiae* (2.123; cf. 2.112) in every imaginable physical phenomenon. Cf. Epicurus, frg. 212 (Usener 163).

15. I am not, of course, taking Lucretius to task for describing the psychological effects of the disease, as Thucydides himself does, particularly in chapter



53. Rather Lucretius fails to draw the line between the two: medical symptoms are often described in a markedly unmedical manner.

16. The impact of this passage is strengthened by the linkage of the medical vocabulary with that describing the burning heat of love (4.1087-90, 1096-1101, 1116-7, 1138). The fire of the lovers seems to have less in common with the traditional conceit than with the *sacer ignis* (6.1167) of the plague (6.1145, 1168-77, 1180). The lovers' sickness and accompanying flames present themselves to Lucretius less as literary conventions than physiological symptoms. The vehement elaboration of his writing conveys an immediacy denied any merely literary conceit.

A wound metaphor sometimes substitutes for, or stands together with, that of disease. It too applies both to fear (*haec vulnera vitae . . . mortis formidine aluntur*, 3.63; cf. 5.1197) and desire (*vulnere amoris*, 1.34; *incerti tabescunt vulnere caeco*, 4.1120; cf. 4.1068-83, noting the complete intermixture with the disease imagery). With the wound imagery, as with that of fire and disease, we have the peculiarly Lucretian tendency to become so carried away by his own figures that they attain concrete reality. Starting with the conventional *mens saucia amore* (4.1047), perhaps in imitation of Ennius' *Medea animo aegro, amore saevo saucia* (Trag. 254, ed. Vahlen<sup>3</sup> [Teubner, 1928]), Lucretius proceeds to a remarkably concrete description (4.1049-57). Cf. his transformation of the equally familiar image of the bonds of love (4.1145-50; 1187; 1201-7): he applies it with such sustained fierceness that it finally achieves physical reality (4.1201-7).

17. It is particularly effective here, coming after the enumeration of all man's physical comforts (5.1440-57). It would be interesting to speculate as to whether the tentative medical metaphor of the sixth proem (*aegris . . . recreaverunt* [cf. *recreata valescat*, 1.942; 4.17] . . . *querellis . . . purgavit pectora*, 6.1-24) is deliberate, looking forward to the description of the plague at the book's end. If intentional, this would shed light on Lucretius' practice in unifying the different books.

18. Diogenes of Oenoanda, frg. 2, col. ii.7, ed. William (Teubner, 1907) 5. The translation is that of A. D. Nock, *Sallustius* (Cambridge, 1926) xxxvi.

19. Frg. 220 and 221 (Usener 169). I use, here and below, the translation of C. Bailey, *Epicurus* (Oxford, 1926) frg. A 54 (p. 115) and D 54 (133). cf. *Ep. Tertia* (Usener 59, line 3); frg. 471 (Usener 301); Wotke, *Wiener Studien* (1888) 196, frg. 64 (also in Bailey, frg. A 64, p. 116).

20. The use of clinical terminology for mental or moral ills is of course traditional. Greek tragedy exploits the analogy constantly (see any *index verborum* under νόσος or φάρμακος); cf. the indices in the 3 vols. of W. Jaeger's *Paideia*, Transl. by G. Highet (New York, 1939-44) s.v. "medicine," and for references to the Diatribes see Nock, *Sallustius*, p. xxviii, note 69. By Horace's time terms like *sanus* and *insanus* were such common coin that their original impress had been nearly obliterated by too frequent handling. Horace, however, refreshes their radical meaning by placing them often in contexts of explicitly medical metaphors. Cf. also his adaption of the doctor-patient analogy of Lucretius, in Satire 1.1.25. The tradition persists at least until Swift, who makes his masque Gulliver a doctor (and twice quotes Lucretius' honeyed cup passage).

I am here concerned only to show that Lucretius draws the analogy, and not to present its biography. Lucretius, moreover, exhibits a fierceness of imaginative involvement which transcends any merely conventional formulation. In

general, his images are less striking for their originality than for the intensity and elaboration with which he employs them.

21. And later, to Aeneas (10.261).

22. Thus where Lucretius exhibits such imaginative involvement in what he describes that conventional metaphors tend to take on physical reality (cf. note 16, above), Vergil reveals careful meditation in submitting his images to this same physical realization. Dido, for instance, is carefully described as transfixed with love for Aeneas, as she will later be transfixed with her physical wound. The opening lines of the fourth book contain terms, here used figuratively, which are to reappear later in their physical reality: *regina gravi saucia cura vulnus alit . . . haerent infixi pectore vultus* (4.1-4); *tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus* (67); cf. *infixum stridit sub pectore vulnus* (689). This represents, I think, a premeditated artistic foreshadowing having little in common with Lucretius' impulsive absorption.

23. My feeling is that Lucretius was probably largely unconscious of any symbolic function the plague might fulfill, and certainly did not think of it as an allegory. His alterations of Thucydides are better understood as a record of his own imaginative tendencies than as the result of any formulated plan consciously imposed. I doubt that his readers would be aware of the changes, or would look upon the plague as anything more than factual. Hence I find it hard to accept J. P. Elder's tentative suggestion that Lucretius may have "intended, deliberately," the plague to be Epicurean conversion propaganda ("Lucretius 1.1-49," *TAPA* 85[1954] 93, note 10). If this were Lucretius' deliberate intention, surely the pattern would be less equivocal, and the lesson more carefully conveyed. The echoes of psychological terminology collected above, and those I shall treat below, are but evidence of his associative manner of thinking. Compare his tendency to revert to the same verbal clusters when treating birth or creation (*pabula laeta, nitidae fruges, ridet, suavis, blandus*, etc. Cf. 1.1-23, 252-7, 2.594-6, 994, and J. P. Elder, "Lucretius" 111.) There is a similar recurrence, in connection with birth, of *in luminis oras* (borrowed from Ennius, but applied in quite different fashion: 1.22; 2.577; 617; 5.1455). None of these words or phrases is intended as a deliberate reminiscence of any other; rather all alike chart the associative manner in which Lucretius' imagination works.

24. Thirst implies water, which is of course the archetype of the life-giving force. The underlying paradox that thirst for this supposedly reviving element (whether figurative, as in the third book, or literal, as in the sixth) should result in death, might be tied to the proem of three (79-83). Here the love of life (or fear of death) leads men to kill themselves, forgetting that this very fear is the *fontem curarum* (3.82). In a sense, the effort to avoid death leads men to plunge into it. The notion of a false or seeming nourishment which is actually a destructive force underlies all three cases, though to insist upon an exact equivalence or detailed parallels would be futile.

25. It should be remembered that Lucretius considers both avarice and ambition as largely motivated by the fear of death (3.64).

26. Epicurus also draws the analogy between the diseased, thirsting man and the victim of desires: frg. 471 (Usener 301).

27. 6.1285. For the generally exhausting effect of the plague, and the struggles it arouses, cf. *dissolvebat eos, defessos ante, fatigans* (6.1162); *nec requies erat ulla mali: defessa iacebant corpora* (6.1178); *incomitata rapi*

*certabant funera vasta*(6.1225); *populum sepelire suorum certantes*(6.1247).

28. 4.1121. cf. *frustra que laborat*(4.1099), and for the broad picture of the exhausting and unrewarded struggle which love entails, see 4.1097-1120. The number of negatives is extraordinary; they systematically punctuate and destroy any possibility of beauty or pleasure that love might have: *non datur . . . nec satiare queunt . . . nec possunt . . . nequiquam . . . possunt nec . . . nec reperire possunt*.

29. Lucretius particularly emphasizes the uncertainty to which those attacked by fear or desire are reduced. For fear see the end of the third book: *morbi quia causam non tenet aeger*(3.1070; cf. 3.1050; 3.37-93). The lovers' search for any sure remedy to their desires is similarly doomed. The description of the immediate act of love (4.1077-1120) is introduced by *fluctuat incertis erroribus ardor amantum*, and concluded by *nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat: usque adeo incerti tabescunt vulnere caeco*, while the results of passion declare man bound to hopeless insecurity: *adde quod alterius sub nutu degitur aetas*(4.1122). Hence the approval of *meretrices*(4.1071) — those using them are healthy (*sanis*, 1075) in that they at least escape the perpetual uncertainty of lovers(4.1060; 1133-40). Cf. the similar attitude of Horace in *Sat.* 1.2.37-79, 127-34, noting the many Lucretian echoes, especially in 72-5, 111-114. Cf. Lejay, *Les Satires d'Horace* (Paris, 1911) *ad loc.* The evidence for Epicurus' attitude is confused; he appears to have objected not to a peaceful marriage, but only to the upsetting quality of an unsatisfactory passion, which he likened to a goad of restlessness (frg. 483; Usener 305) Cf. Bailey, *ad* 4.1058, and J. B. Stearns. *Epicurus and Lucretius on Love*, summarized in *TAPA* 63 (1932) xxxiv.

30. See Ernout-Robin *ad loc.*: "Il y a, dans *quippe etenim*, une nouvelle et étrange déformation de la pensée de Thc." Cf. Munro *ad loc.*

31. *Ratio* translates the Greek *ῥαψα*(2.51.2) which means only "remedy" or "medicine." Though *ratio* here may mean only "method," it surely betrays the same tendency on Lucretius' part to move towards issues that are more than physical. There are at least overtones of the technical terminology of Epicureanism: *vitae rationem quae nunc appellatur sapientia*(5.9). For the use of *ratio*, with *certa*, of philosophic utterance cf. 1.738; 5.111.

32. And did not, as Bignone suggests, plan to make an addition about the life of the gods. (See Bailey, *Addenda et corrigenda*, for various views, and J. P. Elder, "Lucretius" 88 for numerous references and several interesting suggestions of his own.) It seems to me highly unlikely that any author of such violence of imaginative habit that he must describe lambs as "stunned" (*perculsa*, 1.261) by their mother's milk, would be able to write *largo sermone* (5.155) about the immensity of indifference which Epicurean gods inhabit.

## THE CLASSICS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD

BY RICHARD M. GUMMERE

### I. ATLANTIS, ARGONAUTS, AND EXPLORATION

THE "myth," as the Greeks called it, was and still is a vital element in any human venture. The Argo and the Lost Atlantis were more than mere window dressing for our pioneering predecessors. Throughout history, fancy has often been the precursor of fact. Eleanor of Aquitaine dramatized her participation in the crusades with King Louis by dressing herself and her attendants as Amazons, with the Queen as Penthesilea.<sup>1</sup> Rienzi invoked the tribunician power in order to strengthen his popular appeal. And the early Virginia explorations became a fertile field for imaginative symbolism, drawn from classical sources, even though the underlying objective was religious, or political, or commercial.

This symbolism is exemplified in an author of ancient times who appears on Tidewater bookshelves with more regularity than any other. Plutarch's *Theseus* contains the essence of the matter:<sup>2</sup>

May I therefore succeed in purifying Fable, making her submit to Reason and take on the semblance of History! But where she obstinately disdains to make herself credible I shall pray for kindly readers and such as receive with indulgence the tales of Antiquity.

All the American efforts at colonization are based on this fascination for something new: good old William Hubbard, in his *General History of New England*,<sup>3</sup> strikes the prevalent note: *Est natura hominum novitatis avida*, "it is man's nature to strain after novelty."

Whatever may be the origins of "the myth,"<sup>4</sup> symbolic, aetiological, or pure fancy, allegory in this particular transatlantic adventure would seem to have been the main circulating medium. The legend became a publicity slogan, attaching an old story to a new situation. These men were seeking the *meta incognita*, the Unknown Goal — a type-name which still lingers on certain old maps for the southern peninsula of Baffin Land. It is not surprising that the source of this "myth" was classical, especially during the reigns of Elizabeth and James. The fable of Atlantis was in circulation, and Argonauts in those days were chosen as symbols rather than



the Arthurian or European heroes because they were more familiar material. It was the great age of grammar schools; and every boy who had progressed beyond the three R's was at home in classical mythology. Parallels were drawn between the New World and the ancient world. For example, Arthur Barlow, describing the Indians in his narrative of the first voyage to Virginia,<sup>5</sup> reported that "when they go to warres, they cary about with them their idol, of whom they aske counsel, as the Roman were woont of the Oracle of Apollo." Even the Hebrew concept of the "Wilderness Zion" is classically explained by Governor Thomas Hutchinson in terms of the *Germania* of Tacitus: <sup>6</sup> "Who would be interested in Germany, a country vast in extent, harsh in its climate, repellent in its soil and appearance, unless it was his native land?" The transfer of epithet to an "Agrarian Utopia" in the time of Jefferson illustrates a fondness for symbolism, or myth, or fable, as applied to current reality. The Spartan idea ran so frequently through our colonial history as a slogan for courage that it is not surprising to find "Laconia" as the name of Mason's seventeenth-century New Hampshire Tract. The symbolism reached historical absurdity when the Ohio Company, founding the town of Marietta in 1788, adopted the names *Via Sacra*, *Capitolium*, and *Campus Martius*.

The Atlantis myth fitted perfectly into seventeenth-century projects for colonization. Bacon's essay "Of Prophecies" set the seal on the discovery of the New World, with the aid of a famous passage from the *Medea* of the tragedian Seneca: <sup>7</sup>

Venient annis saecula seris,  
quibus Oceanus vincula rerum  
laxet et ingens pateat tellus  
Tethysque novos detegat orbes,  
nec sit terris ultima Thule.

William Strachey, first secretary of the Jamestown colony, wondered whether Columbus had ever read the *Timaeus* of Plato, wherein the "subtile and misterious Priest, old Crisia (*sic*) of Egipt," discourses to Solon about the "Atlantides."<sup>8</sup> Did Columbus feel, he asks, that his own world contained only 180 degrees and that in the other half there must be a "place of habitation?" Or do all these happenings simply "make good the prophecy of reverend Seneca?" Strachey's translation of the *Medea* passage runs as follows:

That age shall come, albeit, in latter tymes,  
When as the sea shall ope her lockt-up bounds,

And mighty lands appear: new heavens, new clymes  
Shall Typhis bring to knowledge, and new grounds,  
New worlds display. Then shall not Thule be  
The farthest nor-west isle our eyes shall see.

As the various discoveries took place along the Atlantic seaboard (and there were many fishermen and adventurers before those in recorded history), the intelligent public acknowledged the truth of the legend. Sir John Denham<sup>9</sup> celebrated its fulfillment:

What the Tragedian wrote, the late success  
Declares was inspiration and not guess.  
As dark a truth that Author did unfold  
As Oracles or Prophets e'er foretold.  
*At last the Ocean shall unlock the Bound,  
Of things, and a New World by Typhis found,  
Then Ages far remote shall understand  
The Isle of Thule is not the farthest Land.*

Fifty years after these early Virginians and their supporters had rhapsodized over the possibilities of the new world, a New England Puritan harked back to the same adventure, expressing the hope that in these western regions the Christian message might triumph over ignorance. Benjamin Tompson<sup>10</sup> alluded to

Unheard of places, like some New-Atlantis;  
Before in fancy only, now Newlandis.

The original lost Atlantis can never be identified. Suffice it to say that guesses ran from islands such as the Canaries or the Azores to a possible continent in a northwesterly direction whither vessels may have been blown. Cotton Mather<sup>11</sup> speculates on the significance of Diodorus Siculus, who tells of Phoenicians driven off their course until they reached "an island of prodigious magnitude," mentioning also Plato's island, "bigger than Africa and Asia put together." Strabo, without accepting the theory, had mentioned<sup>12</sup> the possibility of another continent between Western Europe and Asia. Atlantis, or the *μακάρων νῆσοι*, or the "Happy Western Isles," are fabulous poetic property, known to the early British or European adventurers, based originally on a glimmering of fact and supported by earlier scientists like Eratosthenes, who calculated the circumference of the globe and spoke of possible voyages from Gibraltar to India. The Elizabethans knew most of these classical stories, especially Plato's giant continent.<sup>13</sup>

The Atlantis theme, which had soon turned from a Greek fable into actuality, died hard. As late as 1771 the first real American poet, Philip Freneau, besides other references to the future greatness of America, tried his hand at the Senecan prophecy which Bacon had noted: <sup>14</sup>

The time shall come, when numerous years are past,  
The Ocean shall dissolve the bands of things,  
And an extended region rise at last.  
And Tiphys shall disclose the mighty land  
Far, far away, where none have roved before;  
Nor shall the world's remotest region be  
Gibraltar's rock, or Thule's savage shore.

At the close of the Revolution, Ezra Stiles, president of Yale and a leader in both theology and science, delivered an election sermon at Hartford "On the Future Glory of the United States." Enlarging on the possibility that the Canaanites cast out by Joshua were wafted over to America, whether across the Atlantic or via northeast Asia, he remarks in corroboration: <sup>15</sup> "Plato, Aelian, and Diodorus Siculus narrate voyages into the Atlantic Ocean thirty days west from the Pillars of Hercules to the Island of Atlas." While the charm of the fable, as we have seen, attracted many explorers and their successors in the colonies, there was occasional skepticism which manifested itself when the myth was overworked. Nathaniel Morton, in his Epistle Dedicatory to *New England's Memorial*, addressed to Governor Thomas Prince of New Plymouth, <sup>16</sup> when speaking of earthquakes and hurricanes, adds whimsically as a footnote: "Thus was the Atlantic Ocean caused to be a sea, as Plato affirmed, who lived 366 years before Christ!" Governor Thomas Hutchinson, in his history of Massachusetts Bay, mentioned but dismissed the theory that the Indians "are the posterity of the ancient Scythians, and that 'Massachusetts,' a compound Indian word, might be derived from 'Masagetes.'" <sup>17</sup> Doctor William Stith, the mid-eighteenth-century historian of Virginia and a reliable critic, enlarges on the uselessness of such guesswork. <sup>18</sup> James the First may have been a good classical scholar; but during his reign "the judges and Oracles of Law were, like the lying Oracle of old, much addicted to philippizing." And for historical purposes, Hanno's voyage, Madoc's expedition, Plato's fable, and even Seneca's true prophecy, were all "learned trumpery." The realistic Thomas Jefferson spiked any reliance on Geoffrey of Monmouth and his followers, ridiculing "Moreton's

deduction of the origin of our Indians from the fugitive Trojans.”<sup>19</sup>

Atlantis, however, had fulfilled its inspiring purpose. The long-range prophecy of Charles Aleyn,<sup>20</sup> historian of Henry the Seventh, had been justified by the results of adventurers who became founders, and of fable which became fact:

About this time *our world* began to thinke  
Of a *New World*: ‘twas an *Italian Head*  
Where this imagination first did sinck,  
That other *Lands* might be discovered.  
As *Blith Democritus* of old had done  
In his assertion of more worlds than one.

The adventurers and settlers along the Atlantic seaboard, whether they ascribed their colonizing impulse to the conversion of the natives, or to the relief of an overpopulated country, or to the discovery of new territory for the kingdom, were apt to use classical terminology to publicize their efforts. There were the Elizabethans who tempted the explorers in Latin-laden phraseology with glowing accounts of lands famous for “fertilitye of soyle, insinuation<sup>21</sup> of seas, multiplicitie of rivers, opportunities of habitations.” Sir Thomas Gates used Latin proverbial tags as headings for his colonial broadsides, as: *Dii laboribus omnia vendunt*, “The gods sell all privileges at the price of toil.” It was fashionable to revert to Roman or Greek origins. Oglethorpe explained his plan for Georgia in the same style a hundred years later: “The Romans esteemed the sending forth of colonies among their noblest works,” and recommended that his fellow countrymen go and do likewise. Oceanus Hopkins and Peregrine White were symbolic Puritan names. Even the matter-of-fact Swedes who settled on the Delaware gave ancient names to their emigrant ships, such as *Fama*, *Mercurius*, *Neptunus*, *Achilles*.

Argonauts in search of the Golden Fleece<sup>22</sup> became the most appealing slogan when transatlantic colonization began. The Fleece was allegory in dignified disguise for the scramble after the precious metal and the English aim to drive treasure-laden Spanish galleons off the sea. The Jesuit Johann Bissel<sup>23</sup> translated the voyage and shipwreck story of Pedro Gobeo de Vitoria for an *Argonauticum Americanum* in 1647. Here was a challenge and a Manifest Destiny for Englishmen. The Argonautic theme suited the Elizabethans and their successors, as it suited the Swedes to collect their colonizing propaganda into the *Argonautica Gustaviana*, published in 1633. Prominent among the backers of colonization was William Vaughan,



whose main concern was a combination of the Christian message with opportunities for honest gain. He advertised Newfoundland with a curious classical jargon: "The Golden Fleece, transported from Cambrioll Colchos out of the Southernmost part of the Island commonly called the Newfoundland, by Orpheus Junior," London 1626. The writer refers to the modern "Colchos, where the Golden Fleece flourishes on the backes of Neptune's sheep, continually to be shorn."<sup>24</sup> Presumably many of his readers could recall the scene in Vergil's Fourth Georgic, where Proteus drives his seals ashore for a rest, preliminary to his capture by Aristaeus. A New Englander might wonder whether the Sacred Cod did not also occur to the writer.

Master Robert Hayman published in 1628 *Quodlibets, lately come over from New Britannia*. The interest in this region provoked what Eggleston calls "a jumble of mythology, allegory, political economy, verse in English and Latin, and a general medley."<sup>25</sup> Many were disappointed: Captain Gorges left the new country, "scarce having continued longer in the province than Tully's vigilant consul, that had not leisure, during his whole consulship, so much as once to take sleep." Mason, an Oxford man, was full of Argonautic enthusiasm, and expressed his hopes in verse:<sup>26</sup>

If hope of peace, of quiet life, or gaine,  
May kindle flames within our mind againe,  
Then let us joyne to seek this Golden Fleece,  
Whose like ne'er came from Colchos into Greece.

A hastily scrambled series of couplets is dedicated, in Thomas Morton's *New English Canaan*,<sup>27</sup> to the wonderful Lake Erocoise (Champlain), with Leda and nymphs and naiads adorning its shores, including the inevitable Argonautic theme:

Colcos' golden Fleece reject:  
This deserveth best respect.

The habit lasted on; for Judge Sewall reports that Acting President Hubbard, at the Harvard Commencement of 1688, "made an oration in which he compared Sir William Phips (the finder of the sunken treasure ship) to Jason bringing home the Golden Fleece." Cotton Mather hailed Phips as "a Knight of the Golden Fleece" — "the Stile (*i.e.*, title) might pretend unto some circumstances that would justify it."<sup>28</sup> The gold salvaged by Phips was real; but nearly all the gold sought by the adventurers turned out to be mica or isinglass.<sup>29</sup>

## II. THREE EARLY VIRGINIA COLONIZERS AND THEIR CLASSICAL BACKGROUND

The first piece of literature produced on the Atlantic seaboard was a completed translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* by George Sandys, an Oxford man who spent ten years in Virginia as a plantation owner, treasurer of the company, and councillor under Governor Wyat. Michael Drayton had given him a send-off in England, describing him as a pioneer in making America a cultural outpost of the mother country:

Go on with Ovid, as you have begun  
With the first five books; let your numbers run  
Glib as the former, so shall it live long,  
And do much honour to the English tongue.  
Intice the Muses thither to repair,  
Intreat them gently, train them to that air.

The spirit of the "myth" continued in the type of literature which Sandys selected for his occupation on the foreign shores. Sandys wrote, in the dedication of his Ovid to Charles the First:

It needeth more than a simple denization, being a double stranger sprung from the stock of the ancient Romans but bred in the New World, of the rudeness whereof it cannot but participate, especially having Warres and Tumults to bring it to light in stead of the Muses? <sup>30</sup>

The translation is an excellent one, by any standard. For the most part, the English occupies little more space than the original Latin; and there is a "drive" to the verses. Medea's famous debate with herself, whether to fly with Jason or remain at home, is impressive: <sup>31</sup>

Fierce is my Father, barbarous my land;  
My Brother a child; my sister's wishes stand  
With my desires; the greatest God of all  
My breast inshrines. What I forsake is small;  
Great hopes I follow; to receive the grace  
For Argo's safety; know a better place,  
And Cities which in these far-distant parts  
Are famous with civility and arts;  
And Aeson's son, whom I most dearly prize  
Than wealthy Earth, and all her Monarchies.

Another Virginian who helped to change the fabulous region into the Old Dominion, and who interests us especially by virtue of his

use of the classics, is William Strachey, author of the *Historie of Travell into Virginia Britania*.<sup>32</sup> Secretary of the Colony, he sailed with Gates and Somers, with farewell tributes from Thames-side as rousing "as a Roman triumph." By way of the "still-vexed Bermoothes," he reached Jamestown in 1610, making himself indispensable to the settlers, codifying the laws and advertising the advantages of the province. His endeavor was to extract from the "myth" all available items for the benefit of future "planters." His style is rambling and at times awkward, though picturesque. The Christian message is uppermost; but for illustrative purposes his medium of description is largely classical. The title page motto is taken from Horace, *Epistles* II 1. 250-3, wherein he proposes to discuss *res gestas, terrarum situs, flumina, arces montibus impositas, and barbara regna*.

The aim is *Ecclesiae et Rei-publicae*. The well-worn epigram, "As we are Angli, make us Angells too," was a prayer worthy of emphasis. Writing "On the Wrack and Redemption (Rescue) of Sir Thomas Gates," he describes the tempest which that high-minded alumnus of Gray's Inn faced so bravely:

Hostium uxores, puerique caecos  
Sentiant motus orientis Haedi et  
Aequoris nigri fremitum, et trementes  
Verbere ripas . . . Ego quid sit ater  
Adriae novi sinus, et quid albus  
Peccet Iapyx.<sup>33</sup>

May the wives and children of our *foes alone* be the victims of the rising South Wind and the roaring of the dark waters, and the beaches shaken by the blast! I know the murky waves of the Adriatic and the ominous signs of the clear West Wind.

An illustration of the classical trend characteristic of Strachey's contemporaries is his use of ancient history rather than medieval romances when he refers to the Welshman Madoc's legendary voyage to the region of Florida and Mexico in the twelfth century: the most significant event "synce the fabulous drowning by Deucalion's flood, or burning by Phaeton, or synce the sincking of the Atlantick Islands."<sup>34</sup>

The ambition of the English explorers has parallels in ancient history: "Themistocles," says Strachey, "could not rest when he heard of Melciades' (Miltiades') victory; and Caesar wept at the sight of Alexander's image." What are dangers to true adventurers?

Their friend and promoter Michael Drayton<sup>35</sup> had said to them on their departure: "When Eolus scowls, you need not feare." Numa, Strachey believes, had the right answer when warned of an approaching enemy: "And we doe sacrifice!" "The clamor of a centurion or two cannot disturb Numa Pompilius kneeling at the altar."<sup>36</sup> The British are heavily in debt to the ancients: "What overgrown satyrs would the British be if we had not been civilized by Roman settlements!"

The injection of learning into everyday activities is a characteristic of Strachey's era. He was a graduate of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and a member of Gray's Inn. Though not a writer of distinction, he is apt in his illustrations and conscientious in his reporting.<sup>37</sup> Some of his learning seems farfetched, as, for example, his comment on the Indian dyes: their women stain themselves with a kind of dye, "as is said of Greek women how they colored their faces with certain rootes call Brenthyna." This is mentioned by Hesychius,<sup>38</sup> as a type of rouge which came from Lydia. Their boats, one piece of timber, resemble "The auncyent *monoxylum navigium*" mentioned by Pliny the Elder,<sup>39</sup> Xenophon, Polybius, and others. They "pipe as on a recorder with a kynd of cane, like the Greek pipes which they call *bombyces*." They have a game like the English "bandy," which reminds Strachey of the Trojans teaching the Latins "scipping and frisking at the ball." A high stage, raised like a scaffold, is devoted to the elders, "like the covered place where men used in old tyme to sitt and talke for recreation or pleasure—which they called *praestega*."<sup>40</sup> Their barley, sodden in water, is "not unlike that homely *jus nigrum* which Lacedaemonians used to eate—which Dionisius could not abyde to taste of."<sup>41</sup>

These children of Nature worshipped a devil, Okeus, "as the Romaynes did their hurtfull god Vejovis"—an observation which we note later in William Byrd's conversation with the Indian "Bearskin." Their "weroances" enjoyed metempsychosis, "not unlike the heathen Pythagoras his opinion;" and Strachey condemns the Epicurean doctrine of the soul becoming nothing after the death of the body: "the sowle is not a meere quality of the body."<sup>42</sup>

This colonial secretary, one of a long line of distinguished Stracheys, resembles the Elder Pliny in his spirit of scientific enquiry. He was an excellent classical scholar, and wisely used his Greco-Roman material in its modern application. He was a conscientious financier, though not ultimately successful in the colony. Phrases such as *in assem satisfacere*, "pay up in full," are used with reference to



the debts of the settlement. He was familiar with ancient technical terms: an Indian fast day is compared with the *feriae praecedaneae*, the Roman "preliminary holidays" which preceded a religious day of ill omen.<sup>43</sup> To his noble patron the Earl of Southampton he pays the Horatian compliment: *Candidus et talos a vertice pulcher ad imos*,<sup>44</sup> "Frank and noble from head to foot."

The underlying illustrations are all in the classical vein. Strachey's *Lawes Divine and Morall* is prefaced by two mottos: *Alget qui non ardet*, "He goes a-cold who does not glow with energy," and a philosophical hint that the settlers must make the best of their difficulties: *Res nostrae subinde non sunt, quales quis optaret, sed quales esse possunt*, "our affairs are at present not such as one might wish but such as are possible." The dedication states that the author is presenting a "Toparchia or State of those duties, by which their Colonie stands regulated and commanded," and hails the deputy governor Sir Thomas Dale as "Ethnarches."

The same fulsome classic-laden language was used in letters and reports. The "Relation" of Master Stockam, who called the burden of Virginia a job for Atlas, denounces both the disaffected whites and the Indians. Referring to the former, he threatens punishment: "To such I wish according to the decree of Darius, that whosoever is an enemy to our peace—that his house were pulled downe, and a paire of gallowes made of the wood, and he hanged on them in the place." For the latter he recommends the tough policy: "I am persuaded if Mars and Minerva goe hand in hand, they will effect more good in an hour than those verball Mercurians (*i.e.* language students and emissaries) in their lives; and till their Priests and Ancients have their throats cut, there is no hope to bring them to conversion."<sup>45</sup> Even Captain John Huddleston, commander of the ship that carried a relief cargo of corn from Jamestown to Plymouth, brought a formal letter of introduction to the Pilgrims in which, describing the Virginia massacre of 1622, was the comment: "Hapie is he whom other men's harmes do make to beware," this being an English version of the Latin proverb, *Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum*.<sup>46</sup>

There was a certain flamboyant element in these settlers, whose sufferings exceeded the Puritan quota by reason of their more reckless attitude. Many of them were educated men,<sup>47</sup> like the able and easygoing John Pory, M.A. from Cambridge, member of Parliament, friend of Hakluyt, secretary to Sir George Yeardley, and a diplomat who might also have had high standing in the Embassy to

the Hague, *Si mens non laeva fuisset*.<sup>48</sup> Many young adventurers, some of them defined by William Byrd of Westover as "reprobates of good familys," carried generous pounds-worth of education to unmarked graves along the Tidewater. But Strachey, Sandys, Pory, and others, while making use of classical themes, demythologized into reality an important section of the *meta incognita*, "The Unknown Goal."

Captain John Smith has been a semimythical personality, resembling what the Greeks used to define as an eponymous, and moderns as a self-made hero. Tradition portrays him as a bewhiskered prevaricator of marvelous exploits and a fighting man with a slender education. History takes him seriously as a constructive explorer and a tireless advocate of overseas settlement.<sup>49</sup> There is, however, something further to be considered apart from the romantic adventures familiar to every schoolboy and the partisan debates of debunkers and enthusiasts. He was a man of wide reading as well as an explorer devoted to the enlargement of his country's interests. And it is significant that, apart from the religious motives so prevalently uppermost in the minds and phraseology of the colonizers, his medium of expression is apt to run towards the classical themes which were especially familiar to Englishmen in the Elizabethan and Jacobean decades.<sup>50</sup>

The parish register of Willoughby in Lincolnshire records his baptism, *ixth die Januarii* 1579-80, in the usual semi-Latin terms. His father was a farmer in comfortable circumstances, and allowed his son a decent education at the free grammar schools of Alford and Louth. All our evidence indicates that Smith was a person who, though naïve, could put up a good front with both speech and pen in the company of university graduates. While resting between campaigns at his Lincolnshire retreat, he read extensively, including the picturesque combination of Marcus Aurelius and Machiavelli's *Arte della Guerra*.<sup>51</sup> That some perusal of Polybius was of practical use to our hero is evident from his application of the torch-signaling code at the siege of Olympach (Ober-Limbach) in Hungary against the Turks. With certain modifications, he follows the ancient historian.<sup>52</sup> Signalers on the mountain, visible to the town, flash with three torches to the governor of the town, seven miles away. The besieged flash back with three torches also. In the code, the alphabet is divided into two parts, A-L and M-Z. The participants show and hide one torch "so oft as there is letters from A to that letter you meane." Two torches similarly used take care of the interval M-Z. Three

lights indicate the end of a word, and the answer is one light shown at the close of the message.

Besides specific citations, there are hidden allusions which indicate familiarity, or at least a good memory. Smith was undoubtedly at home with Golding's rendering of Ovid, with Thomas Lodge's Seneca, and with North's Plutarch.<sup>53</sup> In his description of Virginia he remarks of the climate: "The colde is extreme sharpe; but here the proverbe is true, that no extreame long continueth," reminding us of the Epicurean proverb on pain: *si longus, levis; si gravis, brevis*.<sup>54</sup> Addressing his fellow explorers at the mouth of the Potomac in 1608, he talks like a Roman general addressing his troops, with a touch of the *Miles Gloriosus*: "You cannot say but I have shared with you the worst that is past; and for what is to come, I am contented you allot the worst part to myself."<sup>55</sup> The preface to Smith's last work, *Advertisements for the Unexperienced Planters of New England* (1631), shows his familiarity with ancient anecdote:

Honest Reader, Apelles by the proportion of a foot could make the whole proportion of a man! Were hee now living, he might goe to schoole; for now are thousands who can by opinion proportion kingdoms, cities, and Lordships, that never durst adventure to see them. And some try to tell what all England is like by seeing Milford Haven, as what Apelles was by the picture of his great toe.<sup>56</sup>

Roman heroism as a model for young Englishmen is a redundant theme in Smith's writings. In one of his tall statements to the Worshipful Adventurers, he excuses himself by a boastful comparison: "I am not the first that hath been betrayed by Pirates . . . Foure men of warre had been sufficient to have taken Sampson, Hercules, and Alexander the Great, no other way furnisht than I was . . . What made Rome such a Monarchesse, but only the adventures of her youth, not in riots at home but in dangers abroad" — a sentiment which is prefaced by a brave call to his countrymen: "A note for men that have great spirits and small meanes." There is a delicate hint, in a dedication to the Duchess of Richmond, of his own exploits: "When shall we looke to find a *Julius Caesar*, whose atchievements shine as cleare in his owne commentaries as they did in the field?" We note one unchanging purpose in the writings and testimony of this adventurer to whose mapping and exhortation succeeding settlers owed so much. There are, he feels, too many stay-at-homes, too many "tender educats." "All the *Romans* were not *Scipios* — Had they dived no deeper in the secrets of their discoveries

than wee — they had never beene remembered as they are; yet had they no such certainties to begin as wee." England must conquer everywhere, as did Rome. He gathered evidence from others, one of whom wrote in a collection edited by Smith himself:

For the great Romans got into their hand,  
The whole world's compass, both by Sea and Land,  
Or any seas, or heaven, or earth extended,  
And yet that Nation could not be contented.<sup>57</sup>

John Smith was in cordial agreement with the Londoners who had the fondest hopes for success in colonizing Virginia. The sermon by Daniel Price, preached at St. Paul's Cross in May, 1609, for the purpose of confuting skeptics, accords with the captain's views: "That Virgin Country may in time prove to us the farm of Britain, as Sicily was to Rome, or the garden of the World, as was Thessaly."<sup>58</sup> But the immediate problems were pressing, and the Romans could also serve as a warning: "The *Romanes* estate hath been worse than this: for the meere covetousnesse and extortion of a few of them so mooved the rest, that, not having any imployment but contemplation, their great judgments grew to so great malice, as themselves were sufficient to destroy themselves by faction."<sup>59</sup> The disciplinary doubt which troubles all leaders led him to "prevent" (i.e., anticipate) the mutterings of the mutineers, and to quote the saying of the woman who was vainly trying to resist her emotions:

Some would say with Seneca  
"I know those things thou sayest are true, good nurse,  
And fury forceth me to follow worse.  
My minde is harried headlong up and downe,  
Desiring better counsel, yet found none."<sup>60</sup>

Granting occasional doubtful authenticity, we sometimes puzzle over the problem whence Smith derived certain of his more recondite illustrations. For example, in discussing the enviable success of certain Dutch traders, under conditions where today a statistical letter would be in order, the Captain clouds his report with some deep celestial physics: "The benefit of fishing is that *primum mobile* that turns all their *spheres* to this height of plentie, strength, honour, and admiration."<sup>61</sup> It is either a credit to the intelligence of the age, or a bit of pedantry on the part of the writer, when Aristotelian cosmology is introduced into what we should now regard as a report to the Bureau of Fisheries.



Again, what was the extent of Smith's acquaintance with the Roman master of atomic philosophy? "To conclude with Lucretius," he tells us when censuring those of little courage:

It's want of reason, or it's reason's want  
Which doubts the mind, and judgment so doth dant,  
That those beginnings makes men not to grant.  
John Smith writ this with his owne hand.

The scholar would be inclined, with some justice, to toss this gallimaufry out of the window; but it offers the historian a chance to observe an ambitious mind wrestling manfully with the Roman poet-philosopher's *Temptat enim dubiam mentem rationis egestas*.<sup>62</sup>

We may close these sketches of the admiral's ventures into the classics with some verses which he (or "Maister John Pory") quotes in order to encourage harmonious partnership of all hands for purposes of exploration and colonization. "Peruse this saying of honest Claudius (meaning Claudian)":<sup>63</sup>

"See'st not the world of Natures worke, the fairest well, I wot,  
How it, itself together ties, as in a true-loves knot.  
Nor see'st how th' elements are combined, maintaine one constant plea,  
How midst of heaven contents the Sunne, and shore containes the sea;  
And how the aire both compasseth, and carrieth still earth's frame,  
Yet neither pressing burdens it, nor parting leaves the same."

The verse structure is too good to be the work of our noble adventurer: it is excellent though rough Elizabethan. In modern prose<sup>64</sup> Claudian's lines read as follows: "Seest thou not how the fair frame of the very universe binds itself together by love, and how the elements, not united by violence, are for ever at harmony among themselves? Dost thou not mark how that Phoebus is content not to outstep the limits of his path, nor the sea those of his kingdom; and how the air, which in its eternal embrace encircles and upholds the world, presses not upon us with too heavy a weight nor yet yields to the burden which itself sustains?"

If we had nothing but Smith's own story we might be compelled to admit that in his case Fable, in the words of Plutarch, had failed "to make herself credible." But there is much testimony from his associates and backers that the Argonautic myth "takes on the semblance of history." There are many of these tributes.<sup>65</sup>

John Smith evidently had a wide circle of friends, or at least believers in the activities of colonization. The poet George Wither,

*e Societate Lincol.*, heralded his *Description of New England* in 1616. Another hailed the exploit of a man who could

In spight of Pelias, when his hate lies colde,  
Return as Iason with a Fleece of Gold.

For the revised edition of *The Generall Historie* in 1624, "T.T." turned Argonautic:

Smith is here to anvil out a piece  
To after Ages and Eternall Fame,  
That we may have the golden Jason's fleece.  
He, Vulcan-like, did forge a new plantation,  
And chained their kings to his immortal glory.

Richard James, highly approving the patronage of the Duchess of Richmond in assisting Smith to publish his *Generall Historie*, celebrated the Captain's Caesar-like qualities. Anthony Fereby contributed some verses to the same effect:

And when dissolved, laid in thy mother's womb,  
There, Caesar-like, Smith's epitaph and tomb.

Finally, his friend Cartner offered him a dedicatory couplet:

The old Greek Bard counts him the only man  
Who knows strange Countries, like his Ithacan.  
All these are met in thee.

Edward Jordan indicated his affection for the "Admirall of New England" by complimentary verses signed *Tuissimus*.

There are two puzzling lines of original but bungling Latin, following some couplets in which "I.C." and "C.P." felicitate Smith for having "brought straggling Astraea back":

Quisque suae sortis Faber: an Faber exstitit unquam,  
Te, Smithe, fortunae verior usque suae?

Admitting the obvious use of the pun *Faber* 'smith,' and calling to mind the oldest Roman proverb, we arrive at the meaning: "Every man is the artificer of his own destiny; never a truer Smith of his own fortunes existed than thyself, O Smith." Samuel Purchas, conscientious herald of foreign colonization, greeted the adventurer in some awkward verses which allude to Achilles and Pallas and the hero's expertness in "sword-grammar," implying that Smith was as clever with his brain as he was with his weapons.

It is tempting to accept, as a final sample of these tributes, the poem signed "Io.Done" in the 1624 edition of the *Generall Historie*. The great Donne is an entirely possible author of these lines:

Nor who doth better win th' Olympian prize  
Than he whose COUNTRYE'S Honor stirres his  
bloud?

The Dean of St. Paul's joined the Virginia company of stockholders on May 22d, 1622; he preached a sermon at Paul's Cross on November 13th, 1622 "To the Honorable Company of the Virginia Plantation"; and long before this date, in some state papers of 1609, we find John Chamberlain writing to Dudley Carleton: "News here is none at all, but that John Donne seeks to be secretary at Virginia."<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately, despite the numerous occasional poems ascribed to Donne, and quite properly the elegy on Prince Henry in 1612, this couplet is not included in the canon of his genuine writings; and his later editors are skeptical. We may resist the temptation to count the great preacher as one of Smith's "fautors," and regret the necessity.

This atmosphere, flamboyant but sincere, followed Smith to the grave; he was ever a herald of something new, flavoring it with the ancient history which he loved and exemplifying the classical enthusiasms of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The introduction to his *Advertisements for the Inexperienced Planters* contains a woodcut of a coat of arms, with Neptune carrying a trident and riding a dolphin, and the motto *gens incognita mihi serviet*. On his tomb, "in St. Sepulchers on the South Side of the quire," were his arms and the motto *accordamus, vincere est vivere*,<sup>67</sup> so closely in those days did the "myth" combine with what Bacon called "the disposition and management of business." We may preserve what the lawyers define as "a learned doubt" regarding the veracity of many of Smith's stories, including in this category certain other adventurers. But as a model "Argonaut" he has no superior.

## NOTES

1. Amy Kelly, *Eleanor of Aquitaine* (Harvard University Press, 1950) 38-39.
2. Loeb trans. by B. Perrin, I 3. The writer of this article, after its completion, noted a similar application of the Plutarch passage in Edwin Björkman's "Atlantis, Protean and Immortal," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 37 (1938) 184.
3. Boston edition of 1848, 41. Hubbard's phrase is a condensation of many

ancient versions: Aristotle, *History of Animals* 8.28.11, Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists* 14.623, and Pliny, *Natural History* 8.16.42: *volgare Graeciae dictum semper aliquid novi Africam adferre*.

4. A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect* (New York, 1927). See especially W. C. Greene, *Moira, Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944): the myth, as in Homer, ch. II; as in Greek Tragedy, ch. IV.; as in Plato, ch. IX. See also F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907) and W. R. Halliday, *Greek and Roman Folklore* (N. Y., 1927) 74-78. Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950) discusses the same trend in nineteenth-century America.

5. F. C. Rosenberger, *The Virginia Reader* (New York, 1948) 35f.

6. *History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay* (Boston, 1765) ch. I, from Tacitus, *Ger.* 2.

7. Lines 375-9, quoted in Bacon's 35th Essay. *Tethys* is the reading of the best MS (Laurentianus 37.13), but *Tiphys* is found in other MSS and many earlier printed texts. Tiphys was the pilot of the Argo, Tethys the wife of Oceanus.

8. From his *Historie of Travell*, 137f. (See footnote 32.) In Plato's *Timaeus* the younger Critias tells the story as he heard it from his grandfather. The latter, an Athenian, was a friend of Solon who had visited Egypt and learned from a priest the myth of the lost Atlantis. See *ib.* 138-9 for Strachey's comment and his translation of the lines from the *Medea*.

9. From *The Progress of Learning*, 172-3 of his *Poems and Translations* (London, 1703). By 1553 the historian Lopez de Gomara had pronounced the myth to be a fact, identifying Atlantis as America, in his *Pleasant Historie of the Conquest of the Weast India*, trans. from the Spanish (London, 1578).

10. These verses are among those prefixed to William Hubbard's *Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians* (Boston, 1677).

11. *Magnalia* I. I. Diodorus, 5. 19-20, Loeb trans. by C. H. Oldfather, III 145ff.)

12. I. I. 8-9.

13. See, for further discussion, R. R. Cawley, *Unpathed Waters* (Princeton, 1940), containing an excellent bibliography, esp. 36ff., 43ff., 125ff., 163ff.; H. E. Burton, *The Discovery of the Ancient World* (Cambridge, Mass. 1932); Cary and Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers* (London, 1929). Compare Homer, *Od.* 4.561ff.; Pindar, *Olymp.* 2.78; Plato, *Timaeus* 24E and *Critias* 108E. Clement of Rome, in a letter to the Corinthians (K. Lake, *The Apostolic Fathers* [Loeb], *Epist.* I 20.8), may be following Posidonius's lost work *On the Ocean*: "An ocean which men cannot pass, and the worlds beyond it," as Prof. W. W. Jaeger suggested to me.

14. *Poems*, ed. F. L. Pattee (Princeton, 1902) I 47-8. For still further information, see *The Tenne Tragedies of Seneca*, translated into English, first published in 1581 by Thomas Newton, and edited by the Spenser Society, 1887.

15. May 8, 1783. J. W. Thornton, *The Pulpit of the American Revolution* (Boston, 1876) 407.

16. Sixth edition (Boston, 1855) 191.

17. Ed. Boston (1765) I 478. The Massagetae were a savage folk, inhabiting what is now southern Siberia.

18. *History of the First Discovery and Settlement of Virginia*, first published



in 1747; reprinted as no. 6 of Joseph Sabin's *Reprints*, (New York, 1865) vii and 2.

19. Paul Wiltach, *The Correspondence of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson* (Indianapolis, 1925) 48. For the absurd supposition that a Greek fleet "moored on the coast of Brazil" in the time of Alexander the Great, and left an inscription celebrating their exploration, see Josiah Priest, *American Antiquities and the Discoveries in the West* (Albany, N. Y., 1833) esp. 42, 50, and 383-4.

20. *The Historie of that Wise and Fortunate Prince Henrie, of that name the Seventh, King of England* (1638) 127.

21. From Latin *sinus*, "bay" or "inlet."

22. The best ancient account of the Argonauts can be found in Diodorus Siculus, Loeb trans. by C. H. Oldfather 4.40-52. See also the epics by Apollonius Rhodius in Greek and Valerius Flaccus in Latin (incomplete).

23. "Bissellii Argonauticon Americanum" is listed in the catalogue of the private library of William Byrd the second, of Westover, Virginia (died 1744); J. S. Bassett, *The Writings of Colonel William Byrd* (New York, 1901) 416.

24. A similar figure of speech is suggested by Diodorus 4.26.2, namely that the Golden Apples ( $\mu\eta\lambda\alpha$ ) of the Hesperides may stand metaphorically for sheep ( $\mu\eta\lambda\alpha$ ) of the finest breed.

25. E. Eggleston, *Beginnings of a Nation* (New York, 1900) 261; C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* (New Haven, 1934) I 306.

26. For these various enterprises, see F. B. Sanborn, *New Hampshire* (Boston, 1904) 2ff. The reference to Gorges, comparing him with the Roman consul Caninius Rebilus, is found in Cicero, *Epp. ad Fam.* 7.30; also in *Scriptores historiae Augustae* ed. H. Peter (Leipzig, 1884), in the chapter on the tyrant Marius by Trebellius Pollio (*vita* no. 24.) 8.2.

27. Ed. C. F. Adams, Jr. (Boston, 1883) 241. For a theory that the Golden Fleece might have been beaver skins, see *ib.* 295.

28. *Diary* of Samuel Sewall (Massachusetts Historical Society Collections), I 219. K. B. Murdock, *Selections from Cotton Mather* (New York, 1926) 171.

29. As in the case of William Byrd on his Dividing Line Expedition; J. S. Bassett, *The Writings of Byrd*, 134.

30. Published in London (like so many of the early American writings) in 1626. R. B. Davis, in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, series 3, 4 (1947) 297-304, believes that Sandys can justifiably be regarded as the first American writer, not only because of the time which he spent officially in the colony, but also because of the close acquaintance with Virginian institutions, as indicated by the extensive footnotes in his later editions of this translation.

31. From the seventh edition (1678) of Sandys' translation of *Metamorphoses* 7.53-61. Lines 147-8 of the ninth book, where Deianeira bewails herself as deserted by Hercules for Iole, are too condensed:

"Shall I complain? Be mute? Shift houses? Stay?  
Return to Calydon, and give her way?"

32. Ed. Louis B. Wright and Virginia Freund (London, 1953) for the Hakluyt Society, with new material, biographical and historical. This edition is based on the Percy MS (now in the Princeton University Library), rather than on the Bacon MS, which was used by R. H. Major in his publication of 1849. Strachey's *True Repertory* is to be found in *Purchas his Pilgrims*. His *Lawes Divine, Morall, and Martiall* appeared in London in 1612.

33. Horace, *Odes* 3.27.18-24. Strachey, who doubtless knew his Horace by heart, has reversed the order of the two sentences. In the second line, the best MS reading is *austri* (and we translate accordingly); *haedi* was an emendation without MS support, by Lambinus.

34. From his *Praemonition to the Reader*, in the *Travell* (1953), 11-12.

35. *Ode to the Virginia Voyage*.

36. Plutarch, *Numa* 25, quoted in *Travell*, 8. For some other classical sources used by Strachey, see his *Historie of Travell* (1953), 4, 16, 21, 24, 73, 84, 85, 87, 99, 112, 115, 118, 132 (for an amusing display of metaphysical terminology), 135, etc.

37. See Howard M. Jones, *The Literature of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century* (Boston, 1946) 24-26. This excellent study has been of great assistance to the present writer. See also C. R. Sanders, "William Strachey, the Virginia Colony, and Shakespeare," *Virginia Mag. of Hist. and Biog.* 57 (1949) 115-132.

38. Hesychius, *Lexicon*, ed. K. Latte (Copenhagen, 1953) no. 1097 (p. 346) — *βρενθινά* — *Travell* 70. Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists* 2.69b, Loeb trans. by C. B. Gulick (VII 196) mentions "a perfume called Brentheium."

39. *Nat. Hist.* 6.26.105 (carrying pepper from Cottonara), *Travell*, 75.

40. A sort of porch: see Plutarch, *Caesar* 17, and a puzzling reference in Pollux, *Onomasticon* 7.120 (*προστέριον*). From *Travell*, 79.

41. The reference here is presumably to Plutarch's *Ἐπιτηδεύματα Λακωνικά* 236 E (*On Spartan Fare*). From *Travell*, 81. See also Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 5.34.98.

42. J. S. Bassett, *The Writings of Byrd*, 140-142. Ovid, *Fasti* 3.429-448; Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 5.12.12. From *Travell*, 88, 100.

43. See the note of J. C. Rolfe on Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 4.6, Loeb trans. (I 334). From *Travell*, 96.

44. *Travell*, 150, from Horace, *Epistles* 2.2.4.

45. See L. G. Tyler, *Narratives of Early Virginia, 1606-1625* (New York, 1907), 347f. Also, Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works of Captain John Smith* (Edinburgh, 1910) II 564.

46. See M. P. Andrews, *Virginia, the Old Dominion* (New York, 1937) 112, 94.

47. Howard M. Jones, *Literature of Virginia*, 27-29.

48. Tyler, *Narratives of Early Virginia*, 285; Vergil, *Aeneid* 2.54.

49. It is beside the present point to note the *pros* and *cons* of opinion regarding John Smith. His *True Relation of Virginia* may be bracketed with George Sandys' translation of Ovid as a pioneer production of our American literature. There are many biographies and controversial articles. The definitive collection of Smith's writings is *Travels and Works of Captain J. S.*, ed. E. Arber and A. G. Bradley, two vols. (Edinburgh, 1910). The best biography is that by Bradford Smith (Philadelphia, 1953). There is a bibliography edited by Wilberforce Eames (New York, 1927). An excellent and fair account of his writings can be found in Howard M. Jones, *Literature of Virginia*, 16-23.

50. See J. A. K. Thomson, *Shakespeare and the Classics* (London, 1952) 9-14, on the universality of Latin for everyone with a grammar school education. A man who wished to be a leader, in most forms of activity, had to "deeply imbue his mind in classical books."

51. Marcus Aurelius, perhaps in a translation from Antonio de Guevara's *Libro Aureo*, englished by Sir Thomas North as *The Diall of Princes* (London, 1558), or Lord Berners' *Golden Book of Marcus Aurelius* (London, 1534). He

probably read his Machiavelli in the translation of Peter Whitehorne, of Gray's Inn, London, published in 1562, 1588, etc.

52. See Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, II 829, and Polybius, 10.45-47.

53. Many *florilegia*, or "elegant extracts," in the original or in translation, together with popular phrases from grammar school texts, were available to the men of this period. Throughout the following century, Sir Roger L'Estrange's *Seneca's Morals by Way of Abstract* was a "best-seller."

54. Cicero, *De finibus* 2.22. See also Seneca, *Epistles* 24.14: *levis es, si ferre possum; brevis es, si ferre non possum*.

55. A possible reference to Teucer's hortatory address, Horace, *Odes* 1.7; or to the cheering words of Aeneas, *Aeneid* 1.199. L. G. Tyler, *Narratives of Early Virginia*, 81 and 144.

56. Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, II 921. This anecdote of the famous painter Apelles is slightly garbled; Pliny the Elder, *Nat. Hist.* 35.84, tells the story of the shoemaker whose criticism of a foot in a painting by Apelles is welcome, but whose remarks on other parts of the body are met with the retort *Ne supra crepidam sutor*, "stick to your last!"; see also Valerius Maximus, 8.12.ext.3.

57. Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, II 603. For other references in this connection, see I 179, 276, 228.

58. Alexander Brown, *The Genesis of the United States* (Boston, 1890) I 314.

59. Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, I 211, 228.

60. From Seneca, *Hippolytus* 177 — the soul agony of Phaedra, Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works* II 473. For other classical sources contained either in Smith's actual writings or in his published collections, see I xci, 196, 209, 245, 304, 326; II 935, etc.

61. Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, I 194. The *primum mobile* was the outermost concentric sphere, the earth being situated in the centre. It was the first to be set in motion.

62. Lucretius, 5.1211, reminiscent also of 4.483-5. Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, II 742.

63. *On the Fourth Consulship of Honorius*, 284-289, quoted in *On Loving-Kindness*. If this section of the report was not written by Smith himself, it was without doubt edited under his supervision. Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, II 566. As Book IV of the "Generall Historie," the passage is also found in L. G. Tyler's *Narratives of Early Virginia, 1606-1625* (New York, 1907). The same idea, familiar to every educated Englishman, occurs in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1.5-31. George Sandys had translated this passage from Ovid before leaving England for Jamestown.

64. Loeb trans. by M. Platnauer, I 307. There seems to have been no complete translation of Claudian into English until the early nineteenth century. There were scattered renderings from a few individual poems — notably one of the *Rape of Proserpine* (London, 1628) "Claudian translated out of Latine into English verse, by Leonard Digges, Gent." Thomas Dempster, who for ecclesiastical reasons lived on the Continent, published an edition in 1607.

65. For these various eulogies, see Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, I 280, 182, 282, 284; II 814-818, 971. They are collected in Arber's *English Scholar's Library* (1884), no. 16 intro. p. viii. This work is devoted to Smith's writings, collaborated editions, and testimonials.

66. The verses are in Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, I 284. The sermon is in Donne's *Collected Works* (ed. Alford, 1839) VI 225, — for which our thanks are due to R. P. Sorlien. See Alexander Brown, *Genesis of the United States* (Boston, 1890) I 237, referring to Thomas Birch, *Court and Times of James I* (London, 1848) I 87.

67. See Arber and Bradley, *Travels and Works*, II 919 and 971.





SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF PH.D. 1954 AND 1955

MORTIMER HARDIN CHAMBERS — *Studies in the  
Veracity of Thucydides*.<sup>1</sup>

THUCYDIDES is usually, and rightly, set apart from all other ancient writers of history, both Greek and Roman, for his over-all objectivity, disinterestedness, and accuracy. No ancient author undertook more labor over details; and in a broader sense too none shows more remarkable veracity. The present thesis makes no attempt to overthrow his reputation or to depreciate his extraordinary abilities.

Nevertheless marked progress has been made in the understanding of Greek history since the standard editions of the last century, and it has seemed time for a return to the author himself and to a study of his methods of procedure. For this purpose, Thucydides' veracity appeared a fit subject for investigation. The thesis samples, in greater or less detail, several problems in which the veracity of Thucydides, hitherto accepted almost without question, must be considered. These problems are: his personal political views, the speeches in his *Histories*, his sources and the use that he made of them, the composition of his work, some of the statistics which he presents, the constitutional status of a town in the Athenian Empire, and the topography of Syracuse.

The thesis contains no general chapter of conclusions. Yet one conclusion which seems to emerge is that, despite the justified belief in Thucydides' candor and accuracy, he was not superhuman. The evidence points toward error at certain places in his narrative, although it is sometimes uncertain whether the error is due to Thucydides himself or to corruption in the MSS. At other points there is regrettable obscurity or incompleteness. It will never be possible to regard the Peloponnesian War, as a whole, except as it is presented by Thucydides; but the presence of errors, however small, within his work suggests that no statement of his must be accepted without any question whatsoever. It will always be possible to try

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology, 1954.

to test his evidence and his inferences; to do so is no injustice to Thucydides.

A brief summary of the several chapters in the thesis follows:

*Prolegomena.* There are definite indications of personal political views in Thucydides, particularly regarding certain Greek statesmen, but the thesis does not conclude that there is sufficient evidence of prejudice to charge Thucydides with deliberate misrepresentation. His unflattering portrait of Cleon is not necessarily untrustworthy.

The speeches are indubitably free compositions in the style of Thucydides; there is little individual portraiture in them and they all make use of common rhetorical ideas. For several of them he had little more, in all likelihood, than the "general sense" of what was spoken, and one matter is sometimes debated between two parties neither of whom could have heard what the other said. Thucydides did, however, attempt to pay some attention to fact, and composed the orations with as much fidelity as was possible.

Among his sources, Hellanicus of Mytilene and Charon of Lampsacus are prominent. Hellanicus was used as partial source for the Fifty Years; Charon was used in Book 1 and for certain details in Book 6. Thucydides occasionally disagrees with Herodotus and may not always be correct in doing so.

There seems reason to believe that Thucydides did not always make perfect use of his sources. There is an occasional weak inference from documents, and his information about Athenian finance is not always above question.

The difficult problem of the composition of the work is probably not capable of definite solution. The position here taken is that the balance of probability points toward an early attempt to write the history of the Archidamian War not long after 421.

*Thucydidean Numbers.* Certain numbers in Thucydides are of doubtful accuracy. Some of these are susceptible of emendation.

*The Status of Hestiaeae.* There is conflicting evidence concerning the precise status of Hestiaeae within the Athenian Empire. Epigraphic evidence suggests that it was a cleruchy, but Thucydides appears to speak of it as a colony. Between these two kinds of settlement there were certain distinctions, particularly in the matter of financial obligation to the Athenian Empire. The thesis concludes that, in the present state of the evidence, it is better to regard it as a cleruchy.

*The Topography of Syracuse.* Thucydides's account of the Syracusan and Athenian fortifications during the siege of Syracuse ap-

pears to be correct. New locations of the several walls are submitted. The accuracy of the description, which seems to surpass anything that Thucydides could have reconstructed entirely from accounts of participants in the siege, lends additional strength to the opinion that he visited Sicily for part of his material.

GEORGE ALEXANDER KENNEDY — *Prolegomena and Commentary to Quintilian VIII (Pr. and 1-3)*.<sup>1</sup>

QUINTILIAN'S account of *elocutio* represents the most fully developed form of a traditional theory which had its origins in Greece in the fifth century, was given form by Aristotle and Theophrastus, was elaborated by the Hellenistic writers, and was standardized by the Augustans. The *Prolegomena* of this thesis is an attempt to reconstruct the history of this development, while the commentary seeks to interpret the text of Quintilian in terms of the tradition which it represents.

*Prolegomena*. The first treatise on style was probably written by Polus or one of the other pupils of Gorgias. It was a short separate work cataloging poetic devices which might be applied to prose. No discussion of style was incorporated into the *technē rhētorikē* or rhetorical handbook until the second half of the fourth century. The *Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum* is a conflation of a *technē* of the traditional form by Anaximenes with material from one of the early handbooks on style. Its spurious sections can be identified by the much greater incidence of hiatus in the passages which are for the most part omitted by the catalogue in the sixth chapter. It is probable that this conflation took place at the same time that the spurious introductory epistle was added. This must be dated after the death of Aristotle, who was thus the earliest writer to include a theory of style in a rhetorical handbook. The extant *Rhetoric* is a product of Aristotle's full development. Its first two books elaborate material from an early work on rhetorical logic, while the third book is a revision of the *Theodectea* which was originally a statement of sophistic rhetorical theory on invention, arrangement, and style.

The most important single work in the development of the tra-

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology, 1954.



ditional theory of style was the *Peri lexeōs* of Theophrastus, which made the four virtues of style the standard system of organization for most later handbooks. Stroux' reconstruction of that treatise on the basis of Cicero's *De oratore* is correct, although it is probable that Theophrastus did discuss the *genera dicendi*; for the beginnings of a theory of three styles may be seen in Plato (*Resp.*397C), Isocrates (*Paneg.*11), and Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3,1413b).

In the interval between the fourth and first centuries B.C. the theories of the virtues of style, of the types of style, of tropes, and of figures were all greatly developed. The first two theories may be attributed to Theophrastus. The Stoics seem to have played a leading part in the development of the latter two. The distinctions which they applied to the various propositions of dialectic were taken over by the grammarians (many of whom were also Stoics) and used in cataloguing the devices of the poets. From the grammarians they were borrowed by the rhetoricians and grafted on to the teachings of Aristotle, Isocrates, and Theophrastus concerning metaphors and figures. The rhetoricians also utilized the grammarians' work on the purity of diction and adopted the terms "barbarism" and "solecism," the former referring to the misuse of a single word, the latter to the misuse of words in composition. The most likely center for the union of grammar and rhetoric is the island of Rhodes, where an active rhetorical school sprang up in the second century. The schools at Pergamum and Alexandria contribute only indirectly, while the philosophical schools at Athens, although in the third century they helped to make rhetoric a permanent part of ancient education, turned against the rhetoricians about the middle of the second century and renewed the quarrel which Plato had begun. The second century also witnessed the first influence of Greek rhetoric on Latin literature.

The traditional theory of style as seen in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and in the rhetorical works of Cicero is then examined. In each case it is shown that the purpose of the work and the audience to which it was addressed has heavily influenced the form of the rhetorical tradition which is set forth. The *De oratore* represents the pure Theophrastan tradition and is thus based on the traditional virtues of style. The *Partitiones oratoriae* was written in 46 B.C. and is designed to introduce Cicero's son to the form of rhetoric being taught in the philosophical schools at Athens. It shows strong Stoic influence. The *Orator* was designed to convert Brutus from his Atticist tendencies; it thus omits discussion of the virtues of style

about which there was no disagreement and concentrates instead on the question of which style had the most virtue.

The discussion of the Augustan age centers around an examination of two controversies: that involving Atticism and that between the Theodorean and Apollodoreans. It is questioned whether Caecilius of Calacte, the leading rhetorician of the time, was an Apollodorean in any real sense of the word. By no means should we believe that his lost work *On The Sublime* set forth Apollodorean views on that subject. The anonymous author of the extant treatise of that name shows some sympathy with the Theodoreans, but his major objection to Caecilius is the latter's use of a philosophical rather than an educational approach to the problem. This he improves by describing the process rather than the nature of good writing.

There follows an examination of the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, of the *De elocutione*, and of the *De figuris* of Rutilius Lupus. Horace's *Ars poetica* is shown to be dependent on the rhetorical theory of style, being devoted to the traditional virtue of appropriateness, both in subject matter and in form. Horace's discussion follows the traditional order of rhetorical topics.

In the final section of the Prolegomena the rhetorical writers of the early empire are examined. The view that Quintilian is heavily dependent on Celsus is attacked. Our knowledge of Celsus' rhetorical writings is solely dependent on Quintilian, who shows every sign of being in complete disagreement with him. Neither Julius Severianus nor Isidore may be properly used in the reconstruction of Celsus. The discussions of style in Seneca the philosopher are used to show the state of the traditional topics in the early empire. There was complete agreement in theory and none in practice. What was needed most was a standard of excellence, and Quintilian's great contribution was his canonization of Cicero as the touchstone of style. Quintilian is most heavily dependent on Cicero and the Augustan rhetoricians and probably made no direct use of earlier authors.

*Commentary.* The Commentary is based on the Teubner text of Ludwig Radermacher (vol. 2, Leipzig, 1935). A few emendations are, however, suggested. In 8.3.26 read: "'Aerumna' quid opus est, tamquam parum si <dolor> dicatur? 'queo' horridum, 'reor' tolerabile, 'autumno' tragicum, 'prosapia' insulsum." The "prolem dicendi versu etc." of the MSS is a result of the marginal comment "(Cicero) De Universo:prosapiam" referring to *Timaean* 11. To this was then added "Problem dicendum est." M has inserted the second comment into the text, while A, G, and S have inserted both.

In 8.3.33 read: "Quorum dura quidem admodum videntur utraque 'ens' et 'essentia,'" comparing 8.3.32: "Quae dura quidem . . ."

8.3.61 may be corrected by comparison with 8.3.86. Read: "Eius primi sunt gradus in eo quod velis exprimi (1) clare atque (2) evidenter ostendendo, tertius, qui haec nitidiora faciat, quod proprie dixeris cultum." The first two are taken up in sections 61 to 86, in the last section of which it is remarked that they are not enough and the third topic is then introduced.

In addition to textual matters the Commentary includes extensive linguistic, grammatical, rhetorical, biographical, and literary notes.

NATHAN ABRAHAM GREENBERG — *The Poetic Theory  
of Philodemus*<sup>1</sup>

THIS dissertation deals with the poetic theory of Philodemus of Gadara insofar as it is revealed in his *Poetics* (περὶ ποιημάτων), a work which is partially preserved in the Herculanean Papyri. Aside from the Naples and Oxford copies of all the papyri, no text or treatment of the entire preserved *Poetics* has ever been published.

As is the case with many other works of Philodemus, the preserved portion of the *Poetics* consists mainly of a presentation of opponents' theories and Philodemus' criticism of them. Consequently, it is difficult to gain an exact account of Philodemus' own critical position. However, by a careful consideration of the opponents' views and Philodemus' polemic, it is possible to form some notion of a positive critical theory. Aside from studies of textual problems, previous investigation has either emphasized the theories of Philodemus' opponents or has failed to consider the entire work. Indeed, only one portion of the *Poetics* may be said to have received adequate comment. This is the section which deals with the views of Neoptolemus of Parium and which is of importance to students of the *Ars poetica* of Horace. It is only by an analysis of the entire work that one may gain a clearer perspective of the critical position of Philodemus.

The primary concern of this dissertation is not the establishment of an exact text but, rather, the investigation of the content of the work. Hence, the method pursued is to present most of the texts of

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the *Poetics* in translation or summary. Many fragments have been omitted because, in their present state of preservation, the connection of thought cannot be discerned. The commentary is designed to clarify the theories of opponents and the bases of Philodemus' attack.

The general order of treatment is based upon two considerations.

First, Wilhelm Croenert divided all the papyri of the *Poetics* into three groups on the basis of their scripts as follows: Hands *alpha*, *beta*, *gamma*. This division seems confirmed by the content of each group, and it is adopted here.

Second, although there is reason to suppose that the original order of these divisions was *beta*, *gamma*, *alpha*, they are treated here in the order *alpha*, *gamma*, *beta*, because of their respective states of preservation. Since the papyri of hand *alpha* are definitely attested, are best preserved, and have received the most attention from modern scholarship, they are of prime importance in determining the critical position of Philodemus. With the knowledge gained from the investigation of these papyri, it is possible to proceed with considerable assurance to the analysis of the less well preserved portions. Since the original order is largely preserved in hand *gamma*, it is treated before hand *beta*, which consists of disconnected fragments. An attempt is made here to arrange the fragments of hand *beta* according to the procession of topics in hand *gamma*. This attempt is based upon the similarity and, in some cases, upon the identity of subjects treated in both hand *gamma* and hand *beta*.

In view of the fragmentary state of the work, few certain conclusions may be drawn concerning the structure and organization of the *Poetics*. While it is generally assumed that the papyri in hand *alpha* and hand *beta* constitute part of a single work, the status of hand *gamma* is subject to dispute. There is some possibility that the fragments in hand *gamma* are from a later work than the *Poetics*. However, this paper advances the hypothesis that all the preserved fragments are part of a single work which consisted of at least five books. None of Book I is preserved, but it is possible that a portion of it is summarized in hand *gamma*. Book II probably contained the fragments of hand *beta*. There is no reference to Book III, but the hypothesis is advanced here that it contained the fragments of hand *gamma*. Books IV and V are certainly preserved to some extent in the papyri of hand *alpha*.

The inspection of the entire work indicates that a major part of the *Poetics* was devoted to an attack upon those critics who held that



the judgment of poetry was to be assigned not to the intellect but to the trained perception. Philodemus stated positively that only the intellect can exercise judgment of any sort. Further, he claimed that the peculiar effect of poetry is brought about by content which is artfully expressed. Hence, Philodemus was opposed to any judgment of poetry based upon euphonic elements alone.

Although Philodemus recognized a division of form and content in the consideration of poetry, he insisted that the essence of good poetry was the proper interrelation of form and content, and that neither can be properly considered without reference to the other. This position stems directly from Philodemus' opinion that the function of language is the conveyance of meaning, and that the intellect, as sole judge, will consider all aspects of poetic creation.

In addition to these positive and dogmatic statements, there is an empirical side of Philodemus' theory which he applied in a negative manner. This aspect is embodied in his concept of *ennoia* which is, in effect, the a priori acceptance of certain poetry as good. From an inspection of this body of poetry, Philodemus was able to assert that no restrictions may be placed upon the poet's selection of content. On this basis, Philodemus attacked those theorists who demanded originality of content in the poem, or who required that the content of poetry be educational or morally good. However, it was in accordance with his theoretical position that Philodemus demanded that all poetry should be generally comprehensible, that is, that all poetry should convey meaning.

HARALD ANTON THRAP REICHE — *A History of the Concepts*

Θεοπρεπές and ἱεροπρεπές<sup>1</sup>

**I**NDEBTED for its topic to Professor Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 214, n. 56), this thesis traces the theological category "appropriate to the notion and/or majesty of Godhead and/or the holy" from Xenophanes B26 through Gregory of Nyssa. For the period after Clement of Alexandria, when a systematic Christian theology finally succeeded in formulating the monotheistic character of its triune God, the fullness and repetitiousness of source material

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made necessary a selective treatment of Origen, the Neo-Platonic opposition, and the Latin Cappadocian fathers. Methodologically, this study builds on as broad a factual basis as could be laid with the aid of standard editions and, wherever possible, of special lexica. Throughout, textual and contextual parallelisms were examined for clues as to common sources. The aims of the study were two. Philologically, it sought to document the programmatic continuity of Xenophanes' criterion for the entire post-Xenophanic era, both Greek and Christian. In so doing, it sought to illustrate the more than purely formal continuity of Christian dogma with Greek philosophy.

In reverting from an older liturgical term connected with local cult, to the objective, quasivisual root meaning of its components (wherein *πρέπει* = *ἔοικε*), Xenophanes obtains four distinct though not separate meanings of our concept: (1) relative to our notion of Godhead, a new nonanthropomorphic, nonlocal, cosmomorphic meaning; (2) the old technical, liturgical meaning, although expanded by the additional dimension (3) of thought, word, and civic conduct (see Appendix); and (4) the negative, polemical meaning used to dissociate the purified notion of Godhead from traditional anthropomorphism. Theagenes and Metrodorus explicitly attach their allegorizing method to meaning (4). The *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* ideal of the Xenophantic Socrates, Antisthenes, Plato, and Aristotle's *Protrepticus* attaches its call to self-sufficiency to meanings (2) and (3). The later Plato's astrocosmic theology, classically Aristotle's *De philosophia*, attaches to all four meanings at once. The three *τύποι περὶ θεολογίας* of *Rep.* 2.380 c ff. link meanings (1) and (4), while the triad, unholy, unprofitable, and logically self-contradictory, becomes the definitive subdivision of meaning (4). When Aristotle terms contemplation "worthy of Godhead [*sc.* in us]" (meaning contemplation of the Forms in *Protrepticus* and of the cosmos in *De phil.*, where the images originate of the cosmos as a mysteries temple "worthy of Godhead" and of knowledge as an initiation), he explicitly assimilates the liturgical meaning to meanings (1), (3), and (4). The Xenophantic criterion continues, among his successors, to dominate the debate between the "theoretical" and the "practical" factions; it informs Hecataeus of Abdera's account of Hebrew religion, and Homeric scholarship at Alexandria. Committed by its physico-theology to an inadequate notion of hypothesis and creativity, the Old Stoa was compelled to postulate a triple theology and to pursue the allegorical method of interpreting the poetic genus. Cleanthes' four proofs are shown to support one of

these three branches of the Stoic theology, the "natural" branch. If Zeno's physico-theology entailed grave ambiguities for meaning (1), Cleanthes' insertion of *τῇ φύσει* into the Zenonic telos formula extended these ambiguities to the deity's fellow cosmopolite, man, or meaning (3). Yet it was Cleanthes who supplied the classic formula for the structure of God-knowledge, a formula given final form in Chrysippus' decisive *ἡ θεοπρέπεια ἕξις ἐστὶ τὸ πρέπον τῷ θεῷ σφύζουσα*.

Inscriptional and other evidence increases from the middle of the second century B.C. onward; as was to be expected, it mostly documents the old liturgical meaning (2). By this time Stoa, Garden, Academy, and Peripatos have achieved a remarkable measure of unanimity as regards the negative meaning (4). Though varying in content from school to school, the positive meaning (1) is the criterion jointly invoked by Epicureans, Skeptics, and Middle Stoics in their debate on myth, theodicy, and divination. It is preserved in Cicero, while, following Chrysippus, Seneca and Late Stoic diatribe conflate it with the *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* topos. A survey of the poetic passages labeled "inappropriate to deity" by philologists from Zoilus and Aristotle through the Alexandrians and their successors, Pseudo-Heraclitus and Porphyry, and the various *λύσεις* of this *ἐπιτίμημα διὰ τὸ ἀπρεπές* supplies an important locus of our theme. Likewise, in Dio's *Olympikos* the problem of the proper medium of symbolizing rather than representing godhead proves to be informed by our category. *περὶ κόσμον* and the *Hermetica* are studied as examples of how the dogmatic eclecticism of the first century of our era resolves in Xenophanic terms the conflicting claims of ubiquitous omnipotence and majestic isolation of Godhead. Philo's *θεοπρεπές* and his notion of the positively unknowable (as against the merely unknown) God is studied as a version of Hellenistic Logos theology fundamental for Johannine Logos Christology as well as for the allegorizing defense of Old Testament improprieties (Tertullian, Origen). Plutarch is cited as exponent of Middle Platonism's convergence with some of the aforementioned definitions of what befits Godhead.

Among the earliest Christians, Paul and John are shown to be keenly aware of the challenge which the doctrine of the Incarnation poses for all traditional definitions of what befits Godhead, both Greek and Hebrew. Ignatius connects Chrysippus' definition with the call to martyrdom, while Tertullian, adapting Plato's *Timaeus*, insists against Marcion that the Old Testament Creator-God and the world that He created are not unworthy of Godhead. As for the Christological issue, Xenophanes' category is invoked in the attempt

to define God's relation to the Logos Son (namely, as nonnaturalistic *προβολή*) as well as the relation of the Logos Son to *Christus Patiens*. Quantitatively, the relation of God to the single Logos Son is formulated in opposition not only to the multitude of Gnostic Aeons, but in adaptation of Epicurean anti-Stoic polemic, also to the multitude of popular deities which Gnostic syncretism had simply assimilated to these aeonic emanations. Arguing from their manifest unworthiness of true Godhead, the Church degrades these gods from divine to demonic status, coupling its critique, in the case of the second-century Greek Apologists, with the specification *via negativa*, of God's attributes. Athenagoras, in addition, makes our criterion the mainstay of his argument for the resurrection of the flesh. On the *homoiousian* and subordinationist terms of ante-Nicene Christology, attempts such as Irenaeus' to secure the reality of Christ's vicarious atonement without violating God's immutable dignity, and converse attempts such as those of Tertullian and Hippolytus were doomed to lapse into either the Monarchian or the Docetic heresies, respectively.

The latter besets Clement of Alexandria despite his uncompromising attack upon pagan polytheism in the name of Xenophanes' criterion; it likewise afflicts Origen despite his systematic reinterpretation of all Scripture so as to exclude everything unworthy of the notion of Godhead. Similarly, the Latin Fathers hinge their massive attack on pagan mythology upon the selfsame criterion, deriving it as they do directly from Cicero and the second-century Greek Apologists. It occupies a central place, moreover, in the Neo-Platonic opposition to Christianity. Nicaea's homoiousian coordinationism succeeds in resolving the heretical antinomies described. Fulfilling the Xenophanic-Chrysippian stipulation, it saves the dignity, immutability, and oneness of Godhead even in Christ's Passion. Gregory of Nyssa's *Oratio catechetica* profusely documents the way in which the non-Augustinian branch of post-Nicene orthodoxy employs the Xenophanic category to reconcile the full dignity of triune Godhead with the full and traditionally Hellenic dignity of man's *humanitas*. The dissertation concludes with a brief survey of later usage attesting to the continuing importance of the criterion here studied.



WESLEY DALE SMITH — *Dramatic Structure and Technique  
in Euripides' Suppliants*<sup>1</sup>

**E**URIPIDES' *Suppliants* has been studied as a source for Euripides' personal outlook or as his attempt to influence his audience politically, and only secondarily as a drama. As its title indicates, this thesis presents an examination of the play as an example of dramatic art, on the grounds that such study not only is valuable in itself, but also serves as a necessary corrective for approaches of a biographical or historical nature.

Chapter I is an account of previous criticism of the play, as an exposition of the problem that the thesis sets for itself. Approaches the purpose of which was to discover the poet's views about subjects suggested by the play have set a pattern for its criticism. This pattern involves taking Theseus as the equivalent of Euripides and the first half of the play as the drama, the second half as mainly irrelevant. Norwood is treated as the last of a series who have so approached the play, with minor variations. The essays of Greenwood and Kitto are considered as partial refutations of that view, and as indications of what may be said about the play. The present study starts not from their essays, but from the form of the play.

Chapter II discusses plot structure in Sophocles and Euripides in so far as it deviates from Aristotle's ideal type, and argues that judgments about relevance are closely related to conceptions of structure. Plot structure in the *Suppliants* is then considered: its general similarity to the type designated "diptych" by T. B. L. Webster, and the similarity of the play's second part to the "series of tableaux" recognized by Decharme as the plot of the *Troades*. Structural duality involves duality of emphasis. The relevance of individual scenes is then discussed with regard to the structure described.

Chapter III examines the play by scenes, to determine the effects achieved by each and the technique by which the effects are achieved.

There are three appendices: the first argues that lines 180-183 are an interpolation; the various defenses of the passage are examined with regard to their implications for the scene and the play as a

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology, 1955.

whole, and are rejected. The second appendix analyzes Theseus' speech, 195-249, and defends it as a piece of dramatic writing; various proposals to make the speech shorter and more logical are examined and rejected. Only 238-245 can be isolated from the rest as a possible actor's interpolation, but it is not inappropriate where it stands. The third appendix considers various problems of staging the play.

Some of the conclusions about form and technique in the play follow.

The play is in two parts, different in tone and in structure. The first part primarily concerns the reactions of Aithra and Theseus to the suppliant mothers and Adrastus, and to the Thebans' refusal to allow burial. The second part presents the funeral of the Seven which the first part has made possible. Its structure is that of the funeral ritual, along with which are presented the emotions and attitudes of the mourners, relatives, and friend of the Seven. Dramatic effects are achieved by juxtaposition of the two parts, the first dominated by the confident self-sufficiency of Theseus, the second characterized by the despair and futility of the Argives.

Throughout the play and within each part subjects and characters are treated first from one point of view, then from another. The treatments are simply juxtaposed and allowed to comment on one another. "Contemporary references" in ideas and vocabulary seem to function dramatically in much the manner in which imagery functions. Reflections of fifth-century attitudes and topics of discussion are used as a conveniently short method of enlarging the dramatic context by suggesting to the audience certain of a character's motives or certain qualities in a situation which could only be established otherwise by lengthy exposition.

Throughout the play the audience is virtually forced to give a double response: sympathy for the characters but criticism of their views. The audience is kept from associating itself fully with any of the characters by various means, including the use of satire at crucial points, the juxtapositions mentioned above, and the form itself, in that the emphasis shifts from one set of characters to another in the middle of the play.

The thesis does not concern itself with interpretations of the play as political propaganda or as an indication of Euripides' opinions on particular subjects, except in so far as such studies have distracted from consideration of the play as drama. Treating Theseus as a dramatic character, not a vehicle for the poet's views, makes his

statements intelligible and interesting, and makes it unnecessary to attribute Theseus' optimism to Euripides and then explain it away. Similarly, the funeral speech as related to the play's structure and technique is shown to be an effective piece of dramatic writing.

Consideration of the play as drama reveals that the matter and presentation are complex, and the play is not a simple recommendation of any single view or course of action, rather an examination of the manner in which the play's characters act, and of both reason and emotion as sources of their actions. The play itself is more interesting than the view it expresses, even if that view could be separated from it without falsification.

MIRKO USMIANI — *Marcus Marulus, Life and Works*<sup>1</sup>

MARCUS MARULUS (1450-1524) is honored by his Croatian nationals as the "Father of Croatian literature," his Croatian epic "Judita" being the first large, artistic and dated poem by a known Croatian author. The date of its composition (1501) is regarded as the official birthdate of Croatian literature. Marulus, however, is mainly a Latin author of prose and poetry. His Latin prose works particularly were very popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when his first Latin work, *De institutione bene vivendi* alone saw some forty editions, including translations into several European languages. When the national literatures drove Latin out of use, the Latin works of Marulus were neglected in favor of his Croatian works. This fact resulted in contradictory and incomplete appraisals of the literary work of Marulus. His life story also was known only partially from a one-sided biography written by his friend Franciscus Natalis. This biography can now be complemented with the latest discoveries (1950) concerning his early career.

The dual purpose of this dissertation, then, is to study the biography of Marulus in view of the new discoveries, and to examine his Latin works in an attempt to present a more exact evaluation of his literary personality.

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Mediaeval Latin, 1955.

An examination of the two main sources for the biography of Marulus, the biography of Natalis and the documents recently discovered by Fiskovic in the archives of Split, shows that they do not stand in contradiction to each other, as it would appear on first sight, but rather present a complementary picture of Marulus. The old biography of Natalis describes Marulus' later years and literary activities, while the archival documents show his public career and the private life of his earlier days. From these documents the life story of Marulus may be summarized as follows:

Marcus Marulus was born in 1450 in Split (Spalato), Dalmatia, Yugoslavia, from a noble family, who had originally come from Greece (Marulos, de Marulis) and settled in Split in the thirteenth century. He was educated in the public schools of Split by Italian teachers, the most prominent of which was Tideo Acciarini, a humanist writer and poet himself. The influence of Acciarini upon Marulus is unmistakable—especially of his moralistic work *De animorum medicamentis*. We have sufficient reasons to assert that Marulus completed his education in Split, contrary to the generally accepted assumption that he graduated from the University of Padua. There is no evidence to show that he ever was in Padua, for educational or any other purposes. In the schools of Split, with their traditional medieval curriculum of trivium and quadrivium, Marulus acquired an excellent knowledge of the Latin language and literature, and distinguished himself at an early age in Latin oratory and the composition of poetry. His knowledge of Greek remained rather elementary.

After completing his education, Marulus assisted his father Nicholas in the administration of their family estate, which was considerable for Split circumstances. After his father's death (ca. 1476) Marulus embarked upon a brilliant, if brief, career in the administration of his home town, which at the time was an autonomous commune under Venetian rule. He reached the highest point of his career in 1479, when for the first time he was elected by the City Council to the position of *iudex honorabilis*, the highest office in the city after that of the count, who was always a Venetian nobleman. At the same time, Marulus was involved in some long and painful lawsuits resulting from some improper dealings of his late father and family disputes over his will.

Around the year 1482 Marulus retired from public life to spend the rest of his days in the seclusion of his own home, studying and writing his books. He was never married, but functioned as the head



of his family of six brothers and one sister, Bira, a nun. The assertion that he later traveled in Italy to collect Latin inscriptions is unfounded.

His life of retirement may be divided into two distinct periods. The first period (ca. 1482-1501) is the period of study, when he copied manuscripts and collected material for his later works. With the year 1501 begins the productive period of his life. His first work is the Croatian epic poem "Judita" in six books, which established his prominent position in the history of Croatian literature. The *Judita* also represents his highest achievement in Croatian poetry. After *Judita*, he composed a shorter epic poem in Croatian, the "Historija od Susane" (the story of Susanna), at an unknown date. The rest of his Croatian poetry is on a rather primitive level and shows all the marks of a beginner: it should be placed before 1501.

In 1504 at the latest, Marulus composed his first Latin work, the *De institutione bene vivendi per exempla sanctorum*, first published in Venice, 1506. After that, his other works appeared in slow succession.

Between the years 1506 and 1510, Marulus retired to a small "eremitorium" on the island of Solta, which belonged to the territory of his home town. He had to leave it because of the attacks of Turkish pirates. The rest of his life until his death in 1524 he spent in Split.

The works of Marulus have baffled his literary critics to the extent that we find two distinctly opposing views about the nature of his works. The older view sees Marulus as a learned philosopher; some scholars even go so far as to claim that his works were used as textbooks in Jesuit schools. The more recent view presents Marulus as a popular writer with mystical tendencies, strongly opposed to philosophy. This dissertation attempts to show that neither of these views is quite correct. Marulus is presented here as an ascetical writer, belonging to that class of Christian writers who teach the ways of Christian *ascesis* on an elementary level. Marulus' only concern in his works is to show how to acquire the Christian virtues and avoid vice in order to come closer to God. This didactic element forms the basis for all his works.

Marulus took the inspiration for most of his writings from the Scriptures, which for him are the principal source of all knowledge and the ultimate criterion of all truth.

His works can be divided into four classes according to subject matter:

- (1) Ascetical works
- (2) Biblical narratives
- (3) Philosophy
- (4) History

Of his eight ascetical works, two are lost. Three of the works of this group may be considered a kind of methodological trilogy as follows:

*De institutione bene vivendi per exempla sanctorum Lib. VI*  
(composed ca. 1504, 1st ed. Venice, 1506)

*Quinquaginta parabola*e (composed 1510, 1st ed. Venice, 1517)

*Evangelistarium Lib. VII* (1st ed. Venice, 1516)

These three works treat the problems of Christian perfection on three different levels and are each aimed at a different public. The *De institutione* is written primarily for the clergy. In this work, quotations and examples from the Scriptures and the lives of the saints are assembled methodically to show the virtues necessary for the religious life, from the most elemental ones to the higher theological virtues. The book ends with a discussion of Judgment Day and life everlasting. In the composition of this work, Marulus follows Valerius Maximus (*Factorum et dictorum memorabilium Libri novem*), using, however, only Christian material.

The *Quinquaginta parabola*e are written for the lower levels of the religious orders, the lay brothers and nuns. His fifty parables are mainly inspired by the parables and similes of the Gospels; to each, he added a long meditation on the virtues and vices, following the pattern of *De institutione*. A few of the parables are adapted from ancient literature (Pliny and mythology); several of the most interesting ones are based on observations of everyday life in his home town.

The *Evangelistarium* is written for the general public, clergy and laymen alike, and treats practically all the virtues and vices in the personal life of a Christian. This is his principal prose work, and most revealing of the character and ideas of the author. From it we can see that Marulus follows the philosophy of the late Stoa in the main lines, and that he is particularly under the influence of Seneca. However, in this as in other works, he condemns the study of ancient poetry and ancient philosophy as a useless pursuit, which does not prevent him from using both ancient philosophy and ancient poetry in almost all of his works, poetry for illustration, and philosophy occasionally to corroborate his defense of the Christian truth.

Of the other works of this group, *De laudibus Herculis* is of par-

ticular interest. In this work, a poet and a theologian discuss the value of the myth of Hercules. Marulus applies his technique of allegorical interpretation, previously used on the Bible stories, to the story of the labors of Hercules. Judging Hercules' achievements from the standpoint of Christian morals, he condemns him as a criminal. The young poet, a humanist, is converted to the theologian's point of view. This work is characteristic for the attitude of Marulus towards the humanistic movement of his time.

The three biblical narratives of Marulus are epic poems: the "Davidias" in Latin, and the "Judita" and "The Story of Susanna" in Croatian. The "Davidias Lib. XIV" is the most interesting work of Marulus. With this epic, he attempted to create a Christian *Aeneid*, an ambition common to many humanists at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Marulus was the first humanist to compose such a poem, and the only one who chose an Old Testament hero. Other humanists after him, such as Sannazaro and Jerolamo Vida, used the Gospels as their source. Marulus took the story of David as it stands in the Bible, making only very minor changes. In the poetical form and composition of the poem he follows Vergil. David is represented as a symbol of Christ, as well as his ancestor; he foretells his future greatness in prophecies and psalms. This is similar to the way Aeneas is represented as the founder of the greatness of Rome.

The only philosophical work of Marulus, *Psychologia de ratione animae humanae* is lost and nothing is known about it.

Among his historical works, the *In epigrammata priscorum commentarius* in two parts, is of special interest. The first part contains seventy-four Latin inscriptions with a commentary. These inscriptions are derived from written syllogae: thirty-six inscriptions come from Rome, the others from various places. The second, and more important part of the work, contains twenty-seven Roman inscriptions which Marulus' friend Dominicus Papalis had assembled in his small private museum from the ruins of Salona, Dalmatia. The value of Marulus' syllogae consists in the fact that he was the only one to describe this collection of Papalis after its completion. The museum was later dispersed and most of the Roman inscriptions are now lost. In this work, Marulus is in line with those humanists who contributed their share for the preservation of the values of antiquity.

Marulus also took part in the political struggle which resulted from the Turkish invasions of Europe, from which he suffered

personally. He wrote an open letter for assistance to pope Adrian VI (*Epistola Domini Marci Maruli Spalatensis ad Adrianum VI Pont. Max. de calamitatibus occurrentibus ex exhortatio ad communem omnium Christianorum unionem et pacem*), published in Rome in 1522. In this letter, he asks the pope to organize the Western nations against the Turks, who threatened the very survival of the Christian religion. He pleaded that peaceful coexistence between Christians and Turks was impossible. His plea for help for the Croats engaged in the heaviest battle remained without effect, but his letter was used as an eloquent propaganda leaflet in the political struggles of his age.

MALCOLM VINCENT TIMOTHY WALLACE — *The Epic Technique of Silius Italicus*<sup>1</sup>

ONE definition of classicism embraces the concept of dependence upon a great, or classical model. It can be included from the investigation of Silius' epic technique that the author of the *Punica* composed a poetic version of a portion of Livy's classical history (Books XXI-XXX) which he arranged in classical form, employing Virgil as his principal model. His organization of material, subject as it was to Aristotle's laws of poetic composition, was peculiarly his own.

The mise-en-scène of the *Punica* is the Second Punic War. The theme of the poem, as expressed in the prooemium, is "the arms by which the renown of the Romans raised itself to heaven." Thus the poem concerns more than mere warfare; it is the glory of Rome, early endangered but ultimately triumphant, which the poet desired to exalt in his verses.

A comparison of the portion of the *Punica* which describes the battle of Cannae with the account of Livy clearly demonstrates the poet's employment of his sources. In broad outline, Silius followed Livy. Within this general area of agreement, however, variations of many types are to be found. Between the two extremes of marked dependence and absolute independence may be noted instances in which the poet has transferred incidents from one context to another, passages involving wholesale adaptation of his source material, and poetic descriptions of events which did not take place.

<sup>1</sup> Degree in Classical Philology, 1955.



The poet did not use Livy exclusively as his source. There are grounds for belief that Silius also borrowed material from Ennius and Sallust. There are also in the poem vestiges of a source which shows resemblances to Polybius, Appian, Dio Cassius, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch. In geography, the poet was apparently indebted to Timaeus, Justin, Philistus, Cato, Gnaeus Gellius, Varro, and Posidonius.

In all cases, the freedom with which Silius selected his material and proceeded to adapt it — and at times to depart from it — gives one key to his epic technique. It was the poet's practice to fashion, as it were, a mosaic in verse. This was composed of extracts of events, legends and information which he had adapted from his sources. In any consideration of Silius' relationship to Livy, *imitatio* looms large.

In the composition of epic Latin verse, Silius chose Virgil as his principal model. Despite the many resemblances between the *Punica* and the *Aeneid*, differences between the poems are also evident. In the Invocations to the Muse changes in emphasis may be noted; the Catalogues of forces contain both identical and variant information; the shield of Hannibal, the *Nekyia*, the funeral games, battle scenes, and certain aspects of divine intervention were modeled in Silius upon the general plan of their Virgilian counterparts. Nevertheless, specific differences in Silius' treatment of each epic device may clearly be ascertained. Analysis of the structure of the *Punica* likewise demonstrates that Silius followed Virgil in writing his poem according to a set architectural pattern; yet even here there are differences.

In addition to Virgil, the epic poems of Homer, Lucan, and Apollonius Rhodius served as models for Silius. Occasional resemblances to Statius have also been detected. There are no grounds for believing that Silius imitated Valerius Flaccus or Petronius.

As was the case with Livy, Silius' models, Virgil principally, offered the poet many opportunities for *imitatio*. It is clear from the poem, taken as a whole, that this imitation was deliberate. Silius introduced innovations into his verses because he was a true poet, and because he desired to escape the charge of plagiarism.

To sum up, both Silius' sources (especially Livy) and his models (particularly Virgil) offered him considerable material for the content and form of his epic poem. The poet employed *imitatio* and *innovatio* in his treatment of this body of material.

The originality of Silius must next be considered. The poet selected the historical period of the Second Punic War for the setting of his epic poem. This is in itself a departure from Virgil and a mark of

the influence of Ennius and possibly of Lucan. In order to unify the poem, Silius sought one central character. This is, of course, Hannibal, who may be considered to be the unifying force demanded by the canons of epic poetry. The hero of the poem is Hannibal's antithesis, the glory of Rome, ultimately personified in Scipio Africanus.

After he had selected his *mise-en-scène*, the poet turned to simplification and to unification as his tools of composition. He simplified masses of historical material by reducing them to their essential components, omitting all unnecessary activity. He unified, or attempted to unify, events in many theatres of war by stressing the activities of one character, Scipio Africanus, particularly after Cannae.

In addition to imitation, innovation, simplification and unification of material, Silius employed characteristic devices of oratory to embellish his poem. In the speeches may be noted clear indications of Silius' oratorical training.

Silius' use of the *excursus* is another mark of his dependence upon Virgil, Homer, and Apollonius. Yet he himself must bear the responsibility for the frequent interruption of his narrative by these geographical, historical, personal, and mythological asides. Although he often chose to insert these digressions at places in the poem where a climax had either just been reached or events leading to a climax were about to unfold, it must be admitted that the length of many of the *excursus*es serves to emphasize the interruption of the main action.

It is possible to arrive at certain conclusions concerning Silius' own opinions from selected passages in the poem. Although, from his own statement, he strove to be impartial, his theme demanded that he emphasize the glory of Rome. He did this by recalling famous examples of the past. He further criticized evils present in his own day. His words show that he was a Stoic, a patrician, and perhaps a skeptic.

Similes, metaphors, and other figures of speech are effectively used in the poem. Generally, Silius' style is lucid and adorned with the standard appurtenances of epic poetry. Yet it is not characteristic of the times in which he wrote. He is markedly different from Lucan and Statius. In his simplicity and good taste he is an anachronism, closer to Virgil than to his contemporaries. He wisely discarded the traditional heroic epithet, and substituted descriptions and sketches of his historical characters.

It may therefore be concluded that the epic technique of Silius


Italicus was composed of many elements. From his historical sources he drew material for his poem. Upon his models in epic composition he based his methods of presentation and his employment of standard epic devices. He imitated, he made innovations, he simplified, he unified, he made his own contributions, all in varying degrees in different portions of the poem.

Thus the *Punica* stands as a mosaic in verse. It is not a literary production of surpassing renown. It has many shortcomings, due largely to the poet's lack of a sense of dramatic economy. The poem is nonetheless worthy of consideration because it is a conscious anachronism, an attempt to turn back to the golden age of Latin literature and Roman history. It stands midway between the epic of Virgil and the *centos* of later ages.





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